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The Honorable Patrick Leahy  
Chair 
Subcommittee on Intellectual Property 
United States Senate 
437 Russell Senate Building  
Washington, D.C. 20510 
 
The Honorable Thom Tillis 
Ranking Member 
Subcommittee on Intellectual Property 
United States Senate  
113 Dirksen Senate Office Building 
Washington, D.C. 20510 
 
August 31, 2021 
 
Dear Chairman Leahy and Ranking Member Tillis: 
 
On behalf of the United States Copyright Office, I am pleased to deliver a copy of 
a report entitled Copyright and State Sovereign Immunity, which is available to the 
public on the Office’s website.   
 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Allen v. Cooper, you requested that the 
Copyright Office undertake a study to determine whether, consistent with the 
Court’s analysis, Congress could legislatively abrogate state sovereign immunity 
to suits in federal court for damages for copyright infringement.   
 
In response to your request, the Office solicited the views of interested 
stakeholders and held roundtables to amplify the record.  The Office received 
comments from many copyright owners who believed that their works had been 
infringed by state entities.  A number of state entities provided information 
about their policies on copyright, and views regarding allegations of 
infringement and the possible effect of abrogation on their operations.  The 
Office also conducted extensive research into the legal standards governing 





After carefully evaluating the information provided, the Office can report that 
the number of allegations of state infringement provided in the course of this 
study is substantially greater than the number Congress considered when it 
adopted its prior abrogation legislation, and greater than the evidence found 
insufficient in prior intellectual property cases.  Although few of the 
infringement allegations provided to the Office were adjudicated on the merits, 
the evidence indicates that state infringement represents a legitimate concern for 
copyright owners.  Given the demands of the current legal standard, however, 
and some ambiguity in its application, we cannot conclude with certainty that 
even the current more robust record would be found sufficient to meet the 
constitutional test for abrogation. 
 
The Office nevertheless continues to believe that infringement by state entities is 
an issue worthy of congressional action.  While many such entities take care to 
respect copyright, and engage in activities likely to fall under copyright 
exceptions, others may use copyrighted works for a variety of market-
substituting purposes.  There would seem to be little justification for immunizing 
these types of entities from damages if they intentionally engage in the same 
conduct for which a private party could be held liable.  Therefore, if Congress 
decides not to proceed with abrogation legislation, the Office would support 
consideration of alternative approaches to address this issue. 
 
Please do not hesitate to let me know if you have any questions regarding the 








Register of Copyrights and Director 




This report reflects the dedication and expertise of the Office of the General Counsel at 
the U.S. Copyright Office, in particular the team who served as principal authors: Acting 
General Counsel and Associate Register of Copyrights Kevin Amer, Assistant General 
Counsel Jordana Rubel, Attorney-Advisors Mark Gray, Jalyce Mangum, and David 
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Without their considerable efforts in managing the complex research and writing 
needed to tackle this subject, and their keen understanding of the record, this report 
would not have been possible.   
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Shira Perlmutter 
Register of Copyrights and Director 
U.S. Copyright Office 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In March 2020, the Supreme Court held in Allen v. Cooper that Congress had exceeded its 
constitutional authority when it enacted legislation authorizing copyright infringement 
suits for damages against states.1  The Court based its decision on the legal doctrine of 
sovereign immunity, which generally precludes a federal court from hearing a suit 
against a state without the state’s consent.  The Court noted that Congress has the power 
to abrogate state immunity, including to prevent or remedy deprivations of property 
without due process in violation of the Constitution.  To do so, however, Congress 
generally must develop a legislative record demonstrating a pattern of unconstitutional 
conduct by states for which there are no adequate state remedies.  Following the 
decision, Senators Thom Tillis and Patrick Leahy requested that the Copyright Office 
study the extent to which copyright owners are experiencing infringement by state 
entities without adequate remedies under state law.  Over the past year, the Office has 
solicited public comments, held public roundtables, and conducted legal research on this 
issue.  This report presents the Office’s findings and conclusions. 
Part I of the report describes the history of this study, and Part II summarizes the 
relevant legal background.  The text of the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal suits 
against states by non-residents, and courts have interpreted the Amendment to also bar 
suits filed by residents of the state being sued.  The Supreme Court nevertheless permits 
federal suits for damages against nonconsenting states where Congress has validly 
abrogated state immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment.  In doing so, Congress 
must ensure that there is congruence and proportionality between the constitutional 
injury and the means adopted to prevent or remedy it.  Abrogation provisions that fail to 
meet this standard have been struck down by the Court.   
For most of American history, copyright law did not expressly address the liability of 
states, and courts were divided as to whether they could be subject to infringement suits 
for damages.2  In 1990, Congress amended the Copyright Act to provide that states could 
be liable for infringement to the same extent as nongovernmental entities.  In Allen, 
however, the Court struck down that legislation, holding that it failed to satisfy the 
congruence-and-proportionality standard because Congress had not identified a pattern 
of state copyright infringements that rose to the level of a constitutional violation.  To 
rise to that level, an infringement must be committed intentionally or at least recklessly; 
a negligent act does not suffice. 
Part III of this report discusses the evidence of state infringement submitted in 
connection with this study.  Copyright owners provided comments and testimony 
                                                   
1 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020). 
2 As discussed in this report, suits seeking only injunctive relief can be brought against state officials in 
federal court under the Ex parte Young doctrine. 
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alleging that states have infringed a variety of copyrighted works, including 
photographs, books, and news articles.  Two commenters provided lists totaling over 
130 copyright lawsuits filed against state entities.  A copyright advocacy group 
submitted the results of a survey in which copyright owners were asked about their 
experience with infringement by states.  Out of 657 survey respondents, 115 stated that 
their works had been used by state entities in a way that constituted copyright 
infringement, and many provided additional information identifying the relevant states 
and the frequency of the alleged infringement.  In addition, the Office received 
comments from approximately a dozen copyright owners describing specific instances 
of alleged infringement by state entities.  Commenters representing state entities 
questioned the reliability of the submitted evidence and noted that the allegations of 
infringement did not account for potential defenses such as fair use.  These commenters 
also argued that the allegations, even if true, were insufficient to establish a pattern of 
unconstitutional conduct sufficient to warrant abrogation of sovereign immunity.   
Part IV describes information provided by representatives of state entities regarding 
their policies for preventing and responding to copyright infringement. These 
commenters, mostly from educational institutions, reported that many state entities have 
adopted a variety of policies, practices, and cultural norms to minimize the risk of 
infringement by state actors.  For example, commenters noted that a number of state 
institutions have established dedicated offices to provide guidelines and educational 
resources on compliance with copyright law.   
Part V examines the extent to which copyright owners may have other legal remedies 
against infringing states if they are unable to bring suits for damages in federal courts.  
Where a state has waived immunity from tort or contract claims, copyright owners may 
seek to recover under those causes of action in state court.  The availability of such 
remedies, however, is limited by language in the Copyright Act preempting state-law 
claims involving rights that are the “equivalent” of those protected by federal copyright 
law.  Alternatively, some courts have suggested that copyright owners may be able to 
assert that state infringement amounts to a taking of property without compensation, in 
violation of the federal or state constitutions.  This theory, however, has rarely been 
tested and was recently rejected by the Texas Supreme Court.  In addition, copyright 
owners may bring suits for injunctive relief against state officers in federal court, but this 
does not provide an avenue to recover money damages.  Finally, copyright owners may 
bring suit against individual state officials in their personal capacity, but such officials 
are protected by qualified immunity and, even if found liable, may be unable to satisfy a 
damages award.   
Part VI sets out the Office’s evaluation of the submitted evidence under the Supreme 
Court’s standards for legislation abrogating state immunity.  At the outset, the Office 
notes that the record of alleged state infringements provided in the course of this study 
is substantially greater than the record before Congress when it enacted its prior 
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abrogation legislation.  Moreover, while many state institutions have taken significant 
steps to ensure respect for copyright, it seems clear that state infringements do in fact 
occur and that states’ immunity from damages leaves copyright owners with inadequate 
remedies in many such cases.  Further, the Office is aware that the existence of sovereign 
immunity itself hampers the development of a more conclusive evidentiary record, as it 
often prevents claims from being brought or assessed on the merits. 
It is unclear, however, whether the evidence gathered in this study would be found 
sufficient to abrogate state immunity under the Supreme Court’s precedents.  Although 
the Court has said little regarding the nature and volume of evidence that is needed, the 
case law indicates that the violations by states must be sufficiently numerous and 
serious to constitute a pattern of unconstitutional conduct.  While the infringement 
allegations provided to the Office are substantial in number, few have been corroborated 
or substantively analyzed by a court.  Among the litigated cases cited by commenters, 
only about half resulted in written decisions, and the majority of those were dismissed 
on sovereign immunity grounds without addressing the merits.  The Office itself cannot 
assess the validity of the examples of infringement in the submitted survey responses. 
Given that the evidence gathered here far exceeds that underlying the CRCA, Congress 
may still choose to proceed with adopting new abrogation legislation.  In light of the 
foregoing concerns, however, there is a material risk that a court could find even this 
more robust record insufficient to meet the constitutional abrogation standard.  The 
Office nevertheless continues to believe that the ability of copyright owners to obtain 
adequate relief when their rights are violated—including by state entities—is important 
to the balance of interests struck by the Copyright Act.  While many such entities take 
care to respect copyright, and engage in activities likely to fall under copyright 
exceptions, others may use copyrighted works for a variety of market-substituting 
purposes.  If Congress decides not to proceed with new abrogation legislation, the Office 
therefore would support consideration of alternative approaches to address this issue.
U.S. Copyright Office  Copyright and State Sovereign Immunity  
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I. INTRODUCTION AND STUDY HISTORY 
On March 23, 2020, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Allen v. Cooper,3 which 
struck down as unconstitutional the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act of 1990 
(“CRCA”).  The CRCA subjected states to liability for copyright infringement to the 
same extent as other parties.  The Court held that the law was an invalid exercise of 
Congress’s power to abrogate states’ sovereign immunity against suit in federal court.  
The Court reaffirmed that under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, 
Congress may abrogate states’ immunity in order to redress unconstitutional conduct.4  
But it concluded that the legislative record at the time of the CRCA’s enactment was 
insufficient to support abrogation.5  The Court noted, however, that its decision “need 
not prevent Congress from passing a valid copyright abrogation law in the future.”6  It 
observed that, in adopting the CRCA, “Congress likely did not appreciate the 
importance of linking the scope of its abrogation to the redress or prevention of 
unconstitutional injuries—and of creating a legislative record to back up that 
connection.”7  The Court thus made clear that Congress may validly abrogate sovereign 
immunity if it has a sufficient record of unconstitutional infringement by states.8   
Senators Thom Tillis and Patrick Leahy subsequently sent a letter to the Copyright 
Office noting that the Allen decision has “created a situation in which copyright owners 
are without remedy if a State infringes their copyright and claims State sovereign 
immunity,” and expressing concern about the “impact this may have on American 
creators and innovators.”9  The letter asked the Office to study the issue “to determine 
whether there is sufficient basis for federal legislation abrogating State sovereign 
immunity when States infringe copyrights.”10  In conducting its analysis, the Office was 
asked to “study the extent to which copyright owners are experiencing infringements by 
state entities without adequate remedies under state law,” and to “consider the extent to 
which such infringements appear to be based on intentional or reckless conduct.”11  The 
                                                   
3 140 S. Ct. 994. 
4 Id. at 1003. 
5 Id. at 1006–07. 
6 Id. at 1007. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Letter from Sens. Thom Tillis & Patrick Leahy to Maria Strong, Acting Register of Copyrights, U.S. 
Copyright Office at 1 (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.copyright.gov/rulemaking/state-sovereign-
immunity/letter.pdf (“Request Letter”).  The letter requesting the study is provided in Appendix A. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 2. 
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Senators asked that the Office “provide a public report summarizing the findings of this 
study, as well as the facts and analyses upon which those findings are based.”12 
On June 3, 2020, the Office issued a notice of inquiry inviting written comments and 
empirical research on (1) specific instances of infringing conduct committed by a state 
government entity, officer, or employee; (2) the extent to which state sovereign immunity 
affects the licensing or sale of copies of copyrighted works to state entities; (3) the 
remedies available for copyright owners when states infringe their works; (4) the metrics 
Congress should use to determine whether infringement by state entities is common or 
infrequent; (5) whether the prevalence of infringement by state entities has increased in 
recent years; (6) how different state entities handle claims of infringement; and (7) any 
other pertinent issues the Office should consider when conducting the study.13  On June 
24, 2020, the Office invited a second round of written comments and any additional 
empirical research.14  In response, the Office received forty-eight responsive comments 
from individuals, copyright practitioners, organizations, and state entities.15   
On November 5, 2020, the Office announced that it would conduct public roundtables 
via Zoom, addressing the following topics: (1) evidence of actual or threatened 
copyright infringement by states; (2) state policies and practices for minimizing 
copyright infringement and addressing infringement claims; and (3) alternative 
remedies under state law for copyright infringement.16  Members of the public were 
invited to submit requests to participate in sessions on each topic.  The roundtables were 
held on December 11, 2020.  Participants included copyright owners, as well as 
representatives of state universities, large and small businesses, industry organizations, 
and offices of state attorneys general.17  The roundtables included an audience 
participation session, during which members of the public were able to provide 
additional comments for the record.  The Office also provided certain individuals with 
                                                   
12 Request Letter at 1.  Senators Tillis and Leahy also requested that the Patent and Trademark Office 
complete a study on the issue of patent and trademark infringement by state entities. 
13 Sovereign Immunity Study: Notice and Request for Public Comment, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,252 (June 3, 2020) 
(“NOI”).  The Federal Register notices in this study are collected in Appendix B. 
14 Sovereign Immunity Study: Notice and Request for Public Comment, 85 Fed. Reg. 37,961 (June 24, 2020). 
15 Comments received in response to the notices of inquiry, as well as other background material on the 
Study, are available at https://www.copyright.gov/policy/state-sovereign-immunity/.  References to these 
comments are by party name (abbreviated where appropriate) followed by either “Initial Comments” or 
“Renewal Comments.”  A list of the parties who responded to the Office’s notices is provided in Appendix 
C. 
16 Sovereign Immunity Study: Announcement of Public Roundtables, 85 Fed. Reg. 70,654 (Nov. 5, 2020). 
17 Recordings of the public roundtables are available at https://www.copyright.gov/policy/state-sovereign-
immunity/recordings/, and a transcript of the public roundtables is available at 
https://www.copyright.gov/policy/state-sovereign-immunity/2020.12.11-roundtable-transcript.pdf.  A copy 
of the agenda for the roundtables is provided in Appendix D. 
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the opportunity to submit ex parte letters, due to technical difficulties during the open 
mic session or to ensure a more comprehensive record. 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Eleventh Amendment and Its Origins  
The doctrine of state sovereign immunity is rooted in the Eleventh Amendment to the 
Constitution, which states: 
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted 
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by 
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.18 
The Amendment was drafted in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Chisholm v. 
Georgia, holding that the U.S. Constitution permits a state to be sued in federal court by a 
citizen of another state.19  The text explicitly prevents states from being sued in federal 
court only by citizens of other states or of another country.20  In Hans v. Louisiana, 
however, the Supreme Court interpreted it to prevent states from being sued in federal 
court by their own citizens as well, even for claims arising under federal law.21  The 
Court’s subsequent Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence has adhered to that 
interpretation.22  
While the text of the Amendment references “any suit,” in Ex parte Young the Court held 
that suits seeking injunctive relief against state officers in their official capacity may be 
brought in federal court.23  This means that a plaintiff may obtain an injunction against a 
state official to “end a continuing violation of federal law” by a state entity even when 
the state cannot be sued directly.24  
                                                   
18 U.S. CONST., amend. XI.  
19 2 U.S. 419, 451 (1793) (the “Constitution most certainly contemplates . . . the maintaining a jurisdiction 
against a State, as Defendant”).  
20 In Cohens v. Virginia, the Supreme Court stated in dicta that a suit brought by citizens of Virginia against 
the state of Virginia was not “within the [Eleventh] Amendment,” which only prohibited suits in federal 
court against states by citizens of other states or other countries.  19 U.S. 264, 412 (1821).  
21 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890).  
22 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996); Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Alabama State 
Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184, 186 (1964); Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 51 (1944); Duhne v. New 
Jersey, 251 U.S. 311, 313–14 (1920).   
23 209 U.S. 123, 155–56 (1908).  Part V of this report discusses Ex parte Young suits in greater detail.   
24 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73 (citation omitted). 
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B. Bases for Suits against States 
The first step in evaluating the case law regarding state sovereign immunity with respect 
to copyright infringement claims is understanding the development of state sovereign 
immunity jurisprudence generally.  Since the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment, 
plaintiffs have advanced a number of legal theories in an effort to overcome state 
sovereign immunity and bring claims for damages against states in federal court.  These 
theories range from purported waivers of sovereign immunity by the state to assertions 
that Congress has abrogated states’ immunity.  This section discusses the Supreme 
Court’s analysis of these varied arguments over time. 
 Waiver of Sovereign Immunity 
A state can be sued for damages in federal court if it waives or abandons its sovereign 
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.  A state can waive its immunity through its 
constitution or legislation, or by entering into a consensual agreement with one or more 
other states under the Compact Clause of the U.S. Constitution.25  Actions by properly 
authorized state officials may also constitute waiver, including appearing in federal 
litigation, removing a case from state court to federal court, or agreeing in a contract to 
have disputes resolved in federal court.26  
In the absence of an express waiver or an action signifying waiver, plaintiffs have argued 
that states constructively waived their immunity.  In Edelman v. Jordan, the Supreme 
Court rejected the theory that a state could constructively waive its immunity simply by 
participating in a federal program.  The Court explained: 
Constructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the 
surrender of constitutional rights, and we see no place for it here.  In 
deciding whether a State has waived its constitutional protection 
under the Eleventh Amendment, we will find waiver only where stated 
“by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications 
                                                   
25 See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (stating that a state statute or constitutional 
provision that specifies the state’s intention to subject itself to suit in federal court would constitute waiver); 
Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Co., 359 U.S. 275, 789–790 (1959) (compact entered into by two states under 
the Compact Clause giving states right to be sued waived sovereign immunity). 
26 Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. System of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 624 (2002) (state’s removal of case from state 
court to federal court waives sovereign immunity); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 468-
69 (1945) (stating that state legislature or a properly authorized executive or administrative officer of the 
state could waive state immunity); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1883) (general appearance by state 
in federal litigation waives sovereign immunity). 
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from the text as (will) leave no room for any other reasonable 
construction.”27  
For some time, the Court recognized constructive waiver in a narrow set of 
circumstances in which Congress had clearly expressed an intent to create a private right 
of action against states engaged in a certain activity and a state then engaged in that 
activity.28  The Court ultimately rejected the concept of constructive waiver of sovereign 
immunity in College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense 
Board.29  The plaintiffs argued that Florida Prepaid (an agency of the state of Florida) had 
constructively waived its immunity by marketing and administering its college tuition 
prepayment program after the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act (“TRCA”) made 
clear that such activity could subject states to suit.30  A majority of the Court held that the 
doctrine of constructive waiver “stands as an anomaly in the jurisprudence of sovereign 
immunity, and indeed in the jurisprudence of constitutional law.”31  The Court 
explained: 
The whole point of requiring a “clear declaration” by the State of its 
waiver is to be certain that the State in fact consents to suit.  But there is 
little reason to assume actual consent based upon the State’s mere 
presence in a field subject to congressional regulation.  There is a 
fundamental difference between a State’s expressing unequivocally that it 
waives its immunity and Congress’s expressing unequivocally its 
intention that if the State takes certain action it shall be deemed to have 
waived that immunity.32  
Thus, under the current jurisprudence, a plaintiff who seeks to bring a suit for damages 
against a state can rely on a theory of waiver of sovereign immunity only if the state has 
expressly waived its immunity or taken an official action that signifies waiver (e.g., an 
appearance in federal litigation). 
                                                   
27 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171(1909)).  
28 See, e.g., Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama Docks Department, 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (holding that by 
operating a railroad in interstate commerce after Congress had conditioned that right upon amenability to 
suit in federal court, Alabama must have accepted the condition and consented to suit in federal court). 
29 527 U.S. 666, 680 (1999). 
30 Id. at 670–72. 
31 Id. at 679–80. 
32 Id. at 680–81 (emphasis in original).  The Court noted that Congress, in the exercise of its power under the 
Spending Clause, could continue to make waiver of sovereign immunity an express condition of eligibility 
to receive federal funding.  Id. at 686–87. 
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 Congressional Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity  
Another way a state can be sued for damages in federal court is if Congress has 
abrogated states’ sovereign immunity.  The Court has considered the circumstances 
under which Congress may abrogate states’ immunity, focusing on two potential sources 
of congressional authority: Article I of the Constitution and Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
a. Article I 
Early cases rested on the theory that Congress has the authority to abrogate states’ 
Eleventh Amendment immunity under Article I of the Constitution.  The theory was that 
“the States surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when they granted Congress the 
power to regulate commerce.”33  The Court embraced this theory in Parden, holding that 
because Congress enacted legislation that included a private right of action against state-
run railroads pursuant to its authority to regulate commerce, “it must follow that 
application of the Act to such a railroad cannot be precluded by sovereign immunity.34  
Therefore, the Court held, a state that chooses to act within “the realm of congressional 
regulation” consents to any conditions that Congress was authorized by the Constitution 
to impose, including a private right of action against the state.35   
This approach, which is reminiscent of the constructive waiver arguments that were 
ultimately rejected in Florida Prepaid, showed signs of splintering in Pennsylvania v. Union 
Gas Co.36  In an opinion by Justice Brennan, four Justices concluded that Congress may 
abrogate sovereign immunity pursuant to its authority under the Commerce Clause, 
relying on substantially the same rationale articulated in Parden.37  The plurality 
concluded that “to the extent that the States gave Congress the authority to regulate 
commerce, they also relinquished their immunity where Congress found it necessary, in 
exercising this authority, to render them liable.”38  In a separate opinion, Justice White 
agreed that Congress has the authority under Article I to abrogate states’ immunity, but 
disagreed with “much of [Justice Brennan’s] reasoning.”39  Four dissenters would have 
held that Article I is not a basis for abrogation because “state immunity from suit in 
                                                   
33 377 U.S. at 191–92.  
34 Id. at 192.   
35 Id. at 196.   
36 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
37 Id. at 19–20.  
38 Id. at 19–20. 
39 Id. at 57 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
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federal courts is a structural component of federalism, and not merely a default 
disposition that can be altered by action of Congress pursuant to its Article I powers.”40   
The Court ultimately overruled both Union Gas and Parden in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. 
Florida, in which it held that “[e]ven when the Constitution vests in Congress complete 
law making authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents 
congressional authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting States.”41  
The Court concluded that Justice Brennan’s opinion to the contrary in Union Gas 
“deviated sharply” from established federalism jurisprudence and “eviscerated” 
the Hans decision by eroding the bedrock principle that sovereign immunity is a 
limitation on the judicial authority conferred on federal courts in Article III.42  The Court 
accordingly held that “Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional 
limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction” by sovereign immunity.43  Thus, after 1996, 
the general rule has been that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity 
based on its Article I powers.   
In Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, the Court was asked to decide whether a 
proceeding initiated by a bankruptcy trustee to set aside preferential transfers by the 
debtor to state agencies was barred by sovereign immunity.44  The Court held that the 
unique history of the Bankruptcy Clause and legislation enacted shortly after ratification 
showed that the Clause “was intended not just as a grant of legislative authority to 
Congress, but also to authorize limited subordination of state sovereign immunity in the 
bankruptcy arena.”45  Specifically, the Court determined that the drafters of the 
Constitution were aware of the important role of federal courts as the country replaced 
“the patchwork of insolvency and bankruptcy laws” with a federal bankruptcy system.46  
The Court held that “those who crafted the Bankruptcy Clause would have understood 
it to give Congress the power to authorize courts to avoid preferential transfers and to 
recover the transferred property” from states that laid claim to it.47  Thus, states agreed 
in the plan of the Convention not to assert immunity in bankruptcy proceedings relating 
                                                   
40 Id. at 38 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
41 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996).  The statute at issue, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, was enacted pursuant to 
the Indian Commerce Clause of Article I, but the Court held there was “no principled distinction in favor of 
the States to be drawn between the Indian Commerce Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause,” and its 
holding was with respect to Article I generally.  Id. at 63.  
42 Id. at 64. 
43 Id. at 72–73. 
44 546 U.S. 356 (2006). 
45 Id. at 362–63. 
46 Id. at 366. 
47 Id. at 372.   
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to the turnover of such transfers.48  Legislation enacted shortly after ratification of the 
Constitution also explicitly granted federal courts the authority to issue writs of habeas 
corpus to release debtors from state prisons.49  In the particular context of the 
Bankruptcy Clause, therefore, the Court has recognized an exception to the “general rule 
that Article I cannot justify haling a State into federal court.”50   
b. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Plaintiffs also have sought to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for 
congressional abrogation of state immunity.  Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws.”51  To secure this guarantee, section 5 provides that “Congress shall have 
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”52  The 
Supreme Court has interpreted these provisions to permit Congress to abrogate 
sovereign immunity to remedy deprivations of constitutional rights by states, subject to 
two requirements. 
The first requirement, articulated in the Court’s 1985 decision in Atascadero State Hospital 
v. Scanlon,53 is that Congress must use an “unequivocal expression” of intent to abrogate 
state immunity in the statutory text.  The Court had previously required such “an 
unequivocal expression of congressional intent,”54 but had not made explicit that the 
expression must appear in the statutory text.55  In Atascadero, the statute provided that no 
person with a disability shall be “subjected to discrimination under any program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”56  The Court held that this general 
authorization to sue did not abrogate state immunity because “States are not like any 
                                                   
48 Id.  
49 Id. at 374.   
50 Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1002. 
51 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. 
52 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 5. 
53 473 U.S. 234 (1985). 
54 Pennhurst State School Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984) (“although Congress has power with 
respect to the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment 
immunity, we have required an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to overturn the 
constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States”) (quoting Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 
(1979)). 
55 See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 243 (finding requirement that Congress use “unmistakable language in the 
statute itself” “consistent with” past precedent). 
56 29 U.S.C. § 794. 
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other class of recipients of federal aid,” and Congress must “express its intention to 
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable language in the statute itself.”57   
The second requirement for abrogation under the Fourteenth Amendment is that the 
remedy must be sufficiently “congruent and proportional” to the constitutional harm 
Congress seeks to prevent.  This requirement originated with City of Boerne v. Flores,58 
where the Court considered whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) 
was a proper exercise of Congress’s power under section 5.  RFRA created a cause of 
action against state actors if a state law substantially burdened religious exercise.59  The 
Court held that Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers authorized 
only remedial or preventative measures.60  As such, there “must be a congruence and 
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted 
to that end.”61  
Applying that standard to RFRA, the Court held that the statute was “so out of 
proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as 
responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.”62  The Court 
specifically pointed to the statute’s breadth and the lack of historical evidence of state 
hostility to the exercise of religion.  RFRA applied to all laws of all agencies and 
employees of federal, state and local governments, with no geographic limitations or 
termination date or mechanism.63  This broad application was not supported by the 
record before Congress, which was devoid of any examples of state legislation enacted 
“due to animus or hostility to the burdened religious practices” that would rise to the 
level of a constitutional violation.64  As a result, the Court held that RFRA exceeded 
Congress’s powers under section 5.65 
Since City of Boerne was decided, the Court has applied the “congruence and 
proportionality” test to uphold abrogation under the Fourteenth Amendment on two 
occasions.  In Tennessee v. Lane, the Court applied the test to Title II of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act and concluded that the statutory remedy was congruent and 
                                                   
57 Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 243, 246. 
58 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
59 Id. at 515–16 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(2), which stated that law’s purpose is “to provide a claim or 
defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government”). 
60 Id. at 524–29.  
61 Id. at 519–20. 
62 Id. at 532. 
63 Id. at 533. 
64 Id. at 530–31.  
65 Id. at 536. 
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proportional to the harm being addressed:  discriminatory access to the courts.66  And in 
Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, the Court found the family leave 
provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act congruent and proportional to the goal 
of preventing gender discrimination in the workplace.67  
As in City of Boerne, the Court’s analysis in these cases focused both on the evidence 
before Congress of a pattern of constitutional violations by states and on the scope of the 
remedial scheme to address those violations.  In Lane, the Court noted that Congress 
held thirteen hearings, assembled a task force “that gathered evidence from every State 
in the Union,” and found “hundreds of examples of unequal treatment of persons with 
disabilities by States and their political subdivisions,” the overwhelming majority of 
which occurred in the administration of public programs and services.68  Based on this 
evidence, as well as a report showing that “76% of public services and programs housed 
in state-owned buildings were inaccessible to and unusable by persons with 
disabilities,” the Court found Congress had ample evidence of widespread 
unconstitutional disability discrimination by the states.69   
Similarly, in Hibbs, the record before Congress included an array of evidence showing 
widespread sex discrimination by states.  For example, nineteen states had laws limiting 
how many hours women could work, and many states offered their employees different 
durations of parental leave depending on the sex of the parent.70  Additional evidence in 
congressional reports and hearings demonstrated that “even where state laws and 
policies were not facially discriminatory, they were applied in discriminatory ways.”71  
Based on this combination of evidence, the Court found that Congress had amassed 
significant evidence of widespread sex discrimination by states.72   
In contrast, the Court has found that Congress did not have a sufficient record when it 
enacted the abrogating legislation without evidence of pervasive unconstitutional 
conduct by states.  In Board of Trustees v. Garrett, the Court struck the abrogation 
provisions in Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act because “the great majority” 
                                                   
66 541 U.S. 509, 531 (2004) (finding “Title II’s requirement of program accessibility[] is congruent and 
proportional to its object of enforcing the right of access to the courts”). 
67 538 U.S. 721, 729–31 (2003) (noting a record of states participating in and contributing to gender-based 
discrimination in connection with providing leave benefits). 
68 Lane, 541 U.S. at 516, 526 (internal citations omitted). 
69 Lane, 541 U.S. at 527. 
70 Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 729–31 (noting that “differential leave policies were not attributable to any differential 
physical needs of men and women, but rather to the pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family 
members is women’s work”). 
71 Id. at 732.   
72 Id.   
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of the record before Congress related to discrimination by private employers, not by 
states.73  The “half a dozen examples” that involved state discrimination “f[e]ll far short 
of even suggesting [a] pattern of unconstitutional discrimination,” particularly in light of 
the estimated 43 million Americans with disabilities.74  Similarly, in Kimel v. Florida Board 
of Regents, the Court struck down the abrogation provisions in the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act because the evidence before Congress “almost entirely consist[ed] of 
isolated sentences clipped from floor debates and legislative reports.”75  The Court 
accordingly concluded that Congress “never identified any pattern of age discrimination 
by the States, much less any discrimination whatsoever that rose to the level of 
constitutional violation.”76   
C. Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity from Copyright 
Infringement Claims 
This section discusses how courts, Congress, and the Copyright Office have analyzed 
over time whether states are immune from suits for damages for copyright infringement 
specifically.  It first describes how courts historically analyzed sovereign immunity in the 
context of copyright cases.  It then details Congress’s attempt to abrogate sovereign 
immunity through the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act after receiving a report from 
the Copyright Office describing the scope of copyright infringement by state entities.  
Finally, it discusses the Court’s recent decision in Allen v. Cooper, which held that 
Congress’s attempt at abrogation was invalid and that states therefore are currently 
immune from suits for copyright infringement damages in federal court.   
 Early Treatment of State Infringement  
For most of American history, copyright law did not expressly address the liability of 
states.  Instead, the law provided that “anyone” or “any person” who infringed a 
copyright was subject to liability.  For example, the 1909 Act stated that “if any person 
shall infringe the copyright in any work protected under the copyright laws of the 
United States, such person shall be liable” for an injunction or damages.77  And when 
Congress enacted the 1976 Act, the text stated that “[a]nyone who violates any of the 
                                                   
73 531 U.S. 356, 369–72 (2001). 
74 Id. at 369–72. 
75 528 U.S. 62, 89 (2000).  The Court found that evidence of discrimination in the private sector was 
insufficient to establish that states committed the same conduct, and it also rejected a California state report 
on age discrimination in its public agencies as an insufficient basis for imposing liability on “every State of 
the Union.”  Id. at 90–91. 
76 Id. at 89. 
77 1909 Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 60–349, § 25, 35 Stat. 1075, 1081 (1909). 
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exclusive rights of the copyright owner . . . is an infringer of copyright” subject to 
remedies.78   
In the absence of statutory guidance, courts looked to the Supreme Court’s abrogation 
jurisprudence to determine whether states could be subject to infringement claims.  The 
early cases—which preceded the ruling in Seminole Tribe that Article I is not a valid basis 
for abrogation for most claims—came to inconsistent conclusions.  In a 1962 case, Wihtol 
v. Crow,79 the Eighth Circuit dismissed a copyright claim against a school district because 
the district was “an instrumentality of the State of Iowa, constituting a part of its 
educational system and engaged in performing a state governmental function under 
state law and at state expense,” and Eleventh Amendment case law provided that “a 
state could not be sued without its consent.”80  The court did not discuss the basis for the 
abrogation or whether the Congress had made its intent to abrogate sufficiently clear in 
the statutory text.81 
The Ninth Circuit took a different approach in Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona,82 where it 
affirmed an award of copyright damages under the 1909 Act.  The court reasoned that 
the “sweeping and without apparent limitation” language in the statute subjecting to 
damages “any person [who] shall infringe” should be broadly construed.83  In the court’s 
view, that broad language provided “sufficient indication of the intent to include states 
within the class of defendants,” which was enough to abrogate state immunity.84  The 
court considered abrogation authority to be “inherent” in Congress’s power under 
Article I, section 8 (the “Intellectual Property Clause”) to legislate in the area of 
copyrights and patents,85 and concluded that “a state may neither abrogate nor in any 
way diminish the federally granted and protected rights of a copyright holder.”86 
                                                   
78 1976 Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 94–553, § 501(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2584 (1976). 
79 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962). 
80 Id. at 781–82. 
81 See id. at 782 (concluding without analysis that plaintiffs could not “obtain a judgment against the School 
District for damages payable out of public funds” and citing several cases that did not consider whether 
Congress had abrogated state immunity). 
82 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1979). 
83 Id. at 1284–85. 
84 Id. at 1285. 
85 Id.; see U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries”). 
86 Mills Music, Inc., 591 F.2d at 1285 (quoting Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 552 (1973) (applying 
copyright preemption to a state criminal statute because states “cannot exercise a sovereign power which, 
under the Constitution, they have relinquished to the Federal Government for its exclusive exercise”)). 
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A few years later, a district court in Virginia was faced with reconciling these two 
approaches.  In Johnson v. University of Virginia,87 the court had to determine whether the 
1976 Copyright Act permitted suits for damages against states.  The court concluded that 
the reasoning of Mills Music was more persuasive, noting that Wihtol “provides little 
more than a conclusory statement that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against the 
states,” while Mills Music “includes a thoughtful examination of the 1909 Act and the 
recent Supreme Court opinions concerning the Eleventh Amendment, particularly 
Edelman v. Jordan.”88  The court then found that the Mills Music holding was “equally 
compelling, if not more compelling with respect to the 1976 Act” because whereas the 
1909 Act applied to “any person” infringing a copyright, the 1976 Act applied to 
“anyone” infringing a copyright—language “at least as sweeping, and probably more 
sweeping, than the language of the 1909 Act in identifying the class of defendants 
subject to copyright infringement suits.”89  Thus, the court permitted a claim for 
damages to go forward against a state university. 
 The Oman Report 
While the language in the 1976 Copyright Act was deemed sufficient to abrogate 
sovereign immunity by two courts, in 1985, the Atascadero Court held that abrogation of 
state sovereign immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment requires “unequivocal” 
language making that intention explicit.90  In 1987, the House Judiciary Committee, 
concerned that the 1976 Act’s “anyone” language was insufficiently clear, asked the 
Copyright Office, led by then-Register Ralph Oman, to study and issue a report on “the 
interplay between copyright infringement and the Eleventh Amendment.”91  Thus, the 
Office was asked to examine “the practical problems relative to the enforcement of 
copyright against state governments” and produce a green paper on the state of the law 
and any limits on congressional action.92 
                                                   
87 606 F. Supp. 321 (W.D. Va. 1985). 
88 Id. at 323. 
89 Id. at 324. 
90 473 U.S. at 246–47. 
91 Letter from Reps. Robert W. Kastenmeier & Carlos Moorhead, Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and 
the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, to Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights, U.S. 
Copyright Office 1 (Aug. 3, 1987). 
92 Id. 
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The Copyright Office issued a Request for Information seeking public comment93 and 
received over 600 pages of submissions.94  Most public comments expressed concern 
about potential infringement by state actors in the future if Congress failed to clarify that 
states were subject to suits for damages for copyright infringement,95 but a few 
mentioned instances in the past where states had committed copyright infringement and 
relied on their Eleventh Amendment immunity to avoid being sued.  For example, the 
American Journal of Nursing Company submitted a comment stating that after a 
nursing home run by Minnesota copied the journal’s publications and resold them for a 
fee, the journal sought legal counsel and was advised that nothing could be done 
because the nursing home “would be considered a state agency and hence be immune 
from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.”96  And a company that made training videos 
for equipment maintenance commented that when it found a Texas prison copying 
videos provided for marketing purposes, the prison stated that “they normally make 
copies of such tapes [and] they were permitted by law to do so.”97  
A handful of state entities also submitted comments expressing the position that states 
were immune from suits for damages for copyright infringement under the Eleventh 
Amendment.  The Virginia Attorney General wrote that he “strongly feels that recent 
Eleventh Amendment precedent compels the conclusion that the states are immune from 
claims for money damages for copyright infringement,”98 and the Massachusetts 
Attorney General wrote that the “weight of current case law supports the position that a 
state retains its Eleventh Amendment immunity from a suit commenced under the 
Copyright Act.”99 
                                                   
93 Request for Information: Eleventh Amendment, 52 Fed. Reg. 42,045 (Nov. 2, 1987). 
94 The Office’s report is available at: https://www.copyright.gov/reports/copyright-liability-of-states-
1988.pdf.  A scan of the comments was uploaded to the Internet Archive at https://archive.org/details/
Copyright11thAmendmentStudyComments.  
95 See, e.g., McGraw-Hill, Inc. Comments at 1–2, Comment No. 11 (Jan. 27, 1988) (stating that, because over 
40% of its School Division’s textbook sales and 75% of its College Division’s textbook sales are to state 
agencies, state immunity from copyright infringement would be “crippling” to its business); The American 
Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (“ASCAP”) Comments at 5, 10 (Feb. 1, 1988) (stating that 
ASCAP had approximately 870 licenses with state universities and in its experience “the availability of 
monetary damages in an infringement action is a necessary condition for successful licensing”); Holt, 
Rinehart, and Winston, Inc. Comments at 1 (Feb. 1, 1988) (stating that the publisher receives 70% in total 
revenue from state institutions and asking “[i]f state agencies are free to copy material at will, how will the 
authors of the copied works be compensated?”). 
96 Am. J. of Nursing Co. Comments at 1–2 (Jan. 28, 1988). 
97 Law Offices of Alan Ruderman Comments at 1 (Dec. 21, 1987). 
98 Va. Attorney Gen. Comments at 1, Comment No. 7 (Jan. 7, 1988). 
99 Mass. Attorney Gen. Comments at 1, Comment No. 40 (Feb. 4, 1988). 
 
U.S. Copyright Office  Copyright and State Sovereign Immunity  
18 
In June 1988, the Copyright Office published its final report (the “Oman Report”) 
addressing the House Judiciary Committee’s questions.  The Oman Report reviewed the 
public comments, provided a lengthy analysis of Eleventh Amendment case law, and 
attached a 50-state survey by the Congressional Research Service (“CRS”) examining 
state waivers of sovereign immunity.100  Summarizing the comments, the Report noted 
that only “five copyright proprietors document actual problems faced in attempting to 
enforce their claims against state government infringers.”101 
The bulk of the Oman Report summarized relevant Eleventh Amendment case law and 
concluded that the Copyright Act’s text was not sufficiently clear in expressing an intent 
to subject states to suits for damages.  As a result, the Report recommended that 
Congress amend the Act “to clarify its intent to abrogate states’ Eleventh Amendment 
immunity.”102  In reaching this conclusion, the Report noted that the Supreme Court had 
recently granted certiorari in Union Gas after the Third Circuit held that Congress could 
abrogate state sovereign immunity based on its Article I powers.103  If Union Gas were 
reversed and the Court were to find that state immunity could not be abrogated under 
Article I, the Report suggested that Congress consider amending 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), 
which grants federal courts exclusive jurisdiction to hear copyright cases, to permit 
copyright suits against states to be brought in state court.104  The Oman Report did not 
make specific recommendations as to how Congress could abrogate state immunity 
based on the Fourteenth Amendment, because it had not yet been established that 
abrogation under the Fourteenth Amendment involved a different standard than 
abrogation under Article I.105   
 The	Copyright	Remedy	Clarification	Act	
Following the Oman Report, the CRCA was introduced in Congress in February 1989.  
Initially, the bill proposed to amend section 501(a) of the Copyright Act to clarify that the 
                                                   
100 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT LIABILITY OF STATES AND THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT: A REPORT OF THE 
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS (June 1988) (“Oman Report”). 
101 Oman Report at 7. 
102 Oman Report at 104. 
103 U.S. v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343, 1356 (3d Cir. 1987). 
104 Oman Report at 104–05. Though bringing a copyright suit in state court would likely still require the 
consent of the state, permitting suits in state court would remove the Eleventh Amendment barrier for 
copyright owners.   
105 The Oman Report preceded by nearly ten years the decision in City of Boerne v. Flores, where the Court 
held for the first time that the Fourteenth Amendment may provide a basis for abrogation only when the 
law passed by Congress is sufficiently “congruent and proportional” to the constitutional harm Congress 
seeks to prevent.  See Oman Report at 76 (citing Matter of McVey Trucking, Inc., 812 F.2d 311, 315–16 (7th Cir. 
1987) (considering whether “there is some constitutionally significant way of distinguishing Congress’ 
Fourteenth Amendment power from its Article I powers,” and concluding there was none).  
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term “anyone” included states and state instrumentalities.  It provided: “As used in this 
subsection, the term ‘anyone’ includes any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any 
officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official 
capacity.  Any State, and any such instrumentality, officer, or employee, shall be subject 
to the provisions of this title in the same manner and to the same extent as any 
nongovernmental entity.”106  
The bill was introduced while Union Gas was pending, and within a few months, the 
Supreme Court issued its plurality opinion in that case, which called into question 
whether Article I would be deemed a valid basis for abrogation in the future.107  Register 
Oman then submitted a supplemental statement to Congress, recommending that 
additional language be added to the bill, in light of the “fragile” holding in Union Gas, to 
make clear that States are subject to the money damages and attorney’s fees provisions 
of the Copyright Act.108  Though Register Oman believed the initial draft of the bill 
satisfied the Atascadero requirement that Congress use an “unequivocal expression” of 
intent to abrogate, he suggested the new language would strengthen the bill in light of 
other recent Supreme Court cases involving the Eleventh Amendment.109  
Following Register Oman’s invitation, the CRCA was amended to add section 511 to the 
Copyright Act, titled “Liability of States, instrumentalities of Sates, and State officials for 
infringement of copyright.”  Section 511 states that such actors “shall not be immune 
under the Eleventh Amendment” and would be liable for remedies “to the same extent” 
as private actors.110  Congress modeled this language on a previous law that the 
Supreme Court had “twice cited as an example of Congress’s ability to abrogate the 
Eleventh Amendment when it wanted to do so.”111  The final version of the CRCA, 
                                                   
106 Copyright Remedy Clarification Act and Copyright Office Report on Copyright Liability of States: Hearings Before 
the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
101st Cong. 3 (1989) (“House Hearings”). 
107 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
108 House Hearings at 46 (statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights). 
109 Id. at 40–46.  In the same month it decided Union Gas, the Court issued three additional opinions 
interpreting Atascadero.  See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65–66 (1989) (citing Atascadero and 
holding state officials acting in their official capacity are not “persons” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
because Congress had not used sufficiently clear language); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230–31 (1989) 
(holding that federal law requiring tuition reimbursement by state was invalid under Atascadero because 
statute did not “address abrogation in even oblique terms, much less with the clarity Atascadero requires,” 
and holding that legislative history is irrelevant to the analysis); Hoffman v. Conn. Dep’t of Income Maint., 492 
U.S. 96, 101 (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding that statutory language was insufficiently clear to abrogate 
under Atascadero). 
110 Pub. L. No. 101–553, sec. 2(a)(2), 101 Stat. 2749 (1990). 
111 H.R. REP. 101-282 at 12. 
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containing both the clarification of the term “anyone” in section 501(a) and the new 
section 511, was signed into law on November 15, 1990.   
 Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank 
Nine years after enactment of the CRCA, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in Florida 
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,112 a case challenging 
the abrogation provisions in the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy 
Clarification Act (“Patent Remedy Act”), which are similar to those of the CRCA.  The 
Court noted at the outset that Seminole Tribe had held that Article I could not be a basis 
for abrogation and that the petitioner and the United States “d[id] not contend 
otherwise.”113  Thus, the question was whether Congress had abrogated state immunity 
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Court’s Fourteenth Amendment analysis applied the intent test from Atascadero and 
the “congruence and proportionality” test from City of Boerne.  The Court found the first 
test satisfied, agreeing that Congress had made its intent to abrogate unmistakably clear 
through the Patent Act’s language that “[a]ny State . . . shall not be immune . . . for 
infringement of a patent.”114  It held, however, that the statute was not congruent and 
proportional to the constitutional violations Congress sought to remedy.115 
The Court determined that in enacting the Patent Remedy Act, Congress had not 
identified a pattern of unconstitutional infringement and tailored its abrogation to that 
pattern.  The Court pointed to the statute’s legislative history, finding that (1) Congress 
had “little evidence of infringing conduct” by state actors;116 (2) Congress had “barely 
considered” the adequacy of state-law remedies for patent infringement by the state;117 
(3) the legislative record did not reflect a pattern of intentional or reckless infringements, 
but instead consisted only of “a handful of instances of state patent infringement that do 
not necessarily violate the Constitution”;118 and (4) the legislation was not limited to 
“cases involving arguable constitutional violations, such as where a State refuses to offer 
any state-court remedy,” or cases where the infringement was not negligent or was 
                                                   
112 527 U.S. 627 (1999). 
113 Id. at 635–36 (“Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers; 
hence the Patent Remedy Act cannot be sustained under either the Commerce Clause or the [Intellectual 
Property] Clause.”). 
114 Id. at 635 (discussing 35 U.S.C. § 296(a)). 
115 Id. at 639. 
116 Id. at 640. 
117 Id. at 643–44 (noting that witnesses did not testify as to inadequacy of state remedies, but only 
inconvenience). 
118 Id. at 645–66. 
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authorized pursuant to state policy.119  Thus, Congress’s effort to abrogate was not 
sufficiently congruent and proportional to a constitutional harm to be a valid exercise of 
its power under the Fourteenth Amendment.  This holding called into question whether 
Congress had enacted the CRCA based on a sufficient record of unconstitutional 
conduct by states, and, therefore, whether state entities could be sued for damages in 
federal court for copyright infringement. 
 Chavez v. Arte Publico Press 
During the mid-1990s, Texas challenged the constitutionality of the CRCA in a case 
involving the University of Houston’s printing of unauthorized copies of a set of short 
stories.  The Department of Justice intervened in the case to defend the constitutionality 
of the abrogation provisions.  In 1995, a Fifth Circuit panel held that the CRCA was a 
valid abrogation under Congress’s Article I powers.  The court concluded that “the 
University had notice that its continued participation in the publishing business for 
profit was conditioned by Congress upon a waiver of its immunity from suit in federal 
court for violations of the Copyright Act.”120  
Texas petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari.  After Seminole Tribe was decided in 
1996, the Court remanded Chavez for further consideration in light of the new decision.121  
The Fifth Circuit then issued a new panel opinion holding that a “fair reading” of 
Seminole Tribe meant that abrogating state immunity was “outside of Congress’s power 
under Article I.”122  The panel rejected the possibility that Congress abrogated state 
immunity under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, reasoning that if property 
rights created under Congress’s Article I powers could be “property” for due process 
purposes, Congress would have “a direct end-run around Seminole’s holding that Article 
I powers may not be employed to avoid the Eleventh Amendment’s limit on the federal 
judicial power.”123  The copyright owner petitioned for, and was granted, en banc 
review.124 
Prior to oral argument, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Florida Prepaid.  After 
reviewing the decision, the Department of Justice sent a letter advising Congress that it 
would no longer defend the CRCA’s constitutionality because it believed the legislative 
history of the CRCA “is not materially better than was the record in the Florida Prepaid 
                                                   
119 Id. at 646–47. 
120 Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 59 F.3d 539, 547 (5th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded sub nom. University of 
Houston v. Chavez, 517 U.S. 1184 (1996). 
121 University of Houston v. Chavez, 517 U.S. 1184 (1996). 
122 Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 157 F.3d 282, 287 (5th Cir. 1998). 
123 Id. at 289. 
124 178 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 1998). 
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case.”125  Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Florida Prepaid, the en banc Fifth 
Circuit remanded the case back to the panel for reconsideration.126  On remand, the 
panel held that the CRCA was not a valid abrogation of state immunity under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.127  The court’s analysis tracked that of Florida Prepaid and 
concluded that the CRCA failed the congruence and proportionality test because “the 
record does not indicate that Congress was responding to the kind of massive 
constitutional violations that have prompted proper remedial legislation, that it 
considered the adequacy of state remedies that might have provided the required due 
process of law, or that it sought to limit the coverage to arguably constitutional 
violations.”128   
Following Chavez, the Department declined to defend the CRCA in subsequent cases, 
advising Congress that “the current legislative record does not support a defense of the 
constitutionality of that statute in its current breadth.”129 
 Allen v. Cooper 
The constitutionality of Congress’s effort to abrogate state sovereign immunity through 
the CRCA ultimately reached the Supreme Court in Allen v. Cooper,130 which involved 
allegations that North Carolina published copyrighted videos and photographs of the 
recovery of the pirate Blackbeard’s ship without authorization.  The district court held 
that the CRCA was an effective abrogation of state immunity because “Congress was 
clearly responding to a pattern of current and anticipated abuse by the states of the 
copyrights held by their citizens.”131  The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that Congress 
had not invoked its Fourteenth Amendment powers to abrogate in enacting the CRCA, 
and even if it had, the abrogation was ineffective because the CRCA had “a similar 
                                                   
125 Letter from Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney General, to Dennis Hastert, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives 
4 (Oct. 13, 1999), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/10-13-1999.pdf.  
126 Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 180 F.3d 674 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc). 
127 Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 604 (5th Cir. 2000). 
128 Id. at 607.  The court declined to adopt the previous holding that copyrights are not “property” under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, noting that under Florida Prepaid, “patent is a form of property protectable against 
the states, [and] copyright would seem to be so too.”  Id. at 605 n.6.   
129 Letter from Loretta Lynch, U.S. Attorney General, to Paul D. Ryan, Speaker, U.S. House of 
Representatives 1 (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-library/osg-530d-
letters/11_21_2016/download (regarding Wolf v. Oakland University Board of Trustees, et al., No.2:15-cv-13560 
(E.D. Mich., filed Oct. 9, 2015)); Letter from Jeffrey B. Wall, Acting U.S. Solicitor General, to Paul D. Ryan, 
Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives 1 (May 5, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-
library/osg_530d_letters_5_5_2017/download (regarding TC Reiner v. Saginaw Valley State University, et al., 
No. 2:16-cv-11728 (E.D. Mich., filed May 16, 2016)). 
130 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020). 
131 Allen v. Cooper, 244 F. Supp. 3d 525, 535 (E.D.N.C. 2017). 
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legislative record and an equally broad enactment” as the patent abrogation provision 
struck down in Florida Prepaid.132 
Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued two bases for abrogation of state 
immunity.  First, he argued that Congress had the power to abrogate under Article I 
because, like the Bankruptcy Clause discussed in Katz, the Intellectual Property Clause 
allowed for abrogation as part of the constitutional scheme.133  The Court rejected this 
argument, holding that Seminole Tribe established that Congress could not abrogate state 
sovereign immunity under Article I, despite Congress’s goal of providing uniform 
remedies for intellectual property infringement.134  The Court limited the holding in Katz 
to the Bankruptcy Clause, which was the product of a “‘unique history’” and “emerged 
from a felt need to curb the States’ authority” at the time of the country’s founding.135 
Second, the petitioner argued that the statutory text and legislative record of the CRCA 
demonstrated the requisite intent to abrogate and satisfied the congruence and 
proportionality test, so that the abrogation was a proper exercise of Congress’s 
Fourteenth Amendment powers.  The Court applied a similar analysis to that of Florida 
Prepaid and reached the same conclusion.  Focusing on the legislative record, the Court 
found the evidence of copyright infringement supporting the CRCA to be “scarcely 
more impressive than what the Florida Prepaid Court saw,” amounting to “only a dozen 
possible examples of state infringement.”136  The Court also pointed to congressional 
testimony and Member statements suggesting that copyright infringement by states was 
not a widespread problem.137  
The Court further held that Congress had failed to make a sufficient showing of 
unconstitutional infringement by states, finding the record of such conduct to be 
“exceedingly slight.”138  It noted that only two of the infringements cited in the 
legislative record appeared to be intentional, “as they must be to raise a constitutional 
issue.”139  Because the Court had not determined in prior cases whether intentional 
conduct includes reckless acts, it stated that for purposes of the legislative record, “an 
infringement must be intentional, or at least reckless, to come within the reach of the 
                                                   
132 Allen v. Cooper, 895 F.3d 337, 350–52 (4th Cir. 2018). 
133 As discussed, Katz had held that the Bankruptcy Clause enables Congress to subject nonconsenting States 
to bankruptcy proceedings.  Katz, 546 U.S. at 377–78. 
134 Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1001–02. 
135 Id. at 1002 (quoting Katz, 546 U.S. at 369 n.9). 
136 Id. at 1006.  
137 Id.  
138 Id. at 1007. 
139 Id. at 1006. 
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Due Process Clause.”140  Moreover, the record contained “no information about the 
availability of state-law remedies for copyright infringement (such as contract or unjust 
enrichment suits)—even though they might themselves satisfy due process.”141  The 
Court also found it problematic that the statute extended to “every infringement case 
against a State,” concluding that its “‘indiscriminate scope’ [was] ‘out of proportion’ to 
any due process problem.”142 
The Court closed its opinion by noting that Congress had enacted the CRCA before the 
Court created the ‘congruence and proportionality’ test, and therefore it “likely did not 
appreciate the importance of linking the scope of its abrogation to the redress or 
prevention of unconstitutional injuries—and of creating a legislative record to back up 
that connection.”143  With the standard now more clear, the Court suggested that 
Congress could pass future legislation that complied with the constitutional 
requirements and properly abrogated state immunity.144 
III. RECORD WITH RESPECT TO STATE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
CONDUCT 
Following the Court’s decision in Allen, the Office issued an NOI requesting public 
comments and soliciting examples of copyright infringement by state government 
entities, officers, or employees.  The sections below summarize the information 
submitted in response to the NOI. 
A. Evidentiary Standard 
As discussed above, the Court in Allen held that the legislative record underlying the 
CRCA was insufficient for abrogation because “Congress did not identify a pattern of 
unconstitutional . . . infringement.”145  While a merely negligent act does not constitute 
an unconstitutional deprivation of property, the Court has reserved deciding whether 
reckless conduct suffices.146  Depending on future guidance from the Court, the relevant 
evidence of state infringement “must be intentional, or at least reckless, to come within 
the reach of the Due Process Clause.”147  In accordance with that standard, the NOI 
                                                   
140 Id. at 1004 (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334 n.3 (1986) and noting that Daniels “reserve[ed] 
whether reckless conduct suffices”). 
141 Id. at 1006–07. 
142 Id. at 1007 (quoting Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 646–47). 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 140 S. Ct. at 1005. 
146 Id. at 1004 (citing Daniels, 474 U.S. at 334 n.3). 
147 Id. 
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requested not only information relating to the frequency of alleged infringements by 
states, but also any evidence that such actions were taken intentionally or recklessly.148   
Commenters disagreed as to the showing necessary to meet the intentionality standard 
articulated by the Court.  The American Intellectual Property Law Association 
(“AIPLA”) argued that the standard merely requires “something beyond negligence” on 
the part of the state.149  It contrasted that showing with the standard for establishing 
willful infringement under section 504 of the Copyright Act.  In AIPLA’s view, the latter 
involves a higher burden of proof, requiring the plaintiff to establish that the defendant 
had actual or constructive knowledge that the activity constituted infringement.150  
Noting that such intent “is difficult to prove,” AIPLA urged the Office to consider to 
consider “whether some non-willful acts of infringement may also unconstitutionally 
deprive copyright owners of their property without due process of law.”151 
The National Press Photographers Association (“NPPA”) argued that the intentionality 
standard generally turns on whether the state investigated a work’s copyright status 
prior to use.  It pointed to case law holding that “a party may act recklessly by refusing, 
as a matter of policy, to even investigate or attempt to determine whether particular 
[works] are subject to copyright protections.”152  As a result, NPPA argued that “absent 
other factors, copyright infringement that occurs without inquiry as to the copyrightable 
status of a work is an intentional infringement, or at least ‘reckless.’”153  
During the roundtables, representatives of state entities advocated for a higher standard, 
under which there must be evidence that a state official had knowledge that the conduct 
was infringing.154  A representative of the University of Illinois suggested focusing on 
affirmative conduct by state actors, such as “removing protective watermarks and 
copyright notices,” that could demonstrate whether the infringement was intentional.155  
                                                   
148 See, e.g., NOI at 34,255 (requesting information about whether state infringement “was intentional or 
reckless, and the basis for that conclusion,” as well as how Congress can determine “whether copyright 
infringement by a state is common or infrequent”). 
149 AIPLA Initial Comments at 6. 
150 Id.  
151 Id. at 7. 
152 NPPA Initial Comments at 10 (quoting Unicolors, Inc. v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 853 F.3d 980, 992 (9th Cir. 
2017)) (alteration in original). 
153 NPPA Initial Comments at 11. 
154 Roundtable Tr. at 113:07–114:01 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Molnar, Ohio Attorney General’s Office) (generally 
agreeing with statement that “the state actor has to know what they’re doing is unlawful and . . . do it 
anyway”).  
155 Roundtable Tr. at 55:01–21 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Benson, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign).  But see 
id. at 115:11–18 (Laiho, Colorado Attorney General’s Office) (“even in instances like that where it may appear 
on its face that there was intent because copyright information had been removed from an image, that it’s 
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Others argued that the analysis should focus on official acts and policies of the state 
entity as an institution, rather than the unratified acts of an individual employee.156   
Because the Court has yet to determine whether reckless conduct can violate the Due 
Process Clause, this study takes no position on the question.  In discussing the record 
evidence, the Office has attempted, where possible, to indicate the extent to which the 
alleged infringements “appear to be based on intentional or reckless conduct,” as 
Congress requested.157  To the extent, however, that the conduct may rise only to the 
level of recklessness, Congress should be mindful of the legal uncertainty in this area. 
B. Evidence Submitted 
 Cases Filed 
In the NOI, the Office asked commenters to provide examples of copyright infringement 
suits brought against state entities and to specify “where the case was filed, what 
claim(s) were brought regarding the infringement, whether the case remains pending, 
and if not, how it was resolved.”158  In response, the Office received two lists of cases.  
AIPLA submitted a list of nineteen cases that it concluded “demonstrate just a portion of 
the public-record case law supporting widespread, unremedied copyright infringement 
by state actors.”159  And an individual commenter, Michael Bynum, submitted a list of 
158 cases that he identified as copyright infringement lawsuits for “intentional 
infringement” filed after the Fifth Circuit’s Chavez decision in 2000.160  Ten cases appear 
on both lists; they thus include a combined total of 167 cases.  
State representatives raised concerns that these lists “are not entirely probative for the 
Copyright Office’s inquiry.”161  They identified three potential deficiencies.  First, they 
                                                   
often the case that it is not . . . a state employee who’s actually done that removal, and that they’ve 
innocently obtained the image from a different website”). 
156 Roundtable Tr. at 26:06–23 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Thro, University of Kentucky) (advocating for focus on 
whether “the governmental entity has adopted a policy that actually results in a constitutional violation,” 
such as “if a university had a policy that we will always violate copyright and never pay any attention to 
it”); id. at 26:24–27:04 (Thro, University of Kentucky) (“[T]he fact that one in 15,000 employees at the 
University of Kentucky inadvertently violates someone’s copyright, or even intentionally violates their 
copyright, does not necessarily mean that the University of Kentucky has committed a constitutional 
violation.”); id. at 59:03–09 (Smith, University of Kansas) (arguing that intent standard requires “find[ing 
state] policy that was intentional that enabled infringement”). 
157 Request Letter at 2. 
158 NOI at 34,255. 
159 AIPLA Initial Comments at 1–3. 
160 Michael Bynum Reply Comments (Oct. 8, 2020). 
161 Roundtable Tr. at 84:15–17 (Dec. 11, 2020) (MacDonald, University of California); see also University of 
Michigan Library Reply Comments at 1 (asserting that “[c]omments submitted by . . . the American 
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observed that the lists are not accompanied by “any proof, or evidence, or a 
determination that, setting aside 11th Amendment sovereign immunity, the state 
defendants did not have meritorious, or at least plausible, defenses that, had they been 
fully litigated, . . . may have prevailed.”162  They noted that, although a case may be 
dismissed based on sovereign immunity, “there are typically many meritorious defenses 
that are raised . . . aside from sovereign immunity,” which “need to be carefully looked 
at” to adequately probe whether there is a pervasive pattern or practice of 
infringement.163  To that point, the University of Michigan Library highlighted that 
“several of the[] cases were dismissed on grounds other than sovereign immunity, such 
as statute of limitations.”164  Second, state representatives contended that the lists do not 
“actually establish that any of the[] alleged infringements, at the time of the alleged 
infringement, were done with intentional or reckless intent.”165  Finally, noting that since 
1987, “over 50,000 copyright opinions were issued by U.S. courts,” state representatives 
argued that the cases identified by the AIPLA, which “make up only .04% of the 
copyright cases filed . . . cannot be considered widespread.”166   
In response to these concerns, the Office sought to identify additional publicly available 
information that would allow for a more complete analysis of the claims in these cases.  
As part of that effort, the Office entered into an academic partnership with the George 
Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School’s Arts & Entertainment Advocacy Clinic.  
Under the supervision of Office attorneys, law students reviewed the available public 
dockets for the listed cases and recorded the following information: the state and year in 
which the case was filed, the type of state defendant(s) sued, the class of work at issue, a 
brief summary of the allegations as stated in the complaint, whether the plaintiff(s) 
alleged “intentional,” “willful,” or “reckless” infringement, the cause(s) of action 
brought, whether plaintiff(s) sought money damages, the defenses asserted, whether the 
docket indicated that the parties reached a settlement agreement, whether there was a 
written decision (including a brief summary of the holding), and whether the written 
decision addressed sovereign immunity.   
                                                   
Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) unsuccessfully attempt to show widespread, intentional and 
reckless copyright infringement”). 
162 Roundtable Tr. at 84:17–23 (Dec. 11, 2020) (MacDonald, University of California). 
163 Id. at 89:25–91:01 (MacDonald, University of California). 
164 University of Michigan Library Reply Comments at 2 & n.8 (citing Reiner v. Canale, 301 F. Supp. 3d 727 
(E.D. Mich. 2018)). 
165 Roundtable Tr. at 85:10–13 (Dec. 11, 2020) (MacDonald, University of California); see also University of 
Michigan Library Reply Comments at 2 (stating that the cases provided by AIPLA “were not litigated on the 
merits”). 
166 University of Michigan Library Reply Comments at 2; see also Roundtable Tr. at 249:01–04 (Dec. 11, 2020) 
(Xu, University of Michigan Library) (“[L]ast year state actors contributed 11 percent of the total GDP.  And 
how many state infringement[s] do we see?  It’s far less than one percent.”). 
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The results of this research are summarized below.  As an initial matter, the Office notes 
that, out of the 167 cases in total, only 132 are included in the analysis.  The excluded 
cases either were unavailable in searches of federal public records or did not involve 
copyright infringement disputes.   
a. General Findings 
The Office’s review of the relevant cases revealed the following:   
• The 132 cases were filed between 1986 and 2020.  Approximately 97% of the cases 
(128) were filed between 2000 and 2020, after the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Florida Prepaid. 
• The cases were filed against state entities in thirty-six states.  Of the 132 cases 
examined, California (14), New York (13), and Texas (12) were the states in which 
infringement cases were filed the most frequently. 
• Approximately 58% of the cases (76) were brought against state-funded 
educational institutions such as universities, colleges, and school districts.  
Approximately 20% (27) were brought against state agencies or the state itself.  
Twenty-seven cases involved claims against multiple kinds of state defendants, 
including state employees in their individual capacities.  
• Literary works (58% or 77 cases) and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works (30% 
or 40 cases) were the most common classes of works at issue. 
• Plaintiffs sought money damages in approximately 88% of the cases examined 
(116). 
• Approximately 53% of the cases (70) resulted in written decisions.   
• Approximately 32% of the cases (42) resulted in written decisions dismissing 
copyright claims on sovereign immunity grounds. 
b. Allegations of Intentional Infringement 
Of the cases examined, the complaints in approximately 59% (or 78 cases) included 
specific allegations of intentional infringement.  An additional four cases involved 
allegations that defendants “knowingly” infringed or “should have known” that 
infringement had occurred,167 but the pleadings were unclear as to whether these 
amounted to allegations of intentional or willful infringement. 
                                                   
167 See Complaint ¶ 25, Collins v. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham, No. 2:09-cv-00856-JEO (N.D. Ala. May 1, 2009), 
ECF. No. 1; Complaint ¶ 17, Rescue Training Assoc. v. La. State Univ., No. 9:05-cv-81146-DTKH (S.D. Fla. Dec. 
29, 2005), ECF No. 1; Complaint ¶ 22, Bergen v. County of Middlesex, New Jersey, No. 2:04-cv-03015 (D.N.J. June 
 
U.S. Copyright Office  Copyright and State Sovereign Immunity  
29 
The Office also examined whether the filings indicated that the parties settled and, if so, 
whether the settlement involved any admissions of wrongdoing.  At least 27% of the 
cases (32) appeared to have resulted in settlements.  An additional 11% (15 cases) were 
voluntarily dismissed, but it was unclear whether the actions were dismissed pursuant 
to a settlement agreement.  None of the cases examined indicated that the settlement 
agreements contained any factual or legal admissions.   
The Office found that the parties reached a settlement in 28% of the cases that involved 
allegations of intentional or willful infringement (22 out of 78 cases).  In several cases, 
however, the actions were settled after the state entities were removed as defendants due 
to sovereign immunity.168   
c. Causes of Action 
To assess “the extent to which copyright owners are experiencing infringements by state 
entities without adequate remedies under state law,”169 the Office also recorded other 
causes of action brought against state defendants in copyright infringement cases.  
While all 132 cases involved allegations of copyright infringement, approximately 58% 
(76 cases) included state law causes of action, such as breach of contract, deceptive trade 
practices, unjust enrichment, and tortious interference.  In approximately 36% of the 
cases where plaintiffs brought additional causes of action (27 out of 76 cases), the courts 
dismissed the copyright claims due to sovereign immunity, and the parties did not have 
the opportunity to litigate the state law claims.  For example, approximately 15% (20 
cases) included contract-related causes of action.  But in most of those cases, state 
defendants succeeded on motions to dismiss the contract claims on preemption 
grounds.170 
                                                   
25, 2004), ECF No. 1; Complaint ¶ 21, Abramowitz v. State of New Jersey, 2:03-cv-01663 (D.N.J. Apr. 15, 2003), 
ECF No. 1. 
168 See Campinha-Bacote v. Bleidt, No. CIV.A. H-10-3481, 2011 WL 679913 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2011) (dismissing 
Texas A&M University as defendant and permitting claims against other defendants; the action against non-
state defendants was ultimately settled); Mktg. Info. Masters, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univ. Sys., 552 F. 
Supp. 2d 1088, 1095–96 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (dismissing claims against university trustees, but allowing claims 
against employee in individual capacity; the latter claim was settled). 
169 Request Letter at 2. 
170 See Maisha v. Univ. of N. Carolina, No. 1:12-CV-371, 2013 WL 1232947 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 27, 2013) (citing 
sovereign immunity, court dismissed university defendant from non-copyright causes of action and 
dismissed copyright claim because plaintiff had no registration), aff’d, 641 F. App’x 246 (4th Cir. 2016); Ass’n 
for Info. Media & Equip. v. Regents of the Univ. of California, No. CV 10-9378 CBM MANX, 2011 WL 7447148, at 
*3, *8 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2011) (court dismissed state university from case citing sovereign immunity and held 
that contract claims were preempted); Jacobs v. Memphis Convention & Visitors Bureau, 710 F. Supp. 2d 663, 682 
(W.D. Tenn. 2010) (citing sovereign immunity, court granted Tennessee tourism agency’s motion to dismiss 
in case where plaintiff alleged defendants infringed copyright in photographs; Applied Pro. Training, Inc. v. 
Mira Costa Coll., No. 10CV1372 DMS (POR), 2010 WL 11463186, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2010) (citing 
 
U.S. Copyright Office  Copyright and State Sovereign Immunity  
30 
d. Sovereign Immunity and Other Defenses  
Finally, the Office examined both the defenses asserted by state defendants in pleadings 
and the courts’ written decisions to probe whether sovereign immunity prevented the 
parties from litigating the merits of the allegations.  State defendants raised “sovereign 
immunity” or “government immunity” as a defense in their answers in approximately 
38% of the cases (50).  The dockets also indicated that sovereign immunity was often 
raised in motions to dismiss filed in lieu of answers, or in motions for summary 
judgment.  Of the seventy cases resulting in written decisions, courts dismissed the 
copyright claims against state entities on sovereign immunity grounds in forty-two cases 
(60%).171 
Of the approximately twenty-eight written decisions that did not address sovereign 
immunity, twenty-four were decided in favor of the state on either procedural or 
substantive grounds.172  Only one of the written decisions addressed fair use,173 which 
state defendants raised in twenty-seven cases (20%). 
                                                   
sovereign immunity, court granted college’s motion to dismiss in case where plaintiff alleged defendants 
infringed copyright in textual works); Parker v. Dufresne, No. 09-CV-1859, 2010 WL 2671578, at *4 (W.D. La. 
May 18, 2010) (citing sovereign immunity, magistrate judge recommended that claims against university be 
dismissed), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV.A. 09-1859, 2010 WL 2671567 (W.D. La. June 29, 2010). 
171 See, e.g., Mktg. Info. Masters, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univ. Sys., 552 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093–96 (S.D. 
Cal. 2008) (dismissing copyright claim against state defendant but permitting claim against state employee 
in individual capacity); InfoMath, Inc. v. Univ. of Ark., 633 F. Supp. 2d 674, 678, 680–81 (E.D. Ark. 2007) 
(dismissing claim for monetary damages against state defendant but permitting suit for injunctive relief); De 
Romero v. Inst. of Puerto Rican Culture, 466 F. Supp. 2d 410, 421 (D.P.R. 2006) (dismissing claims against state 
defendant due to sovereign immunity); Rescue Training Assocs. v. La. State Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll., No. 
05-81146-CIV, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109148, at *4–6 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2006) (dismissing copyright claims 
against state defendants due to sovereign immunity and holding state claims preempted); Lopez v. Johnson, 
No. CV 02-1572 LH/LFG, 2004 WL 7338284, at *3 (D.N.M. Jan. 22, 2004) (dismissing claims against state 
employees in their official capacities due to sovereign immunity); Salerno v. City Univ. of N.Y., 191 F. Supp. 2d 
352, 335–57 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (dismissing copyright claim on Eleventh Amendment grounds, but permitting 
claims for injunctive relief against individual defendants to proceed). 
172 See, e.g., Demartino v. Golston, No. 4:12-cv-372, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160242, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2013) 
(adopting magistrate’s recommendation and dismissing plaintiff’s claim for failure to prosecute); MacSwan 
v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, No. 2:12-CV-1404-HRH, 2013 WL 12096526, at *3 (D. Ariz. Sept. 25, 2013) 
(dismissing plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim on finding that plaintiff created the works within the 
scope of their employment and thus failed to adequately allege an ownership interest in the works at issue); 
Brown v. Fox Sports Net, Inc., No. SACV 08-833CJC (CTx), 2008 WL 11422121, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2008) 
(dismissing copyright claim on finding that defendants were copyright owners of works at issue pursuant to 
transfer agreement). 
173 Authors Guild, Inc. v. Hathitrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (granting defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment on fair use grounds), aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 755 F.3d 87, 105 (2d Cir. 
2014). 
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 Survey Evidence 
In its notice of inquiry, the Office invited submissions of empirical studies analyzing the 
degree to which copyright owners are experiencing infringement by state entities 
without adequate remedies under state law, as well as the extent to which these 
infringements are based on intentional or reckless conduct.174  The Office received one 
such study, from the Copyright Alliance—the results of a public survey that 
incorporated questions from the NOI.175  The survey solicited “feedback from copyright 
owners on their experiences with copyright infringement by states and states’ claims of 
sovereign immunity.”176  
a. Survey Design and Methodology  
The Copyright Alliance’s survey was comprised of thirty-six questions geared towards 
identifying specific instances of copyright infringement by states and/or state entities.177  
It was designed “in a way that [the Copyright Alliance] believed would solicit the most 
accurate responses from creators and copyright owners who may not have a legal 
background.”178  The survey was made available to the public on the SurveyMonkey 
online platform from June 22 to August 10, 2020, and there were 657 respondents,179 
consisting primarily of “small businesses or individual creators.”180   
b. Survey Results 
For the purposes of this report, the Office has grouped the Copyright Alliance’s survey 
results into five general areas discussed in detail below.  
                                                   
174 NOI, 85 Fed. Reg. at 34,255 (June 3, 2020). 
175 A copy of the Copyright Alliance’s survey is available at https://www.copyright.gov/policy/state-
sovereign-immunity/additional-record-materials/copyright-alliance-response-jan-15-2021.pdf. 
176 Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 6; see also Roundtable Tr. at 12:05–11 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Madigan, 
Copyright Alliance). 
177 For example, two questions asked, “Have you ever had a state government entity (e.g., state agency, state 
university, etc.) copy, distribute or otherwise use your copyrighted work without permission in a manner 
that you believed to constitute copyright infringement?” and “Has a state entity ever asserted immunity to 
claims of copyright infringement in the context of a contract negotiation with you?”  COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE, 
COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE SURVEY RESULTS 1, 63 (2021), https://www.copyright.gov/policy/state-sovereign-
immunity/additional-record-materials/copyright-alliance-response-jan-15-2021.pdf (“Copyright Alliance 
Survey”). 
178 Copyright Alliance Survey (Cover Page); Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 7 (accord); see also 
Roundtable Tr. at 12:11–14 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Madigan, Copyright Alliance). 
179 Copyright Alliance Survey (Cover Page). 
180 Roundtable Tr. at 17:09–10 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Madigan, Copyright Alliance). 
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Frequency of Infringement by State Entities 
The Copyright Alliance stated that the survey demonstrated that “creators and 
copyright owners . . . encountered thousands of instances of infringement by state 
entities.”181  One hundred fifteen respondents answered that they had experienced 
infringement by a state or state entity.182  Thirty-two respondents “(29%) said that they 
suffered infringement only once, while 21 [respondents] (19%) said they had suffered 
infringement twice.”183  Fifty-eight respondents “(52%) responded ‘other,’ and when 
asked to specify, the respondents described multiple instances of state infringement.”184  
When describing these multiple instances, “people were identifying several instances, 
sometimes hundreds each,”185 with respondents using the terms and phrases 
“countless,” “at least a dozen,” “several,” “too many to count,” “thousands,” and 
“hundreds of times.”186 
Respondents were asked to identify the type of work(s) infringed, and were “able to 
select as many categories as applicable” from a predetermined list.187  Of the eighty-one 
respondents who answered this question, forty (49%) selected “[p]hotographs,” and 
thirty-one (38%) selected “[b]ooks/poems/blogs/articles.”188  Thirteen respondents (16%) 
selected “[a]udio/sound recordings (including recordings of songs),” while twelve 
respondents (15%) selected “[m]ovies/TV shows/videos.”189  All remaining categories 
received fewer than ten responses each.190 
                                                   
181 Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 7. 
182 Copyright Alliance Survey at 1; see also Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 7. 
183 Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 7; see also Copyright Alliance Survey at 1–2. 
184 Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 7; see also Copyright Alliance Survey at 1–4. 
185 Roundtable Tr. at 206:16–18 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Madigan, Copyright Alliance). 
186 Copyright Alliance Survey at 3–4. 
187 Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 7 n.25 (“Survey respondents were able to select as many 
categories as applicable from a list that included: (1) audio/sound recordings (including recordings of 
songs), (2) books/poems/blogs/articles, (3) choreography, (4) databases, (5) jewelry/fashion designs, (6) 
magazines/newsletters/newspapers/periodicals, (7) movies/tv shows/videos, (8) musical compositions/song 
lyrics, (9) paintings/illustrations, graphic designs, (10) photographs, (11) scripts/screenplays, (12) sculptures, 
(13) software/codes/video games/apps, and (14) other (please specify).”); see also Copyright Alliance Survey 
at 14–16. 
188 Copyright Alliance Survey; see also Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 7. 
189 Copyright Alliance Survey at 14–16; see also Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 7. 
190 Some of the responses provided in the “Other” category appear to identify non-copyrightable material or 
potential violations other than copyright infringement.  See Copyright Alliance Survey at 16 (responses 
within the “other” category include “[p]rivacy invasion and legal rights as a native American,” 
“trademarked phrase ‘Welcome to the D’ used on all World Series promo material,” “[m]y brand name,” 
and “[r]adio station name and design”); see also Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 7–8. 
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When asked to identify the state entity involved in the infringement, forty-eight of the 
eighty-four respondents (57%) identified state universities or institutions of higher 
learning.191  Respondents also identified “state tourism boards, departments of natural 
resources, and museums.”192  Some respondents noted, however, that they could not 
“keep track” due to the numerous instances of infringement, were unable to recall or 
could not identify the alleged infringer, or were “uncomfortable ‘exposing’” the alleged 
infringer.193 
The survey also asked respondents to indicate when the alleged infringements occurred.  
The responses spanned the period from 1978 through 2020, with an upslope of 
infringements reported “starting in the mid-to-late 90s and increasing yearly through the 
2000s and 2010s, with the most instances occurring in 2019 (32 instances or 40% of 
responses).”194  The Copyright Alliance attributes this increase in cases to the growth of 
the internet and “the Florida Prepaid and Chavez cases that challenged the validity of the 
CRCA and may have resulted in states taking . . . a more liberal approach to 
unauthorized use of copyright-protected works.”195 
Respondents were asked whether they monitored for infringement.  Two hundred 
eighty-three respondents (57%) stated “no,” while 217 respondents (43%) stated “yes.”196  
Several respondents who answered “no” noted the difficulty and frustration of 
monitoring for infringement.197  The Copyright Alliance interpreted this data to suggest 
that the number of actual instances of copyright infringement by a state or state entity is 
likely higher than what the survey reflects.198 
                                                   
191 Copyright Alliance Survey at 9–12; see Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 8. 
192 Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 8; see also Copyright Alliance Survey at 10–11. 
193 Copyright Alliance Survey at 13–14. 
194 Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 8; see also Copyright Alliance Survey at 16–21; Roundtable Tr. at 
14:01–07 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Madigan, Copyright Alliance) (discussing the “clear trend of increasing 
infringements” starting in the mid-to-late 90s). 
195 Roundtable Tr. at 14:08–13 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Madigan, Copyright Alliance); see also Copyright Alliance 
Initial Comments at 8. 
196 Letter from Copyright Alliance, to U.S. Copyright Office 64 (Jan. 15, 2021); see also Copyright Alliance 
Initial Comments at 14.  The survey revealed that even if creators and copyright owners were monitoring for 
infringement, 182 out of 280 respondents (65%) were unsure that such monitoring efforts would detect state 
infringement.  Copyright Alliance Survey at 64–65. 
197 See Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 15.  Respondents stated that “[i]t’s too difficult and time-
consuming”” to monitor for infringement, “[monitoring] was so time-consuming and I rarely got anywhere.  
I finally gave up,” and “[t]his. . . is just another David & Goliath situation where the small copyright owner 
is the loser.”  Copyright Alliance Survey at 68, 69, 74.  Others responded that they were not “sure what to do 
about copyright infringement” after they “found out [about the infringement] by accident.”  Id. at 68.   
198 Roundtable Tr. at 13:14–20 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Madigan, Copyright Alliance); see also id. at 13:21–25 (Madigan, 
Copyright Alliance) (“I would also note that the numbers don’t account for matters settled confidentially out 
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State Entities’ Intent 
The survey asked whether respondents believe the infringement committed by state 
entities was intentional.  Out of the seventy-two respondents who answered, forty-two 
(58%) believed that the infringement was intentional, twenty-two (31%) were unsure of 
whether the infringement was intentional or inadvertent, and eight (11%) believed that 
the infringement was inadvertent.199 
The survey allowed respondents to provide a narrative description as to why they 
believed the infringement was intentional.  Forty-two responses were provided.200  In the 
Copyright Alliance’s view, this information “showed at least non-negligent examples of 
infringement.”201  The Copyright Alliance pointed to examples in which respondents 
stated that “an attorney’s warnings were ignored, copyright management information 
(CMI) on the works was ignored or removed, or use of the works continued when an 
entity was aware that a license had expired.”202  Other respondents “recounted situations 
where permission was asked by the state entity, and when permission was denied, the 
entity went on to make unauthorized use of the work anyway.”203  
Response by State Entities 
The survey asked whether respondents tried to contact or notify the state entity about 
the infringement once it was discovered.  Forty-eight respondents (69%) stated that they 
tried to notify the state entity, seventeen (24%) said that they did not attempt to do so, 
and five (7%) were unsure.204  The survey allowed respondents to provide a narrative 
description of the state’s response; forty-eight responses were provided.205  According to 
the Copyright Alliance, a majority of respondents “described situations in which they 
                                                   
of court or situations where the owners didn’t pursue enforcement due to the perceived sort of futility of 
remedies available when suing states.”); Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 14–15 (“With such a large 
number of respondents not monitoring for infringement, it’s likely both that many state infringements are 
not discovered and that a majority of copyright owners are unaware of the extent of lost revenue, licensing 
opportunities, and other harms associated with state infringement.”).  
199 Copyright Alliance Survey at 25–26; see Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 9; Copyright Alliance 
Reply Comments at 3–4. 
200 See Copyright Alliance Survey at 26–29; Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 9. 
201 Roundtable Tr. at 64:16–20 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Madigan, Copyright Alliance); see also id. at 65:05–08 (Madigan, 
Copyright Alliance) (stating that the survey shows “intentional, non-negligent instances of infringement”). 
202 Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 9; see Copyright Alliance Reply Comments at 4 (similar); 
Roundtable Tr. at 64:21–65:03 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Madigan, Copyright Alliance); Copyright Alliance Survey at 
26–29. 
203 Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 9; see also Copyright Alliance Reply Comments at 4; Roundtable 
Tr. at 64:21–65:03 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Madigan, Copyright Alliance); Copyright Alliance Survey at 26–29. 
204 Copyright Alliance Survey at 33 (Jan. 15, 2021); see Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 12. 
205 Copyright Alliance Survey at 33–35. 
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were not taken seriously, their concerns were ignored, and the infringement 
continued.”206  In some instances, “respondents said that the entity made general claims 
about having the ‘right’ to use the work,” while in other cases it was reported that “the 
entity ceased the infringing activity or a settlement was reached.”207  In a separate 
question, the survey asked whether the state asserted “that it was not liable for the 
infringement due to the fact that states are generally immune from being sued under the 
11th Amendment to the Constitution.”208  Twenty-one respondents (44%) said that the 
state entity asserted sovereign immunity under the 11th Amendment, while sixteen 
(33%) reported that sovereign immunity was not asserted, and eleven (23%) did not 
recall.209  
Suits against State Entities  
When asked if they sued the state entity for copyright infringement, thirteen out of 
seventy respondents (19%) responded “yes.”210  The survey does not indicate how many 
suits were filed by each respondent.  The Copyright Alliance notes that “[f]or those who 
sued, 3 brought claims in Texas, 2 in California, and single cases were brought in 26 
other states, U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia.”211  All but one of these suits 
were filed between 2014 and 2020.212   
Effect of Sovereign Immunity on Infringement and Licensing  
A number of survey questions asked about the effect state sovereign immunity may be 
having on the licensing of copyrighted materials to states.  In response to whether a state 
entity has ever asserted sovereign immunity in the context of a contract negotiation, 
sixty-seven respondents (88%) answered “no,” and nine (12%) answered “yes.”213  Fifty-
eight respondents (76%) answered that they did not change their sales and licensing 
practices with states as a result of their immunity from copyright infringement.214  
Similarly, a majority of respondents (56%) stated that they do not provide different 
licensing or payment terms in transactions with a state entity than are provided to other 
                                                   
206 Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 12; see also Copyright Alliance Survey at 33–35 (listing the forty-
eight responses provided by respondents). 
207 Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 12; see also Copyright Alliance Survey at 33–35 (listing the forty-
eight responses provided by respondents). 
208 Copyright Alliance Survey at 35–36; see Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 12. 
209 Copyright Alliance Survey at 35–36; see Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 12. 
210 Copyright Alliance Survey at 36; see Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 12. 
211 Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 12; see Copyright Alliance Survey at 36–43. 
212 Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 12; see Copyright Alliance Survey at 43–48. 
213 Copyright Alliance Survey at 63; see also Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 14. 
214 Copyright Alliance Survey at 61–63; see also Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 14. 
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parties, while eighteen respondents (23%) answered “yes,” and sixteen respondents 
(21%) answered “not sure.”215  Those who answered “yes” provided no further 
information. 
c. Survey Critiques  
Commenters representing state entities challenged the reliability of the Copyright 
Alliance’s survey, arguing that it is not probative of widespread, intentional copyright 
infringement by states.  Several commenters contended that the sample size of 657 
respondents was not large enough to be representative, particularly given that the 
Copyright Alliance represents over 1.8 million individual creators.216  For example, 
noting that “only 115 [of the Copyright Alliance’s] members claimed that they had 
experienced copyright infringement by state entities,” the University of Michigan 
Library argued that “this means that .006% of their membership has allegedly 
experienced copyright infringement by states.”217  
These commenters also faulted the survey for its reliance on respondents’ subjective 
beliefs that infringement had occurred and that states had acted with the requisite 
intent.218  Several noted that the survey did not account for exceptions or defenses other 
than sovereign immunity that may have independently precluded liability.219  For 
                                                   
215 Copyright Alliance Survey at 60–61; see also Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 14; Roundtable Tr. at 
67:10–13 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Madigan, Copyright Alliance) (discussing the survey results for different licensing 
or payment terms by respondents to states or state entities). 
216 See, e.g., Association of Public and Land-grant Universities (“APLU”) and the Association of American 
Universities (“AAU”) Reply Comments at 3 (noting that the Copyright Alliance’s survey is “based on a small 
sample size”); Roundtable Tr. at 18:06–20 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Benson, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign) (discussing the issue with total number of respondents in the Copyright Alliance’s survey). 
217 University of Michigan Library Reply Comments at 1–2; see also Roundtable Tr. at 205:17–206:03 (Dec. 11, 
2020) (Band, Library Copyright Alliance) (discussing the number of alleged infringements reported in the 
Copyright Alliance’s survey compared to the size of the Copyright Alliance’s membership).  
218 See Association of Southeastern Research Libraries (“ASERL”) and the Greater Western Library Alliance  
Reply Comments at 2–3; University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Reply Comments at 1; APLU & AAU 
Reply Comments at 4–5 (noting that information was not collected on whether (1) copyrighted works were 
registered, a prerequisite to a copyright infringement lawsuit for U.S. works; (2) the works were joint works, 
collective works, works made for hire, or transferred or assigned by the original copyright owner; or (3) 
whether the party claiming copyright infringement owned the copyright at the time of the alleged 
infringement). 
219 See Association of University Presses Reply Comments at 2 (discussing cases that were dismissed for 
reasons other than sovereign immunity or would likely fall within fair use); id. (“Ms. Kelly’s unsuccessful 
litigation against Mississippi was not decided on state sovereign immunity grounds; rather the court there 
concluded that, in her zeal, the plaintiff’s pre-publication lawsuit had to be dismissed on grounds of 
ripeness.”) (emphasis in original); University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Reply Comments at 1–2 
(discussing that there was no evidence in the Copyright Alliance’s survey showing the availability of 
defenses or limitations to copyright infringement); APLU & AAU Reply Comments at 12 (noting a list of 
defenses that states and state entities can assert against copyright infringement claims). 
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example, they noted that information was not collected on whether copyright owners 
declined to take action against state university libraries or educational institutions 
because the uses were protected by the exemptions for such entities under sections 108 
and 110 of the Copyright Act.220  Likewise, commenters pointed to the survey’s failure to 
address whether the states’ actions may have constituted fair use.221   
The Copyright Alliance responded to these critiques in its reply comments and at the 
roundtables.  In response to the contention that the survey is not probative of 
widespread, intentional infringement, the Copyright Alliance pointed to the volume of 
the alleged infringements cited by respondents, noting that “people were identifying 
several instances, sometimes hundreds each.”222  With respect to criticism that the survey 
relied on respondents’ subjective beliefs, the Copyright Alliance asserted that “there was 
a pattern shown in the responses to our survey that showed at least non-negligent 
examples of infringement.”223  And it argued that concerns regarding exceptions and 
limitations are “not entirely relevant” because “whether we abrogate or adjust state 
sovereign immunity would have no effect on a state[] entity’s ability to defend itself by 
showing fair use or invoking any other limitation and exception.”224 
 Specific Examples 
The Office also received comments describing specific instances of alleged infringement 
by state entities.  These examples are discussed in the following sections, which are 
organized by the type of work at issue. 
                                                   
220 See APLU & AAU Reply Comments at 5–6; see also Roundtable Tr. at 19:05–10 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Benson, 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) (discussing exceptions that apply to university libraries and 
educational institutions). 
221 See University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Reply Comments at 1–2 (“The survey instrument should 
have included a definition of fair use.  Similarly, the questions should have added a statement at 
the end such as ‘when the use was not a fair use’ to encourage the respondents to consider how 
many instances of infringement (absent sovereign immunity) would be actionable in court.”); Roundtable Tr. 
at 18:21–19:04, 19:11–22 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Benson, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) (discussing the 
concern about whether fair use was considered in the Copyright Alliance’s survey). 
222 Roundtable Tr. at 206:16–18 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Madigan, Copyright Alliance); see also id. at 74:16–19 
(Madigan, Copyright Alliance) (“I think it’s important to understand that there’s no magic number of 
infringements or a bright line that would trigger congressional action.”). 
223 Roundtable Tr. at 64:18–20 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Madigan, Copyright Alliance); see also id. at 65:04–08 (Madigan, 
Copyright Alliance) (“[W]hile I’m sure there are plenty of inadvertent infringements, there does appear to 
also be intentional, non-negligent instances of infringement, which I know some of the authors and creators 
can attest to.”); Copyright Alliance Reply Comments at 3–4 (discussing the survey results regarding 
intentional or inadvertent infringement). 
224 Roundtable Tr. at 22:09–16 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Madigan, Copyright Alliance); see also id. at 23:07–19 (Madigan, 
Copyright Alliance) (arguing that sovereign immunity “hinders the development of the fair use doctrine”). 
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a. News Publishing  
Commenters representing news publishers contended that their industry has 
experienced large-scale infringement by state entities.225  They relied primarily on a 
recent instance in which it was alleged that “over 4,000 news outlets suffered from 
unauthorized copying and republication of their content by an instrumentality of the 
State of California over an eight-year period.”226  Copyright owners argued that this 
example alone demonstrates “systematic industrial-scale copyright infringement” by a 
state actor.227  
As described by commenters, in 2017 multiple news outlets, including Dow Jones & 
Company, The Washington Post, The New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, and 
McClatchy, discovered that the California Public Employee’s Retirement System 
(“CalPERS”), a state agency that manages pension and health benefits for more than two 
million members,228 “was copying, republishing, and distributing thousands of protected 
news articles without having acquired a license or authorization from the publishers.”229  
These commenters alleged that CalPERS maintained a publicly accessible website where 
it reproduced, without authorization, full-text news articles,230 and that CalPERS sent 
daily emails to its senior officials and stakeholders with curated links to full-text articles 
reproduced on the CalPERS website.231   
Commenters reported that the infringement began in 2009, and continued until it was 
discovered in 2017.232  The News Media Alliance asserted that “[i]n total, during the 
eight-year period, CalPERS republished approximately 53,000 news articles from 
roughly 4,500 news organizations,” including “over 9,000 full-text articles from The Wall 
Street Journal, almost 6,900 from The New York Times, over 5,500 from The Los Angeles 
Times, almost 3,900 from The Sacramento Bee, and almost 2,000 from The Washington 
                                                   
225 News Media Alliance Initial Comments at 3. 
226 Id. 
227 Roundtable Tr. at 49:17–24 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Linder, Dow Jones & Company). 
228 About CalPERS: Facts at a Glance for Fiscal Year 2019–20, CALPERS, https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/forms-
publications/facts-about.pdf. 
229 News Media Alliance Initial Comments at 3; see Brief for Dow Jones & Company, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners at 4–5, 8 n.7, Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020) (No. 18-877); Roundtable Tr. at 51:10–
23 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Munter, News Media Alliance). 
230 News Media Alliance Initial Comments at 3–4; see also Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 11. 
231 News Media Alliance Initial Comments at 4; see also Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 11. 
232 News Media Alliance Initial Comments at 3 (citing Yves Smith, CalPERS Pays $3.4 Million to Dow Jones to 
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Post.”233  According to the News Media Alliance, “there was no indication that CalPERS 
had acquired a license to republish or distribute any of these articles.”234 
Copyright owners argued that CalPERS’s actions were deliberate and constituted a 
“systematic violation” of news publishers’ copyrights.235  Because of the prolonged and 
widespread nature of the infringement, publishers concluded that CalPERS actions must 
have been intentional, and not merely accidental or reckless.236  They noted many of the 
articles at issue were originally published behind paywalls and on paid news databases, 
such that obtaining the articles likely required planning and effort.237  
The News Media Alliance reported that several of its members contacted the agency to 
alert it to the infringing activity.238  In at least some cases, “CalPERS responded through 
the office of the Attorney General, indicating that it had taken down the public website 
on June 17, 2017, and that the agency was asserting sovereign immunity for all copyright 
claims.”239  The News Media Alliance stated that it is not aware of any publisher that 
filed suit against CalPERS; instead, “at least three Alliance members decided to settle the 
claims,” with settlement amounts reportedly “var[ying] between low six figures and low 
seven figures.”240   
In the News Media Alliance’s view, these amounts fall well short of the damages that 
could have been obtained had the publishers been able to pursue their claims in court.  It 
estimated that in one case, CalPERS avoided paying Dow Jones & Company “tens of 
millions of dollars” for reproducing 9,000 articles from multiple Dow Jones 
publications.241  Despite the estimated value, Dow Jones & Company was only able to 
secure a settlement of $3.4 million.242  Publishers expressed concern that even these 
reduced amounts will be difficult to obtain in the wake of Allen.243  During the 
roundtables, a representative of Dow Jones noted that the company was in the midst of 
negotiating a settlement with a government entity in another state that had allegedly 
                                                   
233 News Media Alliance Initial Comments at 4. 
234 Id.  
235 Id.  
236 Id. at 4–5. 
237 Id. at 5. 
238 Id.  
239 News Media Alliance Initial Comments at 5; see also Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 11 (stating 
that, in response to Dow Jones & Company, “CalPERS asserted that sovereign immunity exempted it from 
any liability”). 
240 News Media Alliance Initial Comments at 5. 
241 Id. at 4. 
242 Id. at 5. 
243 Roundtable Tr. at 48:03-11 (Dec. 11. 2020) (Linder, Dow Jones & Company). 
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engaged in “industrial reproduction of Dow Jones’ articles without any conceivable fair 
use.”244  The representative testified that, in response to the company’s complaint, the 
state entity pointed “directly to sovereign immunity,” citing Allen.245 
b. Music 
SoundExchange, the entity designated to collect and distribute royalties under the 
statutory licenses for certain digital public performances of sound recordings, filed 
comments describing alleged instances of infringement by state college radio stations.  
According to SoundExchange, “public college webcasters have not complied with” the 
statutory licensing requirements under sections 112 and 114 of the Copyright Act, “nor, 
to our knowledge, obtained direct licenses from copyright owners as an alternative.  In 
some cases, they have expressly refused to pay statutory royalties on sovereign 
immunity grounds.”246   
Based on an informal estimate, SoundExchange identified approximately 350 public 
campus radio stations “that appear to regularly stream music programming over the 
internet.”247  Of those, “only about two thirds (about 245 stations) [had] paid 
SoundExchange statutory royalties for 2020.”248  SoundExchange noted that, among the 
approximately 100 stations that had not paid, almost 40 had paid in 2019.249  It 
speculated that in some cases this change may have been due to “publicity concerning 
the sovereign immunity issue occasioned by the Supreme Court’s consideration of Allen 
v. Cooper,” but it acknowledged that it had “no direct evidence” of such a link.250 
SoundExchange stated that it does not maintain comprehensive records of instances in 
which it has contacted public university webcasters about these issues,251 but it provided 
specific information regarding two such communications.  First, it described 
correspondence with WUTK, the college radio station at the University of Tennessee, in 
2015 and 2016.  After conducting investigative activities that identified WUTK as a 
nonpaying service, SoundExchange had “regular contact with WUTK about obtaining 
                                                   
244 Id. at 48:12–18 (Linder, Dow Jones & Company). 
245 Id. at 48:17–18 (Linder, Dow Jones & Company). 
246 SoundExchange Initial Comments at 1.  
247 Id. at 8. 
248 Id. 
249 Id. at 9. 
250 Id. at 9, 11. 
251 Id. at 4; see also id. (“[W]e have occasionally identified college webcasters that are infringing by using 
sound recordings without licensing and have contacted them about getting licensed. . . .  [T]o the best 
recollection of the SoundExchange staff involved, we have contacted public college webcasters about 
licensing more than a few times over the years, sometimes with success and sometimes not.”). 
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license coverage for its webcasting” activities, which “culminat[ed] in a ‘final notice’ sent 
in April 2016.”252  While WUTK ultimately paid statutory royalties for 2016, the station 
“declined to take steps to address its unlicensed use of copyrighted recordings in prior 
years.”253  As an exhibit to its comments, SoundExchange submitted a letter it received 
from the University of Tennessee’s general counsel’s office stating that “[t]he University 
of Tennessee, as an arm of the State of Tennessee, is entitled to Eleventh Amendment 
immunity in federal court,” and therefore “there is no jurisdictional basis for 
SoundExchange to ‘pursue additional legal measures against WUTK’ regarding any 
request for payments to cover past years.”254  SoundExchange reported that WUTK 
“subsequently paid statutory royalties for 2017 to 2019,” but had not done so for 2020 as 
of the time SoundExchange’s comments were submitted.255 
The second public university webcaster identified by SoundExchange is WHCJ, the 
college radio station at Savannah State University.  According to SoundExchange, WHCJ 
has webcast its programming “since at least 2009” and “has never paid statutory 
royalties to SoundExchange.”256  After SoundExchange “made repeated attempts to 
contact WHCJ to address its infringing transmissions,” it received a letter from Georgia 
Department of Law asserting that the Board of Regents of the University System of 
Georgia, of which Savannah State is a member institution, “has immunity from a suit for 
damages” under the Eleventh Amendment.257  The letter stated that the state of Georgia 
nevertheless “endeavors to support the law” and that the Department of Law would 
contact SoundExchange after investigating the matter further.258  SoundExchange, 
however, has “no record of further contact about this matter from the State of 
Georgia.”259 
Several commenters representing state entities challenged the evidence presented by 
SoundExchange, arguing that it reflects only a small number of instances that do not 
amount to widespread copyright infringement.260  APLU & AAU asserted that the 
                                                   
252 Id. at 5. 
253 Id. at 6. 
254 Id. Ex. A at 1–2 (citations omitted). 
255 Id. at 6. 
256 Id. at 7, 8.   
257 Id. at 7, Ex. B at 1. 
258 Id. Ex. B at 1. 
259 Id. at 8. 
260 See, e.g., University of Michigan Library Reply Comments at 2 (“SoundExchange also relies on shaky 
evidence to show widespread infringement. . . .  Even if there are actual (and even egregious) examples of 
infringement in SoundExchange’s comment, a few examples from one or two state universities are not 
evidence of widespread infringement by state universities or other state actors across the country.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
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evidence actually shows that a “supermajority of public schools do pay royalties, which 
hardly exposes a pattern of systematic non-compliance.”261  They further challenged 
SoundExchange’s suggestion that the lack of statutory royalty payments for 2020 is 
attributable to Allen, emphasizing that the March 2020 decision in Allen came two 
months after the January due date for payments.262  And the University of Michigan 
Library faulted SoundExchange for “ignor[ing] the major adjustments their customers 
. . . fac[ed] during the pandemic,” which saw college and university campuses close at 
the beginning of March.263  One commenter also noted that SoundExchange made “no 
indication . . . of whether the purported rate of non-compliance by public colleges and 
universities is significantly higher than the non-compliance by private colleges and 
universities.”264   
c. Computer Programs 
The Software and Information Industry Association (“SIIA”), a trade association for the 
software and information industries, provided information regarding alleged 
infringement of computer software products by states.  It stated that between 2011 and 
September 2020, SIIA received “86 reports of infringement by state government entities, 
including universities, school districts, police departments, and administrative 
agencies.”265  According to SIIA, this total represents approximately one twentieth of the 
total number of infringements reported through its online piracy reporting portal.266  
These reports indicated that the number of computers involved in these cases “ranged 
from as low as five and as high as 30,000—totaling thousands of potential acts of 
infringement of member software.”267  SIIA noted that “[a]s a general rule, these works 
contained both licenses advising users of the scope of copyright protection as well as a 
                                                   
261 APLU & AAU Reply Comments at 3 (emphasis in original).  
262 Id. at 3 n.12 (noting that SoundExchange “admit[ted] that it ha[d] ‘no direct evidence linking this shift to 
Allen v. Cooper’”) (quoting SoundExchange Initial Comments at 11); id. at 3 (“It is hard to imagine . . . that 
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Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 48 (2003) (statement of Mark Bohannon, General 
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properly affixed copyright notice.”268  SIIA did not provide further details on the nature 
or resolution of these allegations. 
In addition, SIIA cited two recent cases in which software developers brought 
infringement claims against state entities in federal court.269  In the first case, a developer 
filed suit against the Nebraska Department of Education for allegedly creating an 
infringing version of a software product it had previously licensed before terminating 
the license in favor of the newly created software.270  The court granted the department’s 
motion to dismiss, holding that the state only waived sovereign immunity as to claims 
arising from the parties’ contract, but that the infringement claims arose out of the 
Copyright Act rather than the parties’ contract.271  In the second case, Oracle filed suit for 
copyright infringement, among other claims, against the Oregon Health Insurance 
Exchange Information and the State of Oregon, alleging continued use of a software 
program despite lack of payment.272  Regarding the infringement claim, the court 
concluded that Oregon waived sovereign immunity in its agreement with Oracle.273 
In a separate comment, Glenn Forbis, an intellectual property attorney in Michigan, 
described alleged instances of infringement suffered by Dassault Systèmes S.A. and its 
subsidiaries.  Dassault “is the creator of several substantial software solutions in the area 
of 3D CAD modeling applications, simulation applications, social and collaborative 
application, and information intelligence applications.”274  According to Mr. Forbis, each 
month “hundreds of entities . . . use unlicensed and illegal copies of Dassault’s software, 
many times downloaded from internet sites,” and “a substantial number of [these users] 
are public universities.”275  Mr. Forbis reported that these unlicensed uses “can reach into 
the several hundreds of thousands of dollars.”276 
Mr. Forbis stated that Dassault has contacted several public universities “seeking 
cooperation to cease the ongoing use of the unlicensed copies of Dassault’s software and 
to receive just compensation for the past unlicensed use.”277  Many times, however, 
Dassault is “ignored,” resulting in the continuance of the unlicensed uses and no 
                                                   
268 Id. 
269 Id. at 10. 
270 eScholar LLC v. Neb. Dep’t of Educ., 497 F. Supp. 3d 414, 420–21 (D. Neb. 2020). 
271 Id. at 429–30.  The court held that the breach of contract claims could go forward.  Id. at 430. 
272 Oracle Am., Inc. v. Or. Health Ins. Exch. Corp., 145 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1020–22 (D. Or. 2015). 
273 Id. at 1035–38.   
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compensation for past uses.278  In other cases, Mr. Forbis reported, the university 
representative “has flatly used the sovereign immunity of the state government from 
copyright infringement actions as an excuse to deprive Dassault of relief.”279 
d. Photographs and Video 
Copyright owners pointed to several examples of state infringement involving 
photographic works.  This evidence included both aggregated data and descriptions of 
specific allegations by individual copyright owners. 
The Copyright Alliance provided data that, in its view, indicates the pervasiveness of 
state infringement of photographs online.280  It engaged PicRights, “an international 
organization that monitors for copyright infringement involving photographs and 
assists with enforcement and claims resolution” to search for instances of state 
infringement.281  Typically, PicRights analysts crawl the internet searching for 
unauthorized uses of images, and, according to the Copyright Alliance, “frequently 
come across state entity websites that have reproduced copyright protected works of 
their clients.”282  Because “PicRights is familiar with the state sovereign immunity 
doctrine and the uncertainty surrounding state remedies,” however, the organization 
“does not prioritize tracking or responding to instances of potential state 
infringement.”283 
At the request of the Copyright Alliance, and for the purpose of this study, PicRights 
“conducted targeted searches aimed at uncovering specific instances of state copyright 
infringements,” using “state names and a list of keywords that were likely to be 
incorporated in the name of a state entity.”284  Running searches for the period between 
2017 and 2020, PicRights found “110 instances of potential infringement, with the most 
hits identifying websites for institutions of higher learning” in states such as Texas, New 
York, California, and Florida.285  PicRights also identified potential infringement on state 
entity websites for “state bar associations, visitors’ bureaus, departments of 
transportation, and hospitals.”286  According to the Copyright Alliance, “[t]hese results 
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are likely only the tip of the iceberg,” indicating that “state entities continue to make 
unauthorized use of copyright protected works online.”287 
In addition, the Copyright Alliance and several individual photographers provided the 
following allegations of specific instances of state infringement: 
• The Copyright Alliance described claims asserted by a Houston-based 
photographer, Jim Olive, against the University of Houston.288  Mr. Olive took an 
aerial photograph of the City of Houston while harnessed from a helicopter and 
made it available on his website for purchase.289  He alleges that the university 
downloaded the photograph from his website, removed all identifying marks, 
and, without authorization, displayed the photograph on several pages on its 
website to market its College of Business.290  Mr. Olive discovered the alleged 
infringement three years after the university first began displaying the image.291  
In 2017, Mr. Olive sued the university in Texas state court, contending that the 
use of the photograph constituted an unlawful taking under the federal and 
Texas state constitutions’ takings clauses.292  The Texas Court of Appeals held that 
Mr. Olive’s takings claim, based on a single alleged act of copyright infringement, 
was not viable under the federal or state takings clauses.293  In 2021, the Texas 
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment, holding that factual 
“[a]llegations of copyright infringement assert a violation of the owner’s 
copyright, but not its confiscation, and therefore . . . do not alone allege a 
taking.”294  
• The Copyright Alliance also described alleged infringement of the work of David 
K. Langford, a photographer who produces Western-themed images.295  In 2010, 
Mr. Langford discovered that one of his images had been used without his 
authorization as the background on approximately 4.5 million Texas state vehicle 
registration stickers.296  He later discovered that the image “had been scanned by 
a state prison inmate and reproduced under a Texas Department of Criminal 
                                                   
287 Id. 
288 Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 17–18. 
289 Jim Olive Photography v. Univ. of Hous. Sys., 624 S.W.3d 764, 768 (Tex. 2021). 
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291 Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 18. 
292 Id.; see Univ. of Hous. Sys. v. Jim Olive Photography, 580 S.W.3d 360 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019). 
293 See infra at 66–67. 
294 Jim Olive Photography, 624 S.W.3d at 777. 
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Justice contract with the Department of Public Safety.”297  After attempting to 
resolve the issue by contacting the agencies directly, Mr. Langford filed suit in 
Texas state court for personal property theft under Texas’s Private Property 
Rights Protection Act.298  Mr. Langford did not bring a claim for copyright 
infringement because he anticipated that the state agency would raise a 
sovereign immunity defense.299  Mr. Langford ultimately reached a settlement 
with the agency.300 
• Photographer Mike Boatman submitted comments describing alleged instances 
of infringement by government entities in two states.301  First, Mr. Boatman 
alleged that the City of Memphis, Tennessee distributed three of his images to 
Weekly Reader, a national publication circulated to public elementary schools in 
the United States.302  Because he was “[b]arred from filing federal copyright 
litigation due to sovereign immunity,” he sought damages based on the city’s 
alleged failure to return the physical transparencies containing the original 
images.303   
The second incident Mr. Boatman described involves a photograph that he took 
of Kane Wasalenchuk, a professional racquetball player.304  Mr. Boatman alleged 
that the University of North Carolina Asheville appropriated his image to market 
a physical education course on racquetball to their students.305  Mr. Boatman’s 
comment includes a letter he received from the University’s general counsel’s 
office after bringing the issue to its attention.306  The letter states that the 
photograph had been removed from the University’s website but that “[t]he 
University, as a state body, is immune from suit under the legal theory outlined 
in your letter, pursuant to 11th Amendment sovereign immunity.”307  It further 
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stated that if Mr. Boatman brought suit, the University would “pursue any and 
all actions available to it, including Rule 11 sanctions as applicable.”308   
• Ryan French, a photographer and videographer, submitted comments describing 
alleged infringement by the Florida Department of Transportation (“FDOT”).  
According to Mr. French, in 2011 the agency ran a bicycle safety campaign called 
“See the Blind Spots,” which included “public service announcements on 
broadcast television statewide.”309  Mr. French alleged that FDOT’s 
announcements included “multiple clips of accidents [Mr. French] posted on his 
website and YouTube” with his “watermark . . . intentionally blurred.”310  He 
stated that when he contacted FDOT, it “would not take responsibility for the 
problem,” blaming the “‘mistake’ on the marketing agency . . . hired to produce 
the videos.”311  Mr. French explained that “[t]he ad was pulled” and that he “filed 
a copyright complaint on the online-PSA hosted on various video platforms, but 
was not compensated.”312 
• Rick Allen, the plaintiff in Allen, submitted comments describing a separate 
instance of alleged infringement involving the state of Alabama.  He alleged that 
in 2010, the Alabama Department of Conservation and Natural Resources 
(“ADCNR”) misappropriated an underwater image he created of a rare shark, 
altered the image to remove the attribution, and displayed it on the department’s 
website.313  After becoming aware of the infringement, Mr. Allen contacted the 
ADCNR with a letter of complaint and an invoice for use of the image.314  While 
the ADCNR agreed to remove the image from its site, the agency did not pay the 
requested fee.315 
• Pixsy Inc., submitted comments describing its research into alleged state 
infringement of photographs and other visual works.  Pixsy is an “image 
licensing and copyright agent for photographers, agencies, artists, designers and 
illustrators,” with “artificial intelligence technology” that can “scan the public 
                                                   
308 Id.; see also Mike Boatman Initial Comments at 3 (same).  In their reply comments, APLU & AAU noted 
that Mr. Boatman ultimately reached a settlement with the University for $4,000, an amount they assert is 
“above the cost of a license.”  APLU & AAU Reply Comments at 12. 
309 Ryan French Initial Comments. 
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313 Rick Allen Initial Comments at 1. 
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internet” to inform their clients “where and how their images have been used.”316  
Pixsy reported 41,245 uses of client images by 1,625 U.S. postsecondary 
institutions with .edu domains, which “represents approximately $16.5 million in 
image licensing revenue for the creative industries” based on an average 
licensing fee amount of $400 per image use.317  According to Pixsy, “[t]he image 
industry has found that 85% of image uses online are unauthorized uses.”318  
Based on that percentage, it estimated that photographers and artists have likely 
lost approximately $14 million in licensing revenue to postsecondary 
institutions.319 
Pixsy argued that lost licensing fees are often unrecoverable when public 
institutions, which represent 30% of postsecondary institutions in the United 
States, are responsible for the unauthorized use.320  It alleged that “while some 
U.S. State entities pay license fees to cover the use of . . . clients’ images on their 
websites, many representatives of State entities refer to State sovereign immunity 
and do not pay a license fee as a result.”321  To support its claim, Pixsy provided a 
sample of six letters it received from representatives of state entities in response 
to requests for license fees.322  In each letter, the state entity agreed to cease its use 
of the identified third party image(s), but refused to pay the requested retroactive 
licensing fee, citing sovereign immunity.323 
e. Books 
Copyright owners provided several examples of alleged state infringement relating to 
books and similar types of literary works.   
• The Copyright Alliance’s comments described allegations asserted by Dr. Keith 
Bell, “a leading expert on sports performance enhancement” and the author of 
several books, including Winning Isn’t Normal and The Nuts and Bolts of Psychology 
for Swimmers.324  Dr. Bell also testified on his own behalf during the roundtables.  
According to the Copyright Alliance, while Dr. Bell “has identified infringement 
by a variety of individuals and organizations, ranging from small business to 
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Fortune 500 companies,” the “most common and damaging infringement Dr. Bell 
comes across has been by state entities, specifically by public schools, 
universities, and colleges.”325  Dr. Bell testified that state entities have 
“distributed [and] disseminated” his registered books “out to, literally, millions 
of people without any kind of remuneration from them.”326  Providing an 
example, he alleged that “eight of the[] sports [teams]” at the University of 
Louisville “infringed on [his] copyright, [and] gave attribution to anonymous.”327  
He reported to the Copyright Alliance that he has “personally sent cease and 
desist letters to at least nine universities and colleges” and “more than 100 public 
school districts.”328  But he has “not pursued copyright infringement claims 
against roughly 120 other universities and colleges and many hundreds of public 
schools because of likely sovereign immunity defenses.”329   
• The Copyright Alliance described allegations by Michael Bynum, an author who 
has written and edited over 125 books profiling college and professional 
athletes.330  The Copyright Alliance recounted that “[a]fter spending over ten 
years researching” a “biography of Texas A&M University’s football legend E. 
King Gill,” and “sending a draft to members of the Texas A&M Athletic 
Department for help locating additional photos for the book, in 2014 Mr. Bynum 
became aware that the University had reprinted word-for-word portions of the 
unpublished biography and distributed them to thousands of people over the 
internet through its newsletter and through social media.”331 
Mr. Bynum filed suit against the Texas A&M Athletic Department in federal 
court, asserting claims for copyright infringement and unlawful takings, and a 
claim under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.332  According to the 
Copyright Alliance, “[d]espite presenting clear evidence of the infringement,” the 
Southern District of Texas dismissed the claims because “the department is not a 
separate legal entity and lacks capacity to be sued,” and would not permit Mr. 
Bynum to “substitute the University [] as the proper defendant” because “it is a 
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state entity and protected by sovereign immunity.”333  The state unlawful takings 
claim was dismissed “as barred by sovereign immunity, and his federal takings 
claims were dismissed for not being ripe because plaintiffs failed to allege that he 
pursued claims in state court under Texas’s inverse condemnation procedure, 
which is required before alleging a federal takings claim.”334 
• Also alleging state infringement by Texas A&M University, Andrea Johnson, 
founder of C Math is Easy, an organization that offers in-person and online 
tutoring services, testified that the university misappropriated and distributed 
several of her math tutoring packets without her authorization.335  Specifically, 
Ms. Johnson discovered her “workbook retyped” into a math packet distributed 
by the university’s Upward Bound program.336  She asserted that the program 
“lifted at least 30, 40 pages of the meat of [her] workbook” and that the infringing 
work was then “given to high schools in [her] district.”337  Ms. Johnson explained 
that every attorney she approached for help advised that her copyright 
infringement claim could not be remedied due to sovereign immunity.338   
• The Copyright Alliance also reported an account involving the work of Dr. 
Walter Whittle.  As an independent contractor who retains the copyright in the 
proprietary materials provided to his clients, Dr. Whittle “has worked to develop 
unique competency-based job descriptions for over one third of all school 
districts in Ohio.”339  According to the Copyright Alliance, in 2010, Dr. Whittle 
discovered that “a South Carolina high school teacher had posted part of his 
materials on the internet.”340  Concerned that similar infringements may be 
occurring, Dr. Whittle “soon documented 137 violations by separate school 
districts.”341  Dr. Whittle ultimately settled twenty-seven of the violations out of 
court, but he believes that these settlements “fell well short of compensating him 
for his loss and expenses,” which he estimated to be in excess of $685,000.342   
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State representatives responded that these examples fall short of establishing a pattern of 
intentional infringement, arguing that the allegations failed to account for fair use and 
other defenses available to the state.343  With respect to Dr. Bell’s allegations specifically, 
APLU & AAU argued that he is “an odd case study for the Copyright Alliance to 
highlight,” given that courts have dismissed several of his claims on the merits.344  In 
their view, this indicates that many of his allegations “have serious deficiencies and, at 
worse, are pursued in bad faith, or, at best, involve facts subject to reasonable 
dispute.”345 
State representatives also argued that even “in instances when copyright infringement 
by employees of state colleges and universities is intentional, copyright holders do have 
recourse against those employees.”346  APLU & AAU cite Mr. Bynum’s case against Texas 
A&M Athletic Department as an example, noting that while the court “granted Texas 
A&M’s motion to dismiss all claims based on sovereign immunity and also dismissed 
two claims against defendant employees under qualified immunity (and failure to state 
a claim), the court allowed claims against one remaining employee . . . to proceed.”347 
f. Other 
The Office received one additional comment describing alleged infringements of works 
that do not clearly fall into any of the categories above.348  Patricia Ward Kelly, the 
widow of dancer, actor, and director Gene Kelly, submitted comments describing an 
instance in which she became aware that an individual “intended to edit a collection of 
[Mr. Kelly’s] interviews to be published by The University Press of Mississippi without 
obtaining the necessary permissions.”349  Ms. Kelly stated that when her attorneys 
contacted the editor and the publisher to inform them that the materials were protected 
by copyright, they “refused to provide any information” about the intended contents of 
                                                   
343 See, e.g., APLU & AAU Reply Comments at 6–9; Roundtable Tr. at 19:05–15 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Benson, 
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the book.350  Ms. Kelly subsequently engaged in a “legal battle to preserve control over 
[Mr. Kelly’s] intellectual property and [her] rights as the designated custodian of that 
property,” including filing an infringement suit and seeking an “injunction to block the 
publication” of the book.351  The court ultimately dismissed the lawsuit, finding that the 
infringement claim was not ripe.352  The court concluded “that no copyright 
infringement ha[d] yet occurred,” as the defendant was still “‘early in the process of 
researching and selecting interviews [for the book, and she] . . . ha[d] not made any final 
decisions yet on what interviews to include.’”353   
Ms. Kelly also alleged that the University of Kentucky Press “refused [her] attorney’s 
request regarding yet “another publication misappropriating [Mr. Kelly’s] words.”354  In 
addition, she stated that “the University Press of Kansas has similarly embarked upon a 
publication without any of the necessary permissions granted for the use of Gene’s 
intellectual property.”355  Ms. Kelly did not provide further details on either of these 
instances.356 
 Effect on Licensing  
In the NOI, the Office inquired into the extent to which sovereign immunity may affect 
the licensing or sale of copyrighted works to state entities.357  Specifically, the Office 
asked (1) whether copyright owners “provide different payment or licensing terms in 
transactions with state entities than are provided in transactions with other parties”; (2) 
whether copyright owners have “changed aspects of their sales or licensing practices as 
a result of state sovereign immunity”; and (3) whether “different states or state entities 
take different approaches to working with copyrighted material.”358 
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In response, several commenters generally described the negative impact that sovereign 
immunity has on creators’ licensing markets and licensing opportunities,359 but provided 
few specific examples.  AIPLA suggested that there may be such an effect in the context 
of educational licensing, noting that because a “large percentage of U.S. educational 
institutions are public or at least partially state- funded[,] . . . such institutions have 
substantial market power to drive down licensing fees.”360  AIPLA contended that states 
often acquire educational materials “through individual employees that utilize 
discretionary budgets to acquire low-cost copies, which avoids formal school board 
ratification, statutory public bidding procedures for government contracts and/or 
procurement policies.”361  “In such cases,” it asserted, “state actors that exceed the scope 
of a license can later disavow the license and claim that the content owner is ‘chargeable 
with notice’ of government contracting procedures that were not followed.”362  AIPLA 
did not, however, identify specific state entities that have engaged in such practices.  
Other commenters described the ways in which state infringement can result in lost 
licensing revenue,363 but did not provide examples of differences in pricing or licensing 
terms offered to states compared to those offered to private entities. 
Conversely, several commenters and roundtable participants indicated that copyright 
owners do not provide different licensing or payment terms to state entities.364  For 
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Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 2; University of Michigan Library Initial Comments 1–2; University 
of Minnesota Initial Comments at 2; Roundtable Tr. at 67:10–13 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Madigan, Copyright 
Alliance); Roundtable Tr. at 72:09–13 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Sedlik, Art Center College of Design, PLUS Coalition); 
Roundtable Tr. at 120:22–121:03 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Molnar, Ohio Attorney General’s Office); Roundtable Tr. at 
121:16–18 (Dec. 11, 2020) (MacDonald, University of California, Office of General Counsel).  But see News 
Media Alliance Initial Comments at 4 (“[A]ll news publishers offer different terms and licenses to their 
clients, often depending on the type of client and license sought . . . .”). 
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example, the University of Minnesota stated, “[w]e are not familiar with any variations 
in copyright-related terms around licensing or sales of copyrighted works to the 
University of Minnesota that are due specifically to our status as an arm of the state 
government.”365  A representative of the PLUS Coalition, an initiative to facilitate 
licensing of image rights, similarly noted that in his experience, “the license terms 
employed by visual artists in contracting with the states are no different than the license 
terms they use when contracting with other parties.”366  More generally, several 
representatives of state universities emphasized the substantial amounts their 
institutions spend on licensing fees each year, which they believe refutes the suggestion 
that states are exercising undue bargaining power in negotiations for copyrighted 
content.367  
IV. STATE POLICIES TO PREVENT INFRINGEMENT 
As part of this study, the Office invited comments on policies and practices that state 
entities have developed to prevent infringement by their employees.368  In addition, the 
Office devoted a session of its roundtable discussion to this topic.  The record developed 
for this study indicates that many state universities and libraries have developed policies 
regarding the proper use of copyrighted materials.  As noted below, however, very little 
evidence was submitted regarding the policies of other types of state entities.369  As a 
result, it is unclear to what extent they have policies similar to those at universities, or to 
what extent they may provide education to employees about the appropriate use of 
copyrighted material.370   
                                                   
365 University of Minnesota Initial Comments at 2. 
366 Roundtable Tr. at 72:09–13 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Sedlik, Art Center College of Design, PLUS Coalition). 
367 See id. at 70:13–15 (Benson, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) (“[O]ur library is one of the 
largest in the world.  We spend $16 million in licensing fees.”); Id. at 121:08–16 (MacDonald, University of 
California, Office of General Counsel) (“We pay approximately $100 million every year in library content. . . 
.  Some campuses pay well into the tens of millions of dollars a year.  This is just library content.  This is 
separate from a lot of other content that we license for.”); id. at 122:09–13 (Levine, University of Michigan 
Library) (“[C]urrently, in our library, we spent in the range of $29 million on collections, meaning things that 
we license and purchase.”); id. at 247:20–22 (Vockell, University of Texas) (“[O]ur libraries [are] spending $60 
million” on licenses.). 
368 NOI at 34,255. 
369 Commenters provided a handful of examples of such policies by other agencies.  The News Media 
Alliance noted that California’s Attorney General has issued policy guidelines admonishing state agencies to 
respect copyrights.  News Media Alliance Initial Comments at 5 & n.16.  During the roundtables, Maria 
Sapiandante, an intellectual property attorney who represents state agencies, noted that the state of 
California mandates that its employees undergo training about copyright.  Roundtable Tr. at 33:10–19 (Dec. 
11, 2020) (Sapiandante, citing and discussing Cal. Gov’t Code 13988).   
370 See Roundtable Tr. at 173:08–174:11 (Dec. 11, 202) (Klaus).  One university library representative testified 
that librarians help provide copyright training to non-university state agencies and institutions, but did not 
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A. Legal and Organizational Rules  
 The Higher Education Opportunity Act  
Commenters representing state universities pointed to the Higher Education 
Opportunity Act (“HEOA”) as a legal basis to ensure their compliance with copyright 
law.371  The HEOA is a federal statute that requires institutions receiving federal funding 
to take certain measures to discourage copyright infringement.  The HEOA has two 
provisions that are particularly relevant to this topic.  Section 488(a)(i)(E) requires 
institutions to “explicitly inform[] students that unauthorized distribution of 
copyrighted material . . . may subject the students to civil and criminal penalties”372 and 
to describe “the institution’s policies with respect to unauthorized peer-to-peer file 
sharing” and what discipline students may face.373  Section 493 requires an institution to 
“develop[] plans to effectively combat the unauthorized distribution of copyrighted 
material” and “to the extent practicable, offer alternatives to illegal downloading or 
peer-to-peer distribution of intellectual property, as determined by the institution in 
consultation with the chief technology officer or other designated officer of the 
institution.”374   
The first of those provisions is aimed primarily at students, not university employees.  
Although the second provision applies more generally to the institution and its policies, 
it focuses on distribution and file sharing, rather than copying and use more generally.  
Moreover, it is unclear from the record the extent to which university policies under 
HEOA focus on actions by employees, as opposed to students.  Despite these limitations, 
the HEOA’s requirement that the institution have a copyright policy that is 
communicated to its constituencies, may reduce the overall incidence of infringement, 
including unauthorized copying.   
 Copyright Policies Developed by State Institutions 
Several of the comments submitted by state universities highlighted institutional policies 
that have been developed to prevent or respond to copyright infringement.  The 
University of Minnesota noted the existence of several written policies relating to the use 
                                                   
provide details about the nature or extent of such training.  See Roundtable Tr. at 174:13–176:04 (Dec. 11, 
2020) (Samberg, University of California, Berkeley). 
371 APLU & AAU Reply Comments at 13; Roundtable Tr. at 96:12–16 (Dec. 11, 2020) (MacDonald, University 
of California, Office of the General Counsel). 
372 20 U.S.C. § 1092(a)(1)(P)(i). 
373 Id. § 1092(a)(1)(P)(ii)–(iii). 
374 Id. § 1094(a)(29)(A), (B). 
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of copyrighted materials.375  It also has a web page that instructs copyright owners on 
the University’s procedures for reporting infringement, including the emails of 
university personnel and the information needed to respond to the report.376  In the same 
vein, the University of Illinois pointed to its policies to combat infringement,377	and 
comments from APLU & AAU provided links to other university policies relating to 
copyright infringement.378  Although the extent of the information provided varies, these 
websites generally provide basic information about copyright law and a series of 
frequently asked questions, many of which deal with file sharing and uses of 
copyrighted materials in teaching (both online and in-class).379  Most contain a 
description of fair use.380  They also direct students and faculty with specific questions to 
an appropriate office of the university.381 
Library representatives highlighted similar policies.		Yvonne Dooley, a business librarian 
and copyright specialist at the University of North Texas, stated that the university has a 
                                                   
375 University of Minnesota Initial Comments at 4 ( discussing, and providing URLs to, the Board of Regents’ 
policy on copyright, the University’s, Acceptable Use of Information Technology Resources policy, the 
University’s policy on research misconduct policy, and the University’s policy on Teaching and Learning: 
Student Responsibilities). 
376 Id. at 4–6. 
377 University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Initial Comments at 1 (describing outreach efforts and 
providing a URL for its copyright policy).  See University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries Initial 
Comments at 2 (stating that “copyright infringement is viewed as a related ethical issue [to plagiarism], and 
significant educational outreach is done to prevent such issues before they occur”). 
378 APLU & AAU Initial Comments at 5 n.13 (listing several university policies and providing the URLs 
where they may be accessed).  ASERL also noted that state librarians can (and do) take advantage of library-
focused copyright programming, such as the “CopyrightX: Libraries” online course and specialized 
copyright events targeted at librarians.  ASERL Initial Comments at 3–4 & n.11–16 (providing examples of 
copyright-focused programming and online classes that “have been joined by thousands of learners drawn 
from the library community”). 
379 E.g., University of Kentucky, Copyright Resource Center, https://www.uky.edu/copyright (last visited Aug. 
10, 2021); Purdue University, University Copyright Office, https://www.lib.purdue.edu/uco (last visited Aug. 
10, 2021); The Ohio State University, Copyright Services, https://library.osu.edu/copyright (last visited Aug. 
10, 2021); Michigan State University, Office of Copyright, https://lib.msu.edu/copyright (last visited Aug. 10, 
2021). 
380 E.g., Purdue University, University Copyright Office, https://www.lib.purdue.edu/uco (last visited Aug. 10, 
2021); The Ohio State University, Copyright Services, https://library.osu.edu/copyright (last visited Aug. 10, 
2021); University of California-Santa Cruz, Fair Use and Copyright, https://guides.library.ucsc.edu/fair-use 
(last visited Aug. 10, 2021); University of Michigan, Copyright Services, https://www.lib.umich.edu/research-
and-scholarship/copyright-services (last visited Aug. 10, 2021). 
381 E.g., University of Kentucky, Copyright Resource Center, https://www.uky.edu/copyright/contact (last 
visited Aug. 10, 2021); Michigan State University, Office of Copyright, https://lib.msu.edu/copyright (last 
visited Aug. 10, 2021); Purdue University, University Copyright Office, https://www.lib.purdue.edu/uco (last 
visited Aug. 10, 2021); The University of Texas System, UTS 107 Use of Copyrighted Materials; 
https://www.utsystem.edu/sites/policy-library/policies/uts-107-use-of-copyrighted-materials (last visited 
Aug. 10, 2021). 
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“copyright compliance policy” that gives examples of uses that comply with the law, 
imparts information on legal penalties, and describes university discipline policies with 
respect to copyright infringement.382  Rachael Samberg, a librarian at the University of 
California, Berkeley, spoke about the copyright policies created by the library, including 
specific policies governing the digitization of the library’s collection383  According to Ms. 
Samberg, within the University of California system, there are multiple layers of policies 
relating to copyright—some are system-wide, some campus-wide, and some operate at a 
departmental level.384 
B. Educational Efforts 
Commenters also noted that state institutions invest substantial amounts of time and 
effort to educate faculty, students, and other employees about copyright infringement 
issues.385  As examples, commenters pointed to disciplinary codes and information 
provided over email to inform students and others about university policies concerning 
copyright;386 online resources that educate the university community about copyright 
infringement and best practices;387 and collaborations with campus partners to provide 
copyright instruction.388  In addition, several participants at the roundtable spoke about 
outreach efforts to educate university components and other institutions and agencies 
on copyright matters.  Harold Evans, Associate Vice President, Legal and Research at the 
University of Arkansas System, stated that he delivers a “Copyright 101” presentation at 
the various campuses, in order “to advise faculty and staff on what their rights and 
responsibilities are under the Copyright Act.”389  Raven Lanier, of the University of 
Michigan, described her efforts with a variety of institutional constituencies, including 
those developing course materials, “to educate and consult on matters of copyright.”390  
Douglas Shontz, Chief Intellectual Property Counsel for the University of Illinois, stated 
that its copyright librarians has had numerous “one-on-one consultations” with students 
                                                   
382 Roundtable Tr. at 138:03–13 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Dooley, University of North Texas). 
383 Id. at 148:05–149:03 (Samberg, University of California, Berkeley).  Ms. Samberg also adverted to policies 
in other areas, such as course materials and copying library materials.  Id. at 152:17–20 (Samberg, University 
of California, Berkeley).  Brandon Butler stated that the University of Virginia library also has a removal 
policy when notified that digitized material may be infringing.  Id. at 150:01–06 (Butler, ASERL, Software 
Preservation Network). 
384 Id. at 151:05-22 (Samberg, University of California, Berkeley). 
385 APLU & AAU Initial Comments at 5–6. 
386 University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Initial Comments at 1. 
387 ASERL Initial Comments at 3. 
388 University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Initial Comments at 1.   
389 Roundtable Tr. at 139:09–21 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Evans, University of Arkansas). 
390 Id. at 142:22–143:16 (Lanier, University of Michigan Library). 
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and faculty concerning copyright compliance.391  Brandon Butler, a representative of 
ASERL, noted that the ASERL has programs to inform their members about best 
practices in dealing with copyrighted material, and that it conducts webinars to assist 
institutions with copyright compliance.392 
Commenters additionally pointed out that many institutions have full-time staff 
dedicated to copyright policy and education.  The University of Michigan Library noted 
that it established a copyright office in the mid-2000s to provide “copyright information 
and education to the U-M community through research guides, workshops, and 
individual consultations.”393  The University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries hired a 
copyright specialist in 2012 to help educate the university community about copyright 
law.394  In written comments, the specialist stated that she has spent “hundreds of hours 
of consultations and trainings on my campus,” as well as conducting training sessions 
on other University of Massachusetts campuses.395  She also indicated that the University 
has attorneys and others who can provide personal consultations for students and 
faculty regarding claims of copyright infringement.396    
C. Cultural Norms and Expectations 
Finally, state representatives argued that more informal cultural and reputational 
considerations further reduce the likelihood of widespread intentional infringement by 
state educational institutions.  The University of Massachusetts Libraries noted that 
universities treat plagiarism, for example, “as a serious ethical matter warranting 
disciplinary action.”397  Other commenters asserted that universities have an interest, as 
                                                   
391 Id. at 146:12–17 (Shontz, University of Illinois).  In addition, the University of Illinois Press stated that it 
provides authors who submit manuscripts to it with detailed instructions to prevent copyright 
infringement.  University of Illinois Library and the University of Illinois Press Reply Comments at 2 
(providing the URL containing these instructions); see also Association of University Presses Reply 
Comments at 1–2 (noting the resources invested by university presses relating to copyright and referring to 
the organization’s website, which contains guidelines for authors relating to copyright infringement). 
392 Roundtable Tr. at 135:08–36:09 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Butler, ASERL, Software Preservation Network). 
393 University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries Initial Comments at 2.  This comment also noted that 
other “state colleges and universities employ copyright specialists who provide similar services to their 
communities and the public at large.”  Id.  
394 University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries Initial Comments at 1.  The specialist “was hired, not in 
response to complaints from rightsholders about infringement, but out of the proactive desire of the 
University to assist faculty and staff in understanding their rights and responsibilities under copyright.”  Id. 
395 Id. at 3.  
396 Id. at 2–3.  In the last eight years, the University has received “virtually no complaints of infringement.” 
Id. at 3. 
397 University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries Initial Comments at 2; see also University of Minnesota 
Initial Comments at 1 (“The general culture in state governments and educational and research institutions 
is one of compliance with relevant legal and ethical considerations as a matter of course.”). 
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creators of copyrighted material, to respect and support copyrights.398  Sara Benson, 
Copyright Librarian at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, stated that “we, 
at the universities, have a lot of creators[.] . . .  [W]e create scholarship, we create 
books.”399  William Thro, of the University of Kentucky, similarly noted that “universities 
are creators of copyright and various other intellectual property . . . .  We want our 
employees to do that, and we want to take advantage of that, so we’re not going to do 
anything intentionally to undermine that from happening.”400  Others observed that state 
universities and administrators do not want to foster a reputation for being infringers, 401 
and that state legislators would not wish the universities to be so perceived.402  As 
Yunxaio Xu of the University of Michigan Library stated, “[w]e can’t just go about 
infringing copyrights or we wouldn’t even get any funds from our state legislature 
anymore.”403  
V. Existing Remedies 
The Supreme Court held in Allen that a state does not violate the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment “unless it fails to offer an adequate remedy” for the relevant 
unconstitutional conduct.404  The Court held that the CRCA’s legislative record was 
insufficient to establish such a failure, as it reflected little consideration of “the 
availability of state-law remedies for copyright infringement.”405  The first part of this 
section describes the Office’s findings regarding various state-law causes of action that 
have been identified as potential alternative remedies for copyright owners against state 
entities.  In addition, although the availability of federal remedies does not bear directly 
on the abrogation issue, the second part of this section discusses copyright owners’ 
ability to obtain injunctive relief against state officials in federal court, as well as other 
                                                   
398 University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries Initial Comments at 7 (“[N]ot only do educators and 
librarians not infringe ‘intentionally or recklessly’, but that our community is among the most respectful and 
supportive of rightsholders’ interests and prerogatives.”) (emphasis in original); id. at 6 (“The one consistent 
thread that runs through all my consultations is concern on the parts of librarians, academic authors, and 
administrators, for ‘doing the right thing.’”).  
399 Roundtable Tr. at 21:06–08 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Benson, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign). 
400 Id. at 27:17–21 (Thro, University of Kentucky). 
401 APLU & AAU Initial Comments at 6; Roundtable Tr. at 163:19–164:05 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Lanier, University  
of Michigan Library); Roundtable Tr. at 161:01–03 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Samberg, University of California, 
Berkley) (“[T]he reputation of the university is at stake whenever the university is taking action with respect 
to its policies and decision-making on copyright”); see Roundtable Tr. at 158:17–19 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Butler, 
ASERL, Software Preservation Network) (“[A]cademics generally are afraid to engage in anything they 
think might come within a mile of something unlawful”). 
402 Roundtable Tr. at 168:09–11 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Evans, University of Arkansas) (“[P]ublic universities have to 
be very concerned about taking actions that will upset members of the state legislature”).  
403 Id. at 216:09–11 (Xu, University of Michigan Library). 
404 Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1004. 
405 Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1006 (2020). 
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potential alternative federal causes of action, to provide Congress with a fuller picture of 
the overall state of the law in this area. 
A. Potential Remedies in State Court 
 Waiver to Suit in State Court  
Before turning to specific causes of action, the Office notes at the outset that the 
availability of any state-law claim against a state is dependent upon the state having 
waived its sovereign immunity to suit in its own courts.  As part of this study, the Office 
surveyed the constitutional and statutory provisions of every state and the District of 
Columbia pertaining to waivers of immunity.  A chart summarizing the Office’s findings 
is provided in Appendix E.  Most states have waived their sovereign immunity with 
respect to at least some state-law claims.  Twenty-eight states constitutionally authorize 
their state legislatures to specify the procedures and requirements for private suits 
against states and state entities.  An additional nineteen states and the District of 
Columbia do not have express constitutional provisions addressing the issue but have 
enacted statutes permitting such suits.  By contrast, three state constitutions direct that 
the state shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity.406 
Among the states that have waived immunity, the procedural and substantive 
requirements for bringing such actions vary.  Thirty-seven states waive immunity for tort 
actions against the state, and fifteen states permit contract claims.  Some states require 
pre-authorization by a designated official prior to filing a claim or review of the findings 
of the state official by the state legislature,407 while others limit jurisdiction to particular 
causes of action to be brought in specially designated courts or claims commissions.408   
                                                   
406 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 14; ARK. CONST. art. 5V, § 20; W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 35.   
407 See e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4-160(a) (effective June 28, 2021) (“Whenever the Claims Commissioner deems 
it just and equitable, the Claims Commissioner may authorize suit against the state on any claim which, in 
the opinion of the Claims Commissioner, presents an issue of law or fact under which the state, were it a 
private person, could be liable.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-32-7 (2018) (“After the conclusion of . . . [the] 
hearing, the commissioner shall prepare his findings, fully itemized, in respect to the amount of the claim or 
damages” and “[s]uch findings shall be filed in the office of the clerk of courts of the county in which the 
petition was filed and a duplicate thereof filed in the Office of the Governor, who shall submit the same to 
the next session of the Legislature for consideration, compromise, settlement, or rejection by appropriate 
action.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 46-907 et seq. (providing for consideration of claims by legislature’s joint 
committee on special claims against the state). 
408 See e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 19-10-201–223, 21-5-701–708, 6-82-501–507 (2021) (establishing a claims 
commission for the hearing and adjudication of claims against the state of Arkansas, its agencies, and its 
institutions); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/8 (effective Nov. 27, 2018) (establishing exclusive jurisdiction in 
Court of Claims for state-law, contract, and tort claims against state); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (“The North 
Carolina Industrial Commission is hereby constituted a court for the purpose of hearing and passing upon 
tort claims against the State Board of Education, the Board of Transportation, and all other departments, 
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 Effect of Federal Preemption  
Even where a state has waived its immunity with respect to particular causes of action 
brought in state court, the doctrine of federal preemption remains a hurdle.  Section 301 
of the Copyright Act preempts state law claims regarding “all legal or equitable rights 
that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as 
specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of 
expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 
and 103” of the Act.409  Under this provision, state courts are precluded from 
adjudicating claims if (1) the work at issue falls within the “subject matter of copyright,” 
and (2) the claimed rights are “equivalent to” the exclusive rights specified in section 
106.410 
Courts generally hold that a right is “equivalent” to a section 106 right if no extra 
element is required to prove a violation of the right instead of or in addition to the 
elements required to prove copyright infringement.411  The Second Circuit has clarified 
that “[w]hile we have indeed begun by inquiring whether ‘an extra element is required 
instead of or in addition to’ what is required for a copyright infringement claim, not all 
‘extra elements’ are sufficient to remove the claim from the ‘general scope’ 
of copyright.”412  The “critical inquiry” is whether such additional elements “change[] 
the nature of the action so that it is qualitatively different from a copyright infringement 
claim.”413   
Courts have held that section 301 preempts a variety of tort claims, including some that 
appear to require an “extra element,” when the underlying nature of the claim sought to 
                                                   
institutions and agencies of the State.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-32-8,  21-32-3–7 (2018) (providing for 
advisory proceedings before commissioner).  
409 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). 
410 Id.; see Crow v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1224, 1225–26 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984). 
411 See Maloney v. T3Media, Inc., 853 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2017) (“To survive preemption, the state cause of 
action must protect rights which are qualitatively different from the copyright rights. The state claim must 
have an extra element which changes the nature of the action”) (quoting Laws v. Sony Music Ent., Inc., 448 
F.3d 1134, 1143 (9th Cir. 2006)); Forest Park Pictures v. Universal TV Network, Inc., 683 F.3d 424, 430 (2d Cir. 
2012) (“[I]f an extra element is required instead of or in addition to the acts of reproduction, performance, 
distribution or display, in order to constitute a state-created cause of action, there is no preemption”) 
(quoting Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 716 (2d Cir.1992)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283, 287 n.3 (6th Cir. 2005) (“If there is no ‘extra element,’ or the ‘extra 
elements’ are merely ‘illusory,’ then the claim is equivalent to a copyright action,” and it is preempted) 
(citing Wrench v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 454 (6th Cir. 2001)).  
412 Jackson v. Roberts (In re Jackson), 972 F.3d 25, 43–44 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Comput. Assocs. Int’l., Inc. v. Altai, 
Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 716 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
413 Comput. Assocs. Int’l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 716 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & 
Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1535 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)). 
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vindicate an exclusive section 106 right, including tortious interference with a contract or 
a business relationship,414 misappropriation,415 conversion of intangible property,416 
unjust enrichment,417 and unfair competition.418  In other cases, however, courts have 
held that claims based on conversion of personal property,419 unfair trade practices,420 
                                                   
414 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that plaintiff’s 
tortious interference claim based on defendant’s publication of excerpts from plaintiff’s manuscript was 
preempted because it sought to recover the right to authorize the creation of derivative works) rev’d on other 
grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).  
415 NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 851–54 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that plaintiff’s commercial 
misappropriation claim based on defendant’s delivery of real-time game scores was preempted because 
plaintiff’s allegations were “virtually synonymous” with “wrongful copying” and “are in no meaningful 
fashion distinguishable from infringement of a copyright”); see Mktg. Info. Masters, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. 
State Univ. Sys., 552 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1098 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that plaintiff’s misappropriation of trade 
secret claim was preempted because it lacked the ‘extra element’ of ‘disclosure’ of a secret in contravention 
of a specific duty to keep that information confidential) (quoting Idema v. Dreamworks, Inc., 162 F.Supp.2d 
1129, 1195 (C.D. Cal.2001)) (internal quotations omitted).  
416 Harper & Row, Publishers., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that plaintiff’s 
conversion claim based on defendant’s publication of excerpts from plaintiff’s manuscript was preempted 
because the right plaintiff sought to protect was “control over reproduction and derivative use 
of copyrighted material.”); see R.D. Wolf, Inc. v. Brancard, No. CV010507650S, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 720 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 8, 2004) (holding that plaintiff’s conversion claim was preempted because plaintiff 
did not seek relief for the actual physical deprivation of the architectural plans (the property), but for the 
subsequent actions taken with the plans by defendant); Richdale Dev. Co. v. McNeil Co., 508 N.W.2d 853 (Neb. 
1993) (holding that plaintiff’s conversion claim was preempted because the essence of the claim was 
plaintiff’s damage resulting from reproduction and distribution of architectural plans and not physical 
deprivation of the plans). 
417 Briarpatch Ltd., L.P. v. Phx. Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 306 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that plaintiff’s unjust 
enrichment claim based on defendants turning plaintiff’s book into a motion picture was preempted because 
the “specific right they are trying to enforce is the right of adaptation -- i.e., the right to prepare or authorize 
preparation of a derivative work based on a novel or screenplay”). 
418 Kodadek v. MTV Networks, Inc., 152 F.3d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that plaintiff’s unfair 
competition claim based on defendant’s “publishing and placing on the market” plaintiff’s copyrighted 
images was preempted); Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 53 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that plaintiff’s 
unfair competition claim based on defendants’ use of plaintiff’s book in a motion picture was preempted “to 
the extent it seeks protection against copying” of plaintiff’s book). 
419 Nika Corp. v. City of Kan. City, 582 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (holding that plaintiff’s conversion of 
personal property claim based on city’s conversion of certain documents and materials which plaintiff 
claimed were its exclusive property after termination of contract was not preempted). 
420 Balboa Ins. Co. v. Trans Glob. Equities, 1351, 267 Cal. Rptr. 787, 802 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1990) (holding 
that “copyright does not preempt a cause of action based on breach of confidence”); see Comput. Assocs. Int’l., 
Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 717 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that unfair competition claims based upon breaches 
of confidential relationships” are not preempted by federal copyright law). 
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trade secret misappropriation,421 and civil theft or fraud422 include a “sufficiently 
significant” extra element to avoid preemption.  
If a state law claim based on copyright infringement by a state entity is not preempted, 
the copyright owner nevertheless will have more limited remedies than are available 
under federal copyright law.  The Copyright Act allows a copyright owner who timely 
registers its copyright to collect statutory damages ranging from $750 to $150,000 per 
work infringed and recover attorneys’ fees.423  The Act also allows a copyright owner 
seeking actual damages to present proof only of the infringer’s gross revenue, after 
which the infringer has the burden to “prove his or her deductible expenses and the 
elements of profit attributable to factors other than the copyrighted work.”424  A 
copyright owner bringing a state-law claim is not eligible for statutory damages and 
generally is not eligible for attorneys’ fees; it must prove its actual damages under the 
relevant state law.  Some states limit the sum of monetary awards available against a 
state, so  that the actual harm suffered by the plaintiff may exceed the award permitted 
under the law.425   
Commenters representing copyright owners suggested that these limits on remedies 
makes litigation against states a more daunting and expensive prospect.  The News 
Media Alliance pointed to the CalPERS infringement case involving Dow Jones as an 
example.  Dow Jones estimated that its actual damages were “approximately $22 million 
and its statutory damages award would have been about $7.3 million” at a $750 
statutory rate.426  But because CalPERS asserted sovereign immunity, Dow Jones 
                                                   
421 Comput. Assocs. Int’l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 717 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that “[t]he defendant’s 
breach of duty is the gravamen of [certain] trade secret claims, and supplies the ‘extra element’ that 
qualitatively distinguishes such trade secret causes of action from claims for copyright infringement that are 
based solely upon copying”). 
422 Korman v. Iglesias, 736 F. Supp. 261 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (holding that plaintiff’s claim for civil theft under 
Florida Statutes §§ 772.11 and 812.014 was not preempted by the Copyright Act because the civil theft cause 
of action did not contain the same elements as a copyright cause of action; defendant’s scienter, knowingly 
making false representations, did not correspond to the scienter set forth in 17 U.S.C.S. § 506). 
423 17 U.S.C. §§ 412, 504(c)(1)–(2).  Statutory damages and attorneys’ fees are available only for infringement 
that begins on or after the effective date of registration of the work(s) at issue or within three months of first 
publication.  17 U.S.C. § 412.  
424 17 U.S.C. § 504(b). 
425 See e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-15 (2018) (“In any claim or suit for damages against a governmental 
entity or its employee brought under the provisions of this chapter, the liability shall not exceed” “the sum 
of Five Hundred Thousand Dollars” “for all claims arising out of a single occurrence”); MINN. STAT. § 3.736 
subd. 4 & 4a (2020) (establishing limits on monetary liability of the state). 
426 Roundtable Tr.at 47:09–13 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Linder, Dow Jones & Company); Brief for Dow Jones & 
Company, Inc. as Amicus Curiae 8–9 n.7, Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020). 
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ultimately accepted a settlement offer of $3.4 million.427  Copyright owners also 
expressed concern that “the damages for a claim of breach of contract are both lower and 
less certain than those available under the Copyright Act,” so that “the remedies 
available in such cases do not necessarily justify the costs.”428  In contrast, state 
representatives expressed concern that allowing suits seeking statutory damages could 
have a chilling effect on legitimate activities of state research libraries429 and lead to 
increased litigation, much of which they believe may be frivolous.430 
 Contract Claims 
Claims involving a breach of contract are less likely to be preempted by section 301 
because the claim requires the existence of a contract, which is not an element of a claim 
for copyright infringement.431  Some representatives of state university libraries argued 
that the increased digitization of copyrighted works makes the presence of a contract 
more likely.432  The Library Copyright Alliance explained, “[a]n increasing percentage of 
library acquisition budgets are devoted to electronic licenses of content rather than 
purchases of monographs and print issues of serials.”433  If a license is involved and the 
library violates the terms of that license, “the copyright owner can sue the library under 
                                                   
427 Brief for Amicus Curiae Dow Jones & Company, Inc. in Support of Petitioners at 8–9 n.7, Allen v. Cooper, 
140 S. Ct. 994 (2020) (No. 18-877); Roundtable Tr. at 47:90–13, 47:24–48:01 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Linder, Dow Jones 
& Company) (discussing the approximate amount of damages Dow Jones & Company could potentially 
have received as a result of the infringement). 
428 News Media Alliance Initial Comments at 7. 
429 Library Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 5 (“The elimination of sovereign immunity with respect 
to copyright claims would have a negative impact on the digital preservation activities of state-run 
collecting institutions.”). 
430 University of Michigan Library Initial Comments at 2 (“Without sovereign immunity, states will face a 
greater number of complaints from people who are primarily looking for a quick windfall.”); ASERL Initial 
Comments at 2 (“[a]brogation would be a boon to bad actors interested in harassing and extorting state 
institutions”); Roundtable Tr. at 168:24–169:13 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Samberg, University of California, Berkley). 
431 See e.g., Ryan v. Editions Ltd., 786 F.3d 754, 761 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that the court has “long recognized 
that a contractually-based claim generally possesses the extra element necessary to remove it from the ambit 
of the Copyright Act’s express preemption provision”); Lee v. Mt. Ivy Press, L.P., 827 N.E.2d 727 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 2005) (holding that plaintiff’s state law claims against publisher for breach of contract, conversion, fraud, 
and a violation of Massachusetts General Laws chapter 93A were not preempted by section 301 because each 
claim had an extra element that rendered it qualitatively different from a federal copyright claim); Durgom v. 
Janowiak, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 619 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1999) (holding that defendant’s nonpayment of royalties 
was contract issue not preempted by federal copyright law). 
432 Library Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 4–5; ASERL Initial Comments at 2; see Roundtable Tr. at 
229:15–22 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Band, Library Copyright Alliance) (arguing that “preemption is not a problem in 
the vast majority of cases because . . . the content is licensed by the state entity . . . so there’s always a 
contract action”). 
433 Library Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 4. 
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state law for breach of contract.”434  Thus, it argued that breach of contract claims are a 
viable option for an increasing number of copyright owners. 
Copyright owners disagreed.  First, they disputed that infringements by states typically 
occur in the context of a licensing agreement.435  A representative of the PLUS Coalition, 
a licensing initiative for image rights, contended that “the vast majority of infringements 
do not involve a contractual relationship between the rights holder and the state 
entity.”436  Instead, “the state entity may obtain copies from sources such as Google 
[I]mages, social media, websites,” and exploit those copies “without the creators’ 
knowledge.”437   
Second, copyright owners noted that, despite the existence of an “extra element,” some 
courts “will reject contract claims that are at their core about copyright violation[s].”438  
Indeed, certain courts have held that “pre-emption should continue to strike down 
claims that, although denominated ‘contract’ nonetheless complain directly about the 
reproduction of expressive materials.”439  These courts adopt a fact-specific approach 
that may bar a copyright owner’s contract claim if “the right in question is infringed by 
the mere act of reproduction, performance, distribution or display.”440  
 Takings Claims 
A copyright owner whose work has been infringed by a state actor could also potentially 
bring a suit alleging that the infringement constitutes a taking of property without just 
compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution or the state 
constitution.441  In Florida Prepaid, the Supreme Court cited a takings claim as a possible 
remedy for patent infringement by the state.442  Likewise, several academic 
                                                   
434 Id. 
435 Roundtable Tr. at 267:07–10 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Sedlik, Art Center College of Design, PLUS Coalition); id. at 
236:24–237:05 (Bynum, Author) (“[I]n my case . . . I never had a contract with Texas A&M.  They were just 
people that came in the middle of the night and took my work and posted it out to 350,000 people.”). 
436 Roundtable Tr. at 267:07–10 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Sedlik, Art Center College of Design, PLUS Coalition). 
437 Id. at 267:10–14 (Sedlik, Art Center College of Design, PLUS Coalition). 
438 Roundtable Tr. at 233:07–11 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Calzada, National Press Photographers Association). 
439 Selby v. New Line Cinema Corp., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B][1][a] ] at 1–19 and 1–22). 
440 Id. (quoting Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 431 (8th Cir. 1993)) 
(internal quotations omitted) (finding that because the alleged implied-in-fact contract between plaintiff and 
defendants did not regulate the parties’ conduct beyond mere use of plaintiff’s ideas, the rights protected by 
that contract were equivalent to the exclusive rights protected by the Copyright Act of 1976, and thus 
preempted). 
441 U.S. CONST. AMEND. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”). 
442 Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 644 n.9 (1999) (“It is worth 
mentioning that the State of Florida provides remedies to patent owners for alleged infringement on the part 
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commentators have posited that a takings claim would be available in at least some 
circumstances of state copyright infringement.443 
This theory, however, has rarely been tested, and the viability of such a claim remains 
uncertain.  Copyright owners who have sought to bring takings claims have 
encountered difficulty establishing their basic elements.  For example, University of 
Houston System v. Jim Olive Photography centers around a photograph depicting the 
Houston skyline taken by Jim Olive, a professional photographer.444  An employee of the 
University of Houston’s College of Business obtained a copy of the photograph from 
Olive’s website, where it was being offered for license, and uploaded it onto the college’s 
website without authorization or payment.445  Olive asserted takings claims under both 
the federal and Texas state constitutions against the university.  
The Texas Supreme Court held that the allegations of infringement of Olive’s copyright 
did not state a claim for a per se taking under the federal or state constitution.446  A per se 
taking involves “an ‘actual taking of possession and control’ by the government.”447  
Copyright infringement does not qualify as such, the court held, because it does not 
destroy the copyright owner’s bundle of legal rights with respect to the copyrighted 
work.448  The court further held that copyright infringement does not amount to 
“physical occupation’ of property” because copyright is ’nonrivalrous,’ meaning that 
‘another person can use it without simultaneously depriving anyone else of its use.’”449  
The court thus affirmed the dismissal of Olive’s claims.  
                                                   
of the State.  Aggrieved parties may pursue . . . a judicial remedy through a takings or conversion claim.”) 
(citing Jacobs Wind Electric Co. v. Florida Dept. of Transp., 626 So.2d 1333 (Fla. 1993)).   
443 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Sovereign Immunity and Intellectual Property, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (2000) 
(inverse condemnation claim available for state infringement); Thomas F. Cotter, Do Federal Uses of 
Intellectual Property Implicate the Fifth Amendment?, 50 FLA. L. REV. 529, 562–63 (1998) (takings claim is a 
“plausible avenue for relief” if the government use destroys virtually all of the property’s value”); Roberta 
Rosenthal Kwall, Governmental Use of Copyrighted Property: The Sovereign’s Prerogative, 67 TEX. L. REV. 685, 
693–726 (1989) (arguing that state use of copyright should be governed by Fifth Amendment takings 
jurisprudence rather than conventional remedies available against private party infringers).  
444 Univ. of Hous. Sys. v. Jim Olive Photography, 580 S.W.3d 360 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019). 
445 Id. at 363. 
446 Jim Olive Photography v. Univ. of Hous. Sys., 624 S.W.3d 764, 774–77 (Tex. 2021).  The court assumed without 
deciding that copyright qualified as property for the purpose of takings law.  Id. at 770. 
447 Id. at 772–73 (quoting Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 351, 362 (2015)). 
448 Id. at 774–77. 
449 Id. at 776 (quoting Thomas F. Cotter, Do Federal Uses of Intellectual Property Implicate the Fifth Amendment?, 
50 Fla. L. Rev. 529, 562–63 (1998)). 
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Likewise, in Smith v. Lutz, a Texas appeals court upheld dismissal of a programmer’s 
takings claim against the University of Texas for infringing copyrighted software.450  The 
court held that a takings claim was unavailable due to a lack of evidence that the 
University intended to act under its eminent domain powers.451 
B. Available Remedies against State Entities in Federal Court 
 Injunctive Relief  
One remedy for copyright infringement by a state entity that survives Allen is a suit for 
injunctive relief in federal court.  In Ex parte Young, the Supreme Court held that the 
Eleventh Amendment does not preclude suits in federal court seeking injunctive relief 
against state officers.452  Copyright owners accordingly can, and do, bring copyright 
infringement suits against state officers seeking injunctive relief.453  Fifty percent of 
respondents to the Copyright Alliance survey indicated they would bring a suit against 
a state for injunctive relief only.454  Plaintiffs in six of the cases on the lists AIPLA and Mr. 
Bynum submitted requested only injunctive relief in their complaints. 
The ability to seek an injunction in federal court provides some relief to copyright 
owners whose works have been infringed by state entities.  First, bringing a suit for an 
injunction allows copyright owners to have their claims decided upon the merits.455  
Second, if they prove infringement and meet the other requirements for such equitable 
relief, the copyright owner can obtain an injunction against the defendant.456  Third, 
several commenters maintained that the monetary cost of defending against a claim 
seeking an injunction and the adverse publicity the state would receive based on a claim 
of copyright infringement are powerful deterrents.457   
                                                   
450 Smith v. Lutz, 149 S.W.3d 752, 760–61 (Tex. App.–Austin 2004). 
451 Id. 
452 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).   
453 See, e.g., Cambridge Univ. Press v. Albert, 906 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2018) (discussing copyright infringement 
claims by three academic publishers seeking injunctive relief against several officials of Georgia State 
University); Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014) (discussing copyright infringement 
claims by a group of authors and authors’ associations seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against 
several state university presidents and the HathiTrust).   
454 Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 13.   
455 Library Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 4.  
456 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (laying out four-factor test for obtaining a 
permanent injunction).  
457 University of Michigan Library Reply Comments at 3; Library Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 4; 
ASERL Initial Comments at 1.   
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There are, however, significant limitations to the relief an injunction provides.  As 
discussed in comments from the Copyright Alliance and the News Media Alliance, the 
most obvious is the inability to recover damages,458 which prevents the copyright owner 
from recovering lost profits and any decrease in the value of the copyrighted work.  SIIA 
pointed out that many copyright owners invest in the creation of ancillary works in 
addition to the specific work that may have been infringed, and the value of those 
ancillary products may also be affected by the infringement.459  NPPA explained that the 
inability to obtain damages is particularly harmful for works for which the timing of 
first publication is critical, such as a photograph of a news or sporting event, because the 
entire value of the work may be destroyed by an act of infringement during the key time 
period.460  Copyright owners also noted that the inability to recover damages can make 
the cost of bringing a suit prohibitive, particularly for copyright owners with limited 
resources.461   
Additionally, as the Copyright Office has previously noted, an injunction provides 
limited relief against future infringement because it can only be issued and enforced 
against specific individuals, not the state generally.462  Even then, enforcement of the 
injunction can require the filing of a motion for contempt and additional litigation with 
the attendant costs.463  These limitations prevent copyright owners from obtaining 
complete relief when their copyrights are infringed, which as former Register of 
                                                   
458 Copyright Alliance Initial Comments at 30–32; News Media Alliance Initial Comments at 8–9; see also U.S. 
Gen. Accounting Office, GAO-01- 811, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: STATE IMMUNITY IN INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS 13 
(2001), https://www.gao.gov/assets/240/232603.pdf. 
459 See SIIA Reply Comments at 8–10 (providing the example of educational publishers who create software 
as well as “back end servers, artificial intelligence that adapts learning to the ability of a student, and the 
creation of entire learning platforms on which this content can be analyzed, discussed, taught, tested, and 
commented on”). 
460 NPPA Initial Comments at 13 (stating that the value of a photograph is often highest when it is first 
published). 
461 AIPLA Initial Comments at 5 (stating that nonprofits are particularly unlikely to seek injunctive relief); 
Roundtable Tr. at 196:16–20 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Calzada, National Press Photographers Association) (“Playing 
whack-a-mole in federal court is an expensive proposition and it’s really not something that most 
photographers have the resources to engage in.”); id. at 199:06–14 (Madigan, Copyright Alliance) (“[A]s to 
injunctions . . . when we . . . asked the folks who would not be willing to pursue injunctions, why they 
wouldn’t, we heard a lot about how expensive they are, how they only offer prospective relief, how they do 
nothing to remedy for past injuries.”); see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT LIABILITY OF STATES AND 
THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 13–14 (1988), https://www.copyright.gov/reports/copyright-liability-of-states-
1988.pdf.  
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Copyrights Marybeth Peters testified is “central to the balance of interests in the 
Copyright Act.”464   
 Personal-Capacity Suits against State Officials 
Another available remedy for copyright infringement by a state entity in federal court is 
a suit for damages against a state official in his or her personal capacity.465  During the 
roundtable, a representative of the Ohio Attorney General’s Office described such suits 
as a “pretty easy workaround” to enable recovery against the state, noting that the state 
will indemnify the individual defendant for any damages.466  But this potential remedy, 
too, has limitations.  As an initial matter, it is unclear from the record to what extent, or 
under what circumstances, other states will indemnify officials found liable in such 
cases.467  To the extent a state does not do so, the copyright owner’s ability to recover 
damages may be limited by the individual official’s ability to satisfy a judgment.   
In addition, to be able to bring such a suit, the copyright owner must know, or must 
uncover, the identity of the specific individual responsible for the infringement.  The 
individual state official may also be protected from liability by qualified immunity, 
which shields government officials if “their conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.”468  In the copyright context, a state official will be immune from liability unless 
it was clearly established at the time of the alleged infringement that the conduct of the 
state official constituted copyright infringement.  In several cases, copyright owners 
have been unable to prove that a state official should have known that his or her conduct 
                                                   
464 Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 2344 Before the Subcomm. on Courts., 
the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 18 (2003) (statement of 
Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office), 
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju87815.000/hju87815_0f.htm. 
465 See, e.g., Richard Anderson Photography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114, 122 (4th Cir. 1988) (affirming district court 
ruling that state official could be sued in her personal capacity for damages for copyright infringement); 
Lane v. First Nat’l Bank of Bos., 687 F. Supp. 11, 17 (D. Mass. 1988) (denying summary judgment when 
copyright law was clear on the relevant issue at the time state official infringed work such that there was no 
qualified immunity). 
466 Roundtable Tr. at 94:04–14 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Molnar, Ohio Attorney General’s Office).  
467 See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167–68 (1985) (noting that an individual state official, not the state, is 
liable for any damages award); Roundtable Tr. at 61:16–62:06 (Dec. 11, 2020) (Thro, University of Kentucky) 
(“As to whether the state would indemnify, that’s going to be an open question in terms of state law.  We do 
not indemnify if you’re clearly and unambiguously acting outside the scope of your employment”); id. at 
189:09–12 (Evans, University of Arkansas) (“Our state law does cover the indemnification of employees who 
are acting in good faith in the course of their duties and responsibilities to the state entity.”). 
468 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 
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was infringing due to the unsettled nature of the legal issue involved.469  Such a 
conclusion may be particularly likely in fact-specific inquiries such as fair use and the 
work-made-for-hire doctrine.   
3.	 Constitutional Claims 
The Supreme Court held in United States v. Georgia that a federal statute’s abrogation of 
state sovereign immunity is valid insofar as the statute creates a private right of action 
for damages against states “for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”470  Although commenters did not address this theory, the district court in 
Allen recently cited Georgia in concluding that a copyright owner may be able to bring a 
claim against a state to the extent the infringement amounts to a constitutional 
violation.471  At least one circuit court has suggested that a plaintiff faced with an 
Eleventh Amendment bar to a copyright suit might be able to find recovery in federal 
court for a takings clause violation.472  As discussed above, however, the likelihood that a 
copyright owner could successfully argue that infringement of its copyright constituted 
a taking remains uncertain under current case law. 
VI. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The congressional request initiating this study asked that the Office conduct research “to 
determine whether there is sufficient basis for federal legislation abrogating State 
sovereign immunity when States infringe copyrights.”473  As part of that analysis, the 
                                                   
469 See, e.g., Isaenko v. Univ. of Minn., 57 F. Supp. 3d 985, 1013–16 (D. Minn. 2014) (dismissing claims against 
university employees in their individual capacities due to law not clearly establishing at the relevant time 
that the conduct constituted copyright infringement); Molinelli–Freytes v. Univ. of P.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d 150, 
157 (D.P.R. 2011) (finding qualified immunity because the potential application of the work-for-hire doctrine 
in academic context was not settled at the relevant time); Ass’n for Info. Media & Equip. v. Regents of the Univ. 
of Cal., 2:10–cv–09378–CBM (MANx), 2012 WL 7683452, at *5–6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2012) (finding qualified 
immunity because a reasonable person could have believed that defendant’s use of the copyrighted work 
was fair use); Campinha–Bacote v. Bleidt, No. H–10–3481, 2011 WL 4625394, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 
2011) (finding qualified immunity because defendant could have reasonably believed her conduct would 
not violate copyright law). 
470 United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006) (holding abrogation was valid with respect to a claim that 
state violated the Fourteenth Amendment based on the conditions in which it confined a paraplegic prisoner 
and distinguishing invalid abrogation when claims did not rest on allegations of unconstitutional state 
conduct). 
471 Allen v. Cooper, No. 5:15-cv-00627-BO, *23 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 18, 2021).  The court noted that it had never 
ruled on whether Allen had a valid “case-by-case” abrogation claim under Georgia based on his allegations 
that “defendants’ conduct amounted to a taking without compensation and simultaneously violated both 
the CRCA and the Fifth Amendment.”  Id.  The court authorized Allen to amend his complaint to allege 
additional facts regarding his takings claim and the intentionality of the state’s conduct.  Id. at *24.   
472 Lane v. First National Bank of Boston, 871 F.2d 166, 174 (1st Cir. 1988).  
473 Request Letter at 1. 
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Office was asked to “study the extent to which copyright owners are experiencing 
infringements by state entities without adequate remedies under state law” and to 
“consider the extent to which such infringements appear to be based on intentional or 
reckless conduct.”474  The inquiry thus involves both a factual and a legal component.  
First, the Office has collected and analyzed the allegations of state infringement 
submitted by copyright owners in this study, as well as the information provided by 
state institutions in response.  Second, the Office has attempted to determine whether 
these allegations, taken as a whole, are likely to be considered sufficient to meet the 
standard for abrogation set forth in Supreme Court case law, given the available 
remedies. 
With respect to the factual record, the Office can report that the number of allegations of 
state infringement provided in response to the NOI is substantially greater than the 
number cited in the Oman Report.  Commenters submitted lists collecting over 130 
copyright infringement suits brought against state entities in thirty-six states.  Nearly all 
of these cases were filed between 2000 and 2020.  In addition, the survey results 
submitted by the Copyright Alliance include allegations of state infringement reported 
by 115 copyright owners, with the majority of respondents stating that their works have 
been infringed by state entities on multiple occasions.  The Office also received 
individual anecdotes from approximately a dozen copyright owners. 
The evidence indicates that state infringement constitutes a legitimate concern for 
copyright owners.  While the merits of individual claims may often be uncertain, it 
seems clear that there are in fact instances in which some state entities infringe 
copyrights—whether intentionally, recklessly, or negligently—and that those 
infringements can cause harm to the value of the copyrighted works.  Moreover, 
copyright owners’ inability to bring copyright infringement claims for damages in such 
cases can leave them with inadequate remedies.  While some may be able to assert tort 
or contract claims in state court, many such claims will be preempted by the Copyright 
Act, and in any event do not provide the same remedies as are available for copyright 
infringement.  Likewise, recent cases cast doubt on the viability of claims seeking to 
recover under a takings theory.  And although copyright owners may seek injunctive 
relief or bring personal-capacity suits against state officials in federal court, injunctions 
do not compensate copyright owners for monetary harm, and qualified immunity or 
lack of resources may prevent monetary relief against individual state infringers. 
The Office also is mindful that, at least in the copyright context, conclusive evidence of 
intentional or reckless state infringement may be elusive.  Sovereign immunity itself 
may dissuade copyright owners from bringing suit and often prevents adjudication of 
                                                   
474 Id. at 2. 
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the merits of plaintiffs’ claims, making it inherently difficult to develop any record of 
unconstitutional conduct. 
The Office also heard from representatives of a number of state entities, primarily 
universities and libraries, who provided information about their efforts to educate their 
communities about copyright through the adoption of policies and educational 
programs.  They also expressed concern about the potential impact on their operations if 
infringement suits for damages were permitted to proceed.   
As to the legal analysis, the Office notes as a preliminary matter that the standard 
according to which the evidence is to be weighed is not entirely clear.  There has been 
only a limited number of instances in which the Supreme Court has found sufficient 
evidence to support abrogation of state sovereign immunity.  As discussed, in the more 
than two decades since it articulated the “congruence and proportionality” test in City of 
Boerne, the Court has upheld congressional abrogation provisions on only two occasions.  
Those cases arose in the different contexts of disability- and sex-based discrimination, 
respectively.  Thus, while Florida Prepaid and Allen provide examples of evidentiary 
records that are insufficient for abrogation in the intellectual property context, the Court 
has provided less guidance as to the nature and volume of evidence that would be 
sufficient in this area. 
It appears, however, that the threshold as enunciated by the Supreme Court since the 
CRCA was enacted has been set quite high.  In general, the Court’s decisions indicate 
that the instances of unlawful conduct must be sufficiently numerous to establish a 
pattern.  In Lane, the Court found it significant that Congress had “gathered evidence 
from every State in the Union” and found “hundreds of examples of unequal treatment 
of persons with disabilities by States and their political subdivisions.”475  Similarly, in 
Hibbs, the Court noted that nineteen states had laws limiting how many hours women 
could work and that many states offered their employees different durations of parental 
leave depending on the sex of the parent.476  Conversely, where the evidence consisted of 
no more than “half a dozen examples,” the Court found that the record “f[e]ll far short 
of even suggesting [a] pattern of unconstitutional discrimination.”477  In Florida Prepaid, 
the Court concluded that “Congress identified no pattern of patent infringement by the 
States, let alone a pattern of constitutional violations,” where the legislative history 
“provide[d] only two examples of patent infringement suits against the States.”478  And 
                                                   
475 Lane, 541 U.S. at 516, 526 (internal citations omitted). 
476 Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 729–31. 
477 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369–70. 
478 527 U.S. at 640. 
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in Allen, the Court likewise found insufficient evidence of a pattern based on “a dozen 
possible examples of state infringement.”479 
Further, the analysis is not limited to simply tallying the number of allegations of 
infringement against states.  As discussed, only intentional or possibly reckless 
infringements can rise to the level of a due process violation.  Moreover, although the 
Court has said little regarding the need to assess the validity of the claims, it suggested 
in Allen that uncorroborated allegations alone are not sufficient.480 
In light of these precedents, we are unable to conclude with certainty that the evidence 
provided in this study would be held sufficient to establish a pattern of unconstitutional 
conduct.  Although the record includes more examples of potential infringement than in 
Florida Prepaid and Allen, it falls short of the evidence of pervasive unconstitutional 
conduct by state entities in Lane and Hibbs.  Nor has the Office been presented with 
evidence of any state policies permitting or encouraging infringement, as was the case in 
Hibbs.  To the contrary, we received considerable evidence of policies and programs 
adopted by a number of state entities in order to deter infringement.  With respect to 
litigated cases, the lists provided by commenters do not by themselves indicate the 
extent to which the cases involved credible allegations of intentional infringement.  Only 
about half of the cases provided to the Office resulted in a written decision, with the 
majority dismissing the copyright claims on sovereign immunity grounds, and nearly all 
of the others decided in favor of the state.  Similar challenges arise in assessing the 
survey evidence and individual anecdotes.  While the number of alleged infringements 
reported appears significant on its face, the Office has no basis to evaluate whether any 
given respondent had a valid copyright interest, whether the state may have had 
meritorious defenses, and whether any infringement was intentional or reckless.   
Given that the evidence gathered here far exceeds that underlying the CRCA, Congress 
may still choose to proceed with adopting new abrogation legislation.  In light of the 
foregoing concerns, however, there is a material risk that a court could find even this 
more robust record insufficient to meet the constitutional abrogation standard.  The 
Office nevertheless continues to believe that infringement by state entities is an issue 
worthy of congressional action. 
The Office has long been of the view that “[t]he ability of copyright owners to protect 
their property and to obtain complete relief when their rights are violated is central to 
the balance of interest[s] in the Copyright Act,” and that state infringers should be 
                                                   
479 140 S. Ct. at 1006. 
480 Id. (noting that Oman Report “listed seven court cases brought against States (with another two dismissed 
on the merits) and five anecdotes taken from public comments (but not further corroborated)”). 
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subject to infringement liability to the same extent as other parties.481  The Office 
appreciates the concerns of the universities, libraries, and other state entities represented 
in this study, and their implementation of policies and educational programs to ensure 
respect for copyright.  We note that these entities will generally be able to invoke 
protection from non-meritorious infringement suits under the Copyright Act’s 
exceptions and limitations, including fair use, exceptions for reproduction by libraries 
and archives, and limitations on remedies.482  State users of copyrighted works, however, 
are not limited to these institutions.  Other state entities, ranging from athletic 
departments to tourism offices to radio stations, may make use of copyrighted works for 
a variety of purposes, including some that affect the works’ markets.  While the Office 
received little evidence relating to these types of entities, there would seem to be little 
justification for immunizing them from damages if they intentionally engage in the same 
conduct for which a private party could be held liable. 
Previous Congresses have considered legislation that would have avoided the need for 
abrogation by establishing a waiver-based framework for infringement suits against 
states.  Under that model, a state’s ability to recover damages for infringement of its own 
intellectual property rights would be conditioned on its waiving sovereign immunity 
from infringement suits.483  If Congress decides not to proceed with new abrogation 
legislation, the Office would support further consideration of a waiver approach, as well 
as other options to ensure that copyright owners have meaningful remedies when states 
infringe their rights.  As always, the Office stands ready to provide technical advice or 
other assistance to Congress on any legislative proposals. 
                                                   
481 Sovereign Immunity and the Protection of Intellectual Property: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
107th Cong. 10–11 (2002) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office) 
(stating that “the current state of affairs is unjust and unacceptable”). 
482 17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 108, 504(c)(2). 
483 See Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2003, S. 1191, 108th Cong. (2003); see also Intellectual 
Property Protection Restoration Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 2344 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and 
Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003); State Sovereign Immunity and Protection 
of Intellectual Property: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Judiciary Comm., 
106th Cong. (2000). 
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1 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020). 
II. Special Issues for Comment 
OSHA has a particular interest in 
comments on the following issues: 
• Whether the proposed information 
collection requirements are necessary 
for the proper performance of the 
agency’s functions, including whether 
the information is useful; 
• The accuracy of OSHA’s estimate of 
the burden (time and costs) of the 
information collection requirements, 
including the validity of the 
methodology and assumptions used; 
• The quality, utility, and clarity of 
the information collected; and 
• Ways to minimize the burden on 
employers who must comply; for 
example, by using automated or other 
technological information collection 
and transmission techniques. 
III. Proposed Actions 
OSHA is requesting that OMB extend 
the approval of the collection of 
information (paperwork) requirements 
contained in the Anhydrous Ammonia 
Storage and Handling Standard. There is 
a slight adjustment decrease in burden 
hours for this ICR. The burden hours 
have decreased a total of 1 hour (from 
337 to 336 hours). 
Type of Review: Extension of a 
currently approved collection. 
Title: Anhydrous Ammonia Storage 
and Handling Standard (29 CFR 
1910.111). 
OMB Number: 1218–0208. 
Affected Public: Business or other for- 
profit; farms. 
Number of Respondents: 201,300. 
Frequency of Response: On occasion. 
Total Responses: 2,013. 
Average Time per Response: 10 
minutes (10/60 hour) for a worker to 
replace or revise markings on ammonia 
containers. 
Estimated Total Burden Hours: 336. 
Estimated Cost (Operation and 
Maintenance): $0. 
IV. Public Participation—Submission of 
Comments on This Notice and Internet 
Access to Comments and Submissions 
You may submit comments in 
response to this document as follows: 
(1) Electronically at http://
www.regulations.gov, which is the 
Federal e-Rulemaking Portal; (2) by 
facsimile; or (3) by hard copy. All 
comments, attachments, and other 
material must identify the agency name 
and the OSHA docket number for this 
ICR (Docket No. OSHA–2010–0050). 
You may supplement electronic 
submissions by uploading document 
files electronically. If you wish to mail 
additional materials in reference to an 
electronic or facsimile submission, you 
must submit them to the OSHA Docket 
Office (see the section of this notice 
titled ADDRESSES). The additional 
materials must clearly identify your 
electronic comments by your name, 
date, and the docket number so the 
agency can attach them to your 
comments. 
Because of security procedures, the 
use of regular mail may cause a 
significant delay in the receipt of 
comments. For information about 
security procedures concerning the 
delivery of materials by hand, express 
delivery, messenger, or courier service, 
please contact the OSHA Docket Office 
at (202) 693–2350, (TTY (877) 889– 
5627). 
Comments and submissions are 
posted without change at http://
www.regulations.gov. Therefore, OSHA 
cautions commenters about submitting 
personal information such as your social 
security number and date of birth. 
Although all submissions are listed in 
the http://www.regulations.gov index, 
some information (e.g., copyrighted 
material) is not publicly available to 
read or download from this website. All 
submissions, including copyrighted 
material, are available for inspection 
and copying at the OSHA Docket Office. 
Information on using the http://
www.regulations.gov website to submit 
comments and access the docket is 
available at the website’s ‘‘User Tips’’ 
link. Contact the OSHA Docket Office 
for information about materials not 
available from the website, and for 
assistance in using the internet to locate 
docket submissions. 
V. Authority and Signature 
Loren Sweatt, Principal Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Labor for 
Occupational Safety and Health, 
directed the preparation of this notice. 
The authority for this notice is the 
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 
U.S.C. 3506 et seq.) and Secretary of 
Labor’s Order No. 1–2012 (77 FR 3912). 
Signed at Washington, DC, on May 28, 
2020. 
Loren Sweatt, 
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Labor 
for Occupational Safety and Health. 
[FR Doc. 2020–11986 Filed 6–2–20; 8:45 am] 
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Sovereign Immunity Study: Notice and 
Request for Public Comment 
AGENCY: Copyright Office, Library of 
Congress. 
ACTION: Notice of inquiry. 
SUMMARY: The U.S. Copyright Office is 
initiating a study to evaluate the degree 
to which copyright owners are 
experiencing infringement by state 
entities without adequate remedies 
under state law, as well as the extent to 
which such infringements appear to be 
based on intentional or reckless 
conduct. The Office seeks public input 
on this topic to assist it in preparing a 
report to Congress. 
DATES: Written comments are due on or 
before August 3, 2020. 
ADDRESSES: For reasons of government 
efficiency, the Copyright Office is using 
the regulations.gov system for the 
submission and posting of public 
comments in this proceeding. All 
comments are therefore to be submitted 
electronically through regulations.gov. 
Specific instructions for submitting 
comments are available on the 
Copyright Office website at http://
www.copyright.gov/docs/ 
sovereignimmunitystudy. If electronic 
submission of comments is not feasible 
due to lack of access to a computer and/ 
or the internet, please contact the Office, 
using the contact information below, for 
special instructions. 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 
Regan A. Smith, General Counsel and 
Associate Register of Copyrights, 
regans@copyright.gov; Kevin R. Amer, 
Deputy General Counsel, kamer@
loc.gov; or Mark T. Gray, Attorney- 
Advisor, mgray@loc.gov. They can be 
reached by telephone at 202–707–3000. 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On March 
23, 2020, the Supreme Court issued its 
decision in Allen v. Cooper,1 holding 
that the Copyright Remedy Clarification 
Act of 1990 (‘‘CRCA’’), which attempted 
to make states subject to liability for 
copyright infringement to the same 
extent as other parties, did not validly 
abrogate states’ sovereign immunity 
against suit. Following the decision, 
Senators Thom Tillis and Patrick Leahy 
sent a letter to the Copyright Office 
requesting that the Office ‘‘research this 
issue to determine whether there is 
sufficient basis for federal legislation 
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2 Letter from Sens. Thom Tillis & Patrick Leahy 
to Maria Strong, Acting Register of Copyrights, U.S. 
Copyright Office at 1 (Apr. 28, 2020), available at 
https://www.copyright.gov/rulemaking/state- 
sovereign-immunity/letter.pdf (‘‘Request Letter’’). 
3 Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1000. 
4 Id. at 1003. 
5 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, sec. 1. 
6 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, sec. 5. 
7 Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1003. 
8 Public Law 101–553, sec. 2(a)(2), 101 Stat. 2749 
(1990), codified at 17 U.S.C. 511. 
9 473 U.S. 234, 247 (1985). 
10 See 17 U.S.C. 501(a) (1977) (‘‘Anyone who 
violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright 
owner as provided by sections 106 through 118, or 
who imports copies or phonorecords into the 
United States in violation of section 602, is an 
infringer of the copyright.’’). 
11 See Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278, 
1285 (9th Cir. 1979) (affirming copyright damages 
and attorneys’ fees award under 1909 Act because 
language providing for damages against infringers 
was ‘‘sweeping and without apparent limitation, 
suggesting that Congress intended to include states 
within the class of defendants’’); Johnson v. Univ. 
of Va., 606 F. Supp. 321, 324 (W.D. Va. 1985) 
(‘‘[B]ased on the Mills Music analysis of the 1909 
Act, and this court’s examination of the operative 
language of the 1976 Act, the court determines that 
the 1976 Act waived the states’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity from liability for damages 
and equitable relief for copyright infringements.’’). 
But see Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777, 782 (8th Cir. 
1962) (dismissing copyright claim against school 
district on Eleventh Amendment grounds because 
the district was ‘‘an instrumentality of the State of 
Iowa, constituting a part of its educational system 
and engaged in performing a state governmental 
function under state law and at state expense’’). 
12 Letter from Reps. Robert W. Kastenmeier & 
Carlos Moorhead, Subcomm. on Courts, Civil 
Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, to Ralph Oman, Register 
of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office at 1 (Aug. 3, 
1987), reproduced in U.S. Copyright Office, 
Copyright Liability of States and the Eleventh 
Amendment, A Report of the Register of Copyrights 
(June 1988), https://www.copyright.gov/reports/ 
copyright-liability-of-states-1988.pdf. 
13 Request for Information: Eleventh Amendment, 
52 FR 42045 (Nov. 2, 1987). 
14 The public comments can be viewed at https:// 
archive.org/details/ 
Copyright11thAmendmentStudyComments. 
15 U.S. Copyright Office, Copyright Liability of 
States and the Eleventh Amendment: A Report of 
the Register of Copyrights 6 (June 1988) (‘‘Oman 
Report’’) (‘‘The major concern of copyright owners 
appears to be widespread, uncontrollable copying 
of their works without remuneration’’), available at 
https://www.copyright.gov/reports/copyright- 
liability-of-states-1988.pdf. The CRCA’s legislative 
history reveals similar concerns about prospective 
infringement. See Copyright Remedy Clarification 
Act and Copyright Office Report on Copyright 
Liability of States, Hearings Before the Subcomm. 
on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the 
Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 101st Cong. 102 (1989) (testimony of 
Barbara Ringer, former Register of Copyrights) (until 
Atascadero, states believed ‘‘you have got to pay,’’ 
but now ‘‘their lawyers are going to tell them you 
don’t have to pay,’’ and ‘‘gradually, and maybe not 
so gradually, this free ride will become quite the 
rule rather than the exception unless you do 
something’’); Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Patents, 
Copyrights and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 101st Cong. 69 (1989) (prepared 
statement of Copyright Remedies Coalition) 
(expressing concern that ‘‘states may well confuse 
insulation from damages with full immunity from 
any copyright liability, causing them to believe that 
their activities are beyond the reach of the 
Copyright Act’’). 
16 Oman Report at 104. The Office’s specific 
legislative recommendations turned on whether 
Congress could abrogate state immunity under 
Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution (the 
‘‘Intellectual Property Clause’’). The Supreme Court 
had not yet addressed that question. Shortly before 
the report was completed, however, the Court 
granted certiorari in United States v. Union Gas Co., 
832 F.2d 1343, 1356 (3d Cir. 1987), certiorari 
granted sub nom. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 
485 U.S. 958 (1988), in which the Third Circuit had 
held that Article I could be a basis for abrogation. 
The Oman Report recommended that if the 
Supreme Court affirmed that decision, Congress 
should revise section 501 of the Copyright Act to 
‘‘clarify its intent to abrogate states’ Eleventh 
Amendment Immunity pursuant to its [Intellectual 
Property Clause] power.’’ Oman Report at 104. 
Otherwise, the Report recommended that Congress 
‘‘amend the jurisdictional provision in 28 U.S.C. 
1338(a), to provide that where states are defendants, 
private individuals may sue them in state court for 
copyright damages.’’ Id. at 104–05. 
17 17 U.S.C. 511(a); see also id. at 511(b) (‘‘In a 
suit described in subsection (a) for a violation 
described in that subsection, remedies (including 
remedies both at law and in equity) are available 
for the violation to the same extent as such 
remedies are available for such a violation in a suit 
against any public or private entity other than a 
State, instrumentality of a State, or officer or 
employee of a State acting in his or her official 
capacity.’’). 
18 Id. at 501(a). 
19 527 U.S. 627 (1999). 
20 Id. at 640. 
abrogating State sovereign immunity 
when States infringe copyrights.’’ 2 
I. Background 
a. The Copyright Remedy Clarification 
Act 
Under the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity, ‘‘a federal court generally 
may not hear a suit brought by any 
person against a nonconsenting State.’’ 3 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution, however, ‘‘can authorize 
Congress to strip the States of 
immunity.’’ 4 Section 1 of that 
Amendment provides that states may 
not ‘‘deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of 
law,’’ 5 and section 5 gives Congress the 
‘‘power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation,’’ those prohibitions,6 
including by subjecting states to suit in 
federal court.7 
Enacted on November 15, 1990, the 
CRCA amended the Copyright Act to 
expressly provide that states are not 
immune from suit for copyright 
infringement.8 Congress adopted the 
legislation in response to a 1985 
Supreme Court decision, Atascadero 
State Hospital v. Scanlon, in which the 
Court held that to abrogate state 
sovereign immunity under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress must 
use ‘‘unequivocal’’ language making its 
intention explicit.9 At the time, the 
Copyright Act was silent on whether 
states were subject to liability,10 
although some pre-Atascadero courts 
had held that Congress intended states 
to be subject to infringement claims.11 
Shortly after the Atascadero decision, 
Congress asked then-Register of 
Copyrights Ralph Oman to study what 
‘‘practical problems’’ copyright owners 
faced in enforcing their rights against 
state governments.12 The Office 
subsequently issued a request for public 
comment 13 and received approximately 
forty responses.14 Most comments were 
submitted by copyright owners, some of 
whom expressed concern about the risk 
of future infringement by state entities, 
while others discussed past acts of 
infringement committed by states.15 The 
Office summarized these comments in a 
public report (the ‘‘Oman Report’’), 
which ultimately recommended that 
Congress ‘‘amend the Copyright Act 
. . . to ensure that copyright owners 
have an effective remedy against 
infringing states.’’ 16 
After the Office issued its report, the 
CRCA was introduced in Congress, and 
Congress held hearings on the issue of 
state infringement. The final legislation 
amended the Copyright Act to provide 
that ‘‘[a]ny State, any instrumentality of 
a State, and any officer or employee of 
a State or instrumentality of a State 
acting in his or her official capacity, 
shall not be immune, under the 
Eleventh Amendment . . . or under any 
other doctrine of sovereign immunity, 
from suit in Federal court by any 
person’’ for copyright infringement.17 It 
further provided that ‘‘[a]ny State . . . 
shall be subject to the provisions of this 
title in the same manner and to the same 
extent as any nongovernmental 
entity.’’ 18 
b. Florida Prepaid v. College Savings 
Bank 
Nine years after enactment of the 
CRCA, the Supreme Court issued an 
opinion in Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Education Expense 
Board v. College Savings Bank,19 which 
addressed whether Congress had validly 
abrogated states’ immunity from patent 
infringement suits when it adopted the 
Patent Remedy Act. In Florida Prepaid, 
the Court set out a number of 
requirements that Congress needed to 
meet for such abrogation to constitute a 
valid exercise of Congress’s authority 
under section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. First, Congress was 
required to identify a ‘‘pattern of patent 
infringement’’ by state governments.20 
Second, the infringement must 
constitute a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment such that patent owners 
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21 Id. at 642. 
22 Id. at 643. 
23 Id. at 645. 
24 Id. at 639 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
U.S. 507, 520 (1997)). 
25 Id. at 640–41. 
26 Id. at 643–44. 
27 Id. at 645–66. 
28 Id. at 646–47. 
29 See Sovereign Immunity and Protection of 
Intellectual Property, Hearing Before Senate Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 3–4 (Feb. 27, 2000) 
(prepared statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy), https:// 
www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG- 
107shrg85184/pdf/CHRG-107shrg85184.pdf 
(discussing Intellectual Property Protection 
Restoration Act of 2001 and stating that ‘‘no 
condition could be more reasonable or 
proportionate than the condition that in order to 
obtain full protection for your federal intellectual 
property rights, you must respect those of others’’); 
Intellectual Property Restoration Act of 2003, 
Hearing Before House Subcomm. on Courts, the 
internet, and Intellectual Property, 108th Cong. 
(June 17, 2003) (prepared statement of Marybeth 
Peters, Register of Copyrights), available at https:// 
www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat061703.html 
(stating that proposed legislation ‘‘provides 
significant incentives for a State to waive its 
immunity, but does so in a way that is inherently 
proportional and fair to the States and copyright 
owners’’). 
30 Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 999. 
31 Id. at 1006. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 1004. The Court had previously reserved, 
but not decided, the question ‘‘whether reckless 
conduct suffices’’ to violate due process. Id. (citing 
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334 n.3 (1986)). 
34 Id. at 1006. 
35 Id. at 1006–07. 
36 Id. at 1007. 
37 Id. (quoting Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 646– 
47). 
38 Id.; see also id. at 1009 (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(‘‘One might . . . expect that someone injured by 
a State’s violation of [its] duty [not to infringe 
copyright] could ‘resort to the laws of his country 
for a remedy,’ . . . . Or more concretely, one might 
think that Walt Disney Pictures could sue a State 
(or anyone else) for hosting an unlicensed screening 
of the studio’s 2003 blockbuster film, Pirates of the 
Caribbean (or any one of its many sequels).’’ 
(citation omitted)). 
39 Id. at 1007. 
40 Id. 
41 Request Letter at 1. 
42 Id. at 2. 
were being deprived of property 
‘‘without due process of law.’’ 21 The 
Court explained that such a deprivation 
occurs ‘‘only where the State provides 
no remedy, or only inadequate 
remedies, to injured patent owners for 
its infringement of their patent.’’ 22 The 
Court cautioned that, because states do 
not violate due process when they 
commit a ‘‘negligent act that causes 
unintended injury to a person’s 
property,’’ patent infringement that was 
merely negligent rather than intentional 
or reckless did not violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment.23 Third, there 
must be ‘‘congruence and 
proportionality’’ between the 
constitutional violations Congress seeks 
to remedy and the means adopted for 
that purpose.24 
The Court in Florida Prepaid struck 
down the Patent Remedy Act for failure 
to meet these requirements. It 
concluded that Congress had not 
identified a pattern of infringement 
because (1) Congress had ‘‘little 
evidence of infringing conduct’’ by state 
actors; 25 (2) Congress ‘‘barely 
considered’’ the adequacy of state-law 
remedies for patent infringement by the 
state; 26 (3) the legislative record did not 
reflect a pattern of intentional or 
reckless infringements, but instead 
consisted only of ‘‘a handful of 
instances of state patent infringement 
that do not necessarily violate the 
Constitution’’; 27 and (4) the legislation 
was not limited to ‘‘cases involving 
arguable constitutional violations, such 
as where a State refuses to offer any 
state-court remedy,’’ or cases where the 
infringement was not negligent or 
committed pursuant to state policy.28 
After the Court’s decision, Congress 
considered, but did not pass, legislation 
that would have conditioned states’ 
ability to recover damages for 
infringement of their own intellectual 
property on their waiver of immunity to 
infringement damages.29 
c. Allen v. Cooper 
This year, the Supreme Court decided 
Allen v. Cooper, a case considering the 
validity of the CRCA’s abrogation of 
state immunity. In Allen, a videographer 
brought an infringement action against 
North Carolina after the state published 
his videos and photographs of a sunken 
pirate ship online without 
authorization. North Carolina contended 
that it was immune to suit and that the 
CRCA failed to properly abrogate its 
immunity. Applying the analysis from 
Florida Prepaid, the Court held that the 
CRCA failed the congruence and 
proportionality test for substantially the 
same reasons that applied to the Patent 
Remedy Act.30 With respect to the 
legislative record, the Court found the 
evidence of copyright infringement 
supporting the CRCA to be ‘‘scarcely 
more impressive than what the Florida 
Prepaid Court saw,’’ amounting to ‘‘only 
a dozen possible examples of state 
infringement.’’ 31 The Court also pointed 
to congressional testimony and 
statements by Members of Congress 
suggesting that copyright infringement 
by states currently was not a widespread 
problem.32 
The Court further held that Congress 
had failed to make a sufficient showing 
of unconstitutional infringement by 
states. Under its precedent, the Court 
noted, ‘‘a merely negligent act does not 
‘deprive’ a person of property,’’ and 
therefore ‘‘an infringement must be 
intentional, or at least reckless, to come 
within the reach of the Due Process 
Clause.’’ 33 In the case of the CRCA, only 
two of the infringements cited in the 
legislative record appeared to be 
intentional.34 Moreover, the record 
contained ‘‘no information about the 
availability of state-law remedies for 
copyright infringement (such as contract 
or unjust enrichment suits)—even 
though they might themselves satisfy 
due process.’’ 35 The Court thus 
concluded that the balance struck by the 
CRCA ‘‘between constitutional wrong 
and statutory remedy’’ was ‘‘askew.’’ 36 
The ‘‘exceedingly slight’’ evidence of 
Fourteenth Amendment injury, 
combined with the fact that the statute 
extended to ‘‘every infringement case 
against a State,’’ meant that ‘‘the law’s 
‘indiscriminate scope’ [was] ‘out of 
proportion’ to any due process 
problem.’’ 37 
At the conclusion of the opinion, the 
Court observed that its decision ‘‘need 
not prevent Congress from passing a 
valid copyright abrogation law in the 
future.’’ 38 It noted that in adopting the 
CRCA, ‘‘Congress acted before this Court 
created the ‘congruence and 
proportionality’ test,’’ and therefore it 
‘‘likely did not appreciate the 
importance of linking the scope of its 
abrogation to the redress or prevention 
of unconstitutional injuries—and of 
creating a legislative record to back up 
that connection.’’ 39 Under that 
standard, ‘‘if [Congress] detects 
violations of due process, then it may 
enact a proportionate response,’’ and 
[t]hat kind of tailored statute can 
effectively stop States from behaving as 
copyright pirates.’’ 40 
d. Current Study 
On April 28, 2020, Senators Thom 
Tillis and Patrick Leahy sent a letter to 
the Copyright Office noting that the 
Allen decision has ‘‘created a situation 
in which copyright owners are without 
remedy if a State infringes their 
copyright and claims State sovereign 
immunity,’’ and expressing concern 
‘‘about the impact this may have on 
American creators and innovators.’’ 41 
The letter states that the Senators ‘‘have 
heard from affected copyright owners 
that in recent years State infringements 
of copyright have become much more 
common.’’ 42 To determine whether 
there is a sufficient basis for federal 
legislation, the letter asks that the Office 
‘‘study the extent to which copyright 
owners are experiencing infringements 
by state entities without adequate 
remedies under state law. As part of this 
analysis, the Office should consider the 
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43 Id. 
44 Id. Senators Tillis and Leahy also sent a letter 
to the Patent and Trademark Office requesting a 
study of patent and trademark infringement by state 
entities. See Letter from Sens. Thom Tillis & Patrick 
Leahy to Andrei Iancu, Director, U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (Apr. 28, 2020). 
extent to which such infringements 
appear to be based on intentional or 
reckless conduct.’’ 43 The letter requests 
that the Office provide a public report 
summarizing the findings of this study, 
as well as the facts and analyses upon 
which those findings are based, by April 
30, 2021.44 
Pursuant to this request, the Office is 
seeking public input in multiple phases. 
The Office is providing 60 days for 
written comments from interested 
parties on the topics outlined below. To 
fulfill the request from Congress and the 
requirements of the Court, the Office 
seeks factual evidence and other 
verifiable information to support this 
inquiry. For each question, to the extent 
available, please include empirical data 
or other quantitative analysis in your 
response. If describing a litigation 
matter, please include information 
sufficient for the Office to identify such 
matter, such as the relevant court, 
docket number, asserted claims, and 
dates. As applicable, the Office 
encourages commenters to append 
relevant materials, such as pleadings, 
opinions, or other documentary 
evidence, in support of their comments. 
If participants currently gathering 
empirical research and analyses find 
themselves unable to complete them 
within the 60-day period for 
submissions, they are encouraged to 
contact the Office promptly, describing 
the nature of the research and indicating 
the time required for completion. To the 
extent possible, the Office will seek to 
accommodate such submissions by 
providing an additional comment 
period limited to the provision of 
empirical data at a later date, but 
encourages all commenters to meet the 
noticed deadline if possible, so that the 
Office may fully consider the 
submissions in light of the 
congressional deadline. 
After this comment period has closed, 
the Office intends to host one or more 
public roundtables to seek additional 
input, potentially virtually. The Office 
may request further written comments 
on particular issues discussed in 
response to this notice and/or at the 
public roundtables. 
II. Subjects of Inquiry 
The Copyright Office invites written 
comments on the subjects below. A 
party choosing to respond to this Notice 
of Inquiry need not address every 
subject, but the Office requests that 
responding parties clearly identify and 
separately address each subject for 
which a response is submitted. The 
Office also requests that commenters 
explain their interest in the study and, 
with respect to each answer, the basis 
for their knowledge (e.g., the commenter 
is a copyright owner, artist, academic, or 
state official). 
1. Please provide information 
regarding specific instances of 
infringing conduct committed by a state 
government entity, officer, or employee, 
including, where relevant: 
a. The work(s) infringed; 
b. The act(s) of alleged infringement; 
c. When the infringement occurred; 
d. The state actor(s) who committed 
the infringement; 
e. Whether the infringement was 
intentional or reckless, and the basis for 
that conclusion; 
f. Whether the infringement was 
committed pursuant to a state policy; 
g. Whether the state was contacted by 
or on behalf of the copyright owner in 
response to the infringement, and if so, 
how the state responded; 
h. Whether a lawsuit was filed as a 
result of the infringement, and if so, 
where the case was filed, what claim(s) 
were brought regarding the 
infringement, whether the case remains 
pending, and if not, how it was 
resolved; and 
i. If a lawsuit was not filed, why the 
copyright owner chose not to do so, 
including whether it attempted to 
resolve the matter privately in lieu of 
litigation, and any relevant details with 
respect to those attempts. 
2. To what extent does state sovereign 
immunity affect the licensing or sale of 
copies of copyrighted works to state 
entities? For example: 
a. Do copyright owners provide 
different payment or licensing terms in 
transactions with state entities than are 
provided in transactions with other 
parties? 
b. Have copyright owners changed 
aspects of their sales or licensing 
practices as a result of state sovereign 
immunity? 
c. Do different states or state entities 
take different approaches to working 
with copyrighted material? Are there 
particular states that more frequently 
infringe? 
3. What remedies are available for 
copyright owners when states infringe 
their works? 
a. To what extent did copyright 
owners file suits under the Copyright 
Act against state entities prior to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Allen v. 
Cooper? 
b. In your opinion, does the 
availability of injunctive relief against 
state officials provide an adequate 
remedy to address the needs of 
copyright owners in response to 
instances of state copyright 
infringement? 
c. To what extent are there state law 
causes of action that may provide a 
remedy for copyright infringements by 
state entities? Are there state court cases 
in which a copyright owner has been 
awarded a judgment on such a claim? 
d. To the extent state law provides a 
cause of action relevant to copyright 
infringement, how do the elements of 
the cause of action and/or available 
remedies differ from those applicable to 
claims under the Copyright Act? 
e. In your opinion, are those remedies 
adequate to address the needs of 
copyright owners in response to 
instances of state copyright 
infringement? 
4. How can Congress determine 
whether copyright infringement by a 
state is common or infrequent? What 
metrics should be used in making such 
a determination? 
5. Has the prevalence of infringement 
by states increased in recent years? 
a. What empirical evidence is 
available to determine whether and to 
what extent there has been a change 
over time? 
b. To what extent, if any, have 
instances of actual or threatened 
infringement by states increased since 
the decision in Allen, or can they be 
expected to increase? 
6. How do different states handle 
claims of infringement? Please discuss, 
as relevant: 
a. Whether any state agencies carry 
insurance policies that would cover 
infringement by a state employee, and if 
so, whether those insurance policies 
distinguish between infringement that is 
intentional, reckless, or negligent; 
b. Any laws, regulations, or policies 
that state entities have adopted to 
minimize the likelihood of, or to 
provide a remedy for, copyright 
infringement by a state entity; 
c. How frequently copyright owners 
claim a state actor has infringed their 
rights, either privately or in litigation; 
d. How state entities typically 
respond to credible claims of copyright 
infringement, including any formal or 
informal policies providing for 
negotiations with or payment to the 
copyright owner, as well as whether the 
Attorney General’s office is notified of 
such claims; 
e. What state entities are eligible to 
assert sovereign immunity as a defense 
to copyright infringement claims; 
f. Whether state entities have the right 
to waive sovereign immunity as a 
defense to an infringement lawsuit in 
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1 See Docket No. RM2018–3, Order Adopting 
Final Rules Relating to Non-Public Information, 
June 27, 2018, Attachment A at 19–22 (Order No. 
4679). 
federal court, and what authority 
permits or prevents such waiver; and 
g. Whether any states record and/or 
track copyright infringement claims 
received by state entities. 
7. Please identify any pertinent issues 
not referenced above that the Copyright 
Office should consider in conducting its 
study. 
Dated: May 29, 2020. 
Regan A. Smith, 
General Counsel and Associate Register of 
Copyrights. 
[FR Doc. 2020–12019 Filed 6–2–20; 8:45 am] 
BILLING CODE 1410–30–P 
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND 
SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
[Notice (20–051)] 
Notice of Intent To Grant an Exclusive 
License 
AGENCY: National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration. 
ACTION: Notice of intent to grant 
exclusive invention license. 
SUMMARY: NASA hereby gives notice of 
its intent to grant an exclusive invention 
license in the United States to practice 
the invention described and claimed in 
NASA Case Number MFS–33884–1, 
entitled ‘‘Ruggedizing a Commercial 
Camera for Space Flight Environments,’’ 
to Imperx, Inc., having its principal 
place of business in Boca Raton, Florida. 
NASA has not yet made a determination 
to grant the requested license and may 
deny the requested license even if no 
objections are submitted within the 
comment period. 
DATES: The prospective exclusive 
license may be granted unless NASA 
receives written objections including 
evidence and argument, no later than 
June 18, 2020 that establish that the 
grant of the license would not be 
consistent with the requirements 
regarding the licensing of federally 
owned inventions as set forth in the 
Bayh-Dole Act and implementing 
regulations. Competing applications 
completed and received by NASA no 
later than June 18, 2020 will also be 
treated as objections to the grant of the 
contemplated exclusive license. 
Objections submitted in response to this 
notice will not be made available to the 
public for inspection and, to the extent 
permitted by law, will not be released 
under the Freedom of Information Act. 
ADDRESSES: Objections relating to the 
prospective license may be submitted to 
James J. McGroary, Chief Patent 
Counsel/LS01, NASA Marshall Space 
Flight Center, Huntsville, AL 35812, 
(256) 544–0013. Email 
james.j.mcgroary@nasa.gov. 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kyle 
Costabile, Technology Transfer, ST22, 
NASA Marshall Space Flight Center, 
Huntsville, AL 35812, (256) 316–9556. 
Email kyle.p.costabile@nasa.gov. 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This 
notice of intent to grant an exclusive 
invention license is issued in 
accordance with 35 U.S.C. 209(e) and 37 
CFR 404.7(a)(1)(i). The patent rights in 
these inventions have been assigned to 
the United States of America as 
represented by the Administrator of the 
National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration. The prospective 
exclusive license will comply with the 
requirements of 35 U.S.C. 209 and 37 
CFR 404.7. 
Information about other NASA 
inventions available for licensing can be 
found online at http://
technology.nasa.gov. 
Helen M. Galus, 
Agency Counsel for Intellectual Property. 
[FR Doc. 2020–11933 Filed 6–2–20; 8:45 am] 
BILLING CODE 7510–13–P 
POSTAL REGULATORY COMMISSION 
[Docket Nos. MC2020–143 and CP2020–153; 
MC2020–144 and CP2020–154; MC2020–145 
and CP2020–155; MC2020–146 and CP2020– 
156] 
New Postal Products 
AGENCY: Postal Regulatory Commission. 
ACTION: Notice. 
SUMMARY: The Commission is noticing a 
recent Postal Service filing for the 
Commission’s consideration concerning 
negotiated service agreements. This 
notice informs the public of the filing, 
invites public comment, and takes other 
administrative steps. 
DATES: Comments are due: June 5, 2020. 
ADDRESSES: Submit comments 
electronically via the Commission’s 
Filing Online system at http://
www.prc.gov. Those who cannot submit 
comments electronically should contact 
the person identified in the FOR FURTHER 
INFORMATION CONTACT section by 
telephone for advice on filing 
alternatives. 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 
David A. Trissell, General Counsel, at 
202–789–6820. 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 
Table of Contents 
I. Introduction 
II. Docketed Proceeding(s) 
I. Introduction 
The Commission gives notice that the 
Postal Service filed request(s) for the 
Commission to consider matters related 
to negotiated service agreement(s). The 
request(s) may propose the addition or 
removal of a negotiated service 
agreement from the market dominant or 
the competitive product list, or the 
modification of an existing product 
currently appearing on the market 
dominant or the competitive product 
list. 
Section II identifies the docket 
number(s) associated with each Postal 
Service request, the title of each Postal 
Service request, the request’s acceptance 
date, and the authority cited by the 
Postal Service for each request. For each 
request, the Commission appoints an 
officer of the Commission to represent 
the interests of the general public in the 
proceeding, pursuant to 39 U.S.C. 505 
(Public Representative). Section II also 
establishes comment deadline(s) 
pertaining to each request. 
The public portions of the Postal 
Service’s request(s) can be accessed via 
the Commission’s website (http://
www.prc.gov). Non-public portions of 
the Postal Service’s request(s), if any, 
can be accessed through compliance 
with the requirements of 39 CFR 
3011.301.1 
The Commission invites comments on 
whether the Postal Service’s request(s) 
in the captioned docket(s) are consistent 
with the policies of title 39. For 
request(s) that the Postal Service states 
concern market dominant product(s), 
applicable statutory and regulatory 
requirements include 39 U.S.C. 3622, 39 
U.S.C. 3642, 39 CFR part 3030, and 39 
CFR part 3040, subpart B. For request(s) 
that the Postal Service states concern 
competitive product(s), applicable 
statutory and regulatory requirements 
include 39 U.S.C. 3632, 39 U.S.C. 3633, 
39 U.S.C. 3642, 39 CFR part 3035, and 
39 CFR part 3040, subpart B. Comment 
deadline(s) for each request appear in 
section II. 
II. Docketed Proceeding(s) 
1. Docket No(s).: MC2020–143 and 
CP2020–153; Filing Title: USPS Request 
to Add Priority Mail Contract 621 to 
Competitive Product List and Notice of 
Filing Materials Under Seal; Filing 
Acceptance Date: May 28, 2020; Filing 
Authority: 39 U.S.C. 3642, 39 CFR 
3040.130 et seq., and 39 CFR 3035.105; 
Public Representative: Christopher C. 
Mohr; Comments Due: June 5, 2020. 
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requires the employer to make a 
thorough periodic inspection of alloy 
steel chain slings in use on a regular 
basis, but at least once a year. Paragraph 
(b)(6)(ii) requires the employer to make 
and maintain a record of the most recent 
month in which each alloy steel chain 
was inspected and make the record 
available for examination. 
Paragraph (c)(15)(ii) requires that all 
welded end attachments of wire rope 
slings be proof tested by the 
manufacturer at twice their rated 
capacity prior to initial use, and that the 
employer retain a certificate of the proof 
test and make it available for 
examination. 
Paragraphs (e)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii) 
require that synthetic web slings be 
marked or coded to show the 
manufacturer’s name or trademark, the 
rated capacity for the type of hitch, and 
the type of synthetic webbing material. 
Paragraph (f)(2) requires that all hooks 
for which no applicable manufacturer’s 
recommendations are available be tested 
twice before they are put into use. The 
employer shall maintain a record of the 
dates and results of the tests. 
II. Special Issues for Comment 
OSHA has a particular interest in 
comments on the following issues: 
• Whether the proposed information 
collection requirements are necessary 
for the proper performance of the 
agency’s functions, including whether 
the information is useful; 
• The accuracy of OSHA’s estimate of 
the burden (time and costs) of the 
information collection requirements, 
including the validity of the 
methodology and assumptions used; 
• The quality, utility, and clarity of 
the information collected; and 
• Ways to minimize the burden on 
employers who must-comply; for 
example, by using automated or other 
technological information collection 
and transmission techniques. 
III. Proposed Actions 
There is an adjustment decrease of 
3,269 burden hours (from 52,428 hours 
to 49,159 hours). This decrease is a 
result of new data indicating a decrease 
in the number of cranes and derricks 
from 122,091 to 115,829. 
Type of Review: Extension of a 
currently approved collection. 
Title: Rigging Equipment for Material 
Handling (29 CFR 1926.251). 
OMB Control Number: 1218–0233. 
Affected Public: Business or other for- 
profits. 
Number of Respondents: 115,829. 
Total Responses: 306,729. 
Frequency of Responses: On occasion. 
Average Time per Response: Average 
of 3 minutes (3/60 hour) for an 
employer to maintain and disclose a 
certificate to 30 minutes (30/60 hour) for 
an employer to acquire information and 
make a tag for a sling. 
Estimated Total Burden Hours: 
49,159. 
Estimated Cost (Operation and 
Maintenance): $0. 
IV. Public Participation—Submission of 
Comments on This Notice and Internet 
Access to Comments and Submissions 
You may submit comments in 
response to this document as follows: 
(1) Electronically at http://
www.regulations.gov, which is the 
Federal eRulemaking Portal; (2) by 
facsimile (fax); or (3) by hard copy. All 
comments, attachments, and other 
material must identify the agency name 
and the OSHA docket number for the 
ICR (OSHA Docket No. 2010–0038). You 
may supplement electronic submissions 
by uploading document files 
electronically. If you wish to mail 
additional materials in reference to an 
electronic or facsimile submission, you 
must submit them to the OSHA Docket 
Office (see the section of this notice 
titled ADDRESSES). The additional 
materials must clearly identify your 
electronic comments by your name, 
date, and the docket number so the 
agency can attach them to your 
comments. 
Because of security procedures, the 
use of regular mail may cause a 
significant delay in the receipt of 
comments. For information about 
security procedures concerning the 
delivery of materials by hand, express 
delivery, messenger, or courier service, 
please contact the OSHA Docket Office 
at (202) 693–2350, (TTY (877) 889– 
5627). 
Comments and submissions are 
posted without change at http://
www.regulations.gov. Therefore, OSHA 
cautions commenters about submitting 
personal information, such as social 
security numbers and dates of birth. 
Although all submissions are listed in 
the http://www.regulations.gov index, 
some information (e.g., copyrighted 
material) is not publicly available to 
read or download through this website. 
All submissions, including copyrighted 
material, are available for inspection 
and copying at the OSHA Docket Office. 
Information on using the http://
www.regulations.gov website to submit 
comments and access the docket is 
available at the website’s ‘‘User Tips’’ 
link. Contact the OSHA Docket Office 
for information about materials not 
available through the website, and for 
assistance in using the internet to locate 
docket submissions. 
V. Authority and Signature 
Loren Sweatt, Principal Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Labor for 
Occupational Safety and Health, 
directed the preparation of this notice. 
The authority for this notice is the 
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 
U.S.C. 3506 et seq.) and Secretary of 
Labor’s Order No. 1–2012 (77 FR 3912). 
Signed at Washington, DC, on June 18, 
2020. 
Loren Sweatt, 
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Labor 
for Occupational Safety and Health. 
[FR Doc. 2020–13520 Filed 6–23–20; 8:45 am] 
BILLING CODE 4510–26–P 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
Copyright Office 
[Docket No. 2020–9] 
Sovereign Immunity Study: Notice and 
Request for Public Comment 
AGENCY: U.S. Copyright Office, Library 
of Congress. 
ACTION: Notice of Inquiry; extension of 
comment period. 
SUMMARY: The U.S. Copyright Office is 
extending the deadline for the 
submission of written comments in 
response to its June 3, 2020, notice of 
inquiry regarding its state sovereign 
immunity policy study. In addition, the 
Office is providing for a second round 
of written comments. 
DATES: Initial written comments in 
response to the notice of inquiry 
published June 3, 2020, at 85 FR 34252, 
must be received no later than 11:59 
p.m. Eastern Time on September 2, 
2020. Written reply comments and 
empirical research studies must be 
received no later than 11:59 p.m. 
Eastern Time on October 2, 2020. 
ADDRESSES: For reasons of government 
efficiency, the Copyright Office is using 
the regulations.gov system for the 
submission and posting of public 
comments in this proceeding. All 
comments are therefore to be submitted 
electronically through regulations.gov. 
Specific instructions for submitting 
comments are available on the 
Copyright Office website at http://
www.copyright.gov/docs/ 
sovereignimmunitystudy. If electronic 
submission of comments is not feasible 
due to lack of access to a computer and/ 
or the internet, please contact the Office, 
using the contact information below, for 
special instructions. 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 
Kevin Amer, Deputy General Counsel, 
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1 85 FR 34252 (June 3, 2020). 
2 Letter from Sens. Thom Tillis & Patrick Leahy 
to Maria Strong, Acting Register of Copyrights, U.S. 
Copyright Office at 1 (Apr. 28, 2020), https://
www.copyright.gov/rulemaking/statesovereign- 
immunity/letter.pdf. 
3 See 85 FR at 34255. 
kamer@copyright.gov; Mark T. Gray, 
Attorney-Advisor, mgray@
copyright.gov; or Jalyce E. Mangum, 
Attorney-Advisor, jmang@copyright.gov. 
They can be reached by telephone at 
202–707–3000. 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On June 3, 
2020, the U.S. Copyright Office issued a 
notice of inquiry (‘‘NOI’’) commencing a 
policy study on state sovereign 
immunity from copyright infringement 
suits.1 Congress has requested that the 
Office ‘‘research this issue to determine 
whether there is sufficient basis for 
federal legislation abrogating State 
sovereign immunity when States 
infringe copyrights.’’ 2 To assist 
Congress in making that assessment, the 
Office solicited public comment on 
several issues concerning the degree to 
which copyright owners face 
infringement from state actors today, 
whether such infringement is based on 
intentional or reckless conduct, and 
what remedies, if any, are available to 
copyright owners under state law. 
To ensure that members of the public 
have sufficient time to comment, and to 
ensure that the Office has the benefit of 
a complete record, the Office is 
extending the deadline for the 
submission of comments to 11:59 p.m. 
Eastern Time on September 2, 2020. 
The Office has also determined that 
interested parties should be given an 
opportunity to address any comments 
submitted in response to the NOI. In 
addition, as noted in the NOI,3 the 
Office is seeking to provide sufficient 
time for parties engaged in empirical 
research in this area to complete and 
submit their findings. Accordingly, the 
Office is providing for a second round 
of written comments. Additional 
comments must be submitted no later 
than October 2, 2020. In general, these 
comments should be limited to issues or 
concerns presented in the initial 
comments. The Office will, however, 
consider any empirical research 
submitted by the October 2 deadline as 
part of the record in this proceeding. 
Dated: June 22, 2020. 
Regan A. Smith, 
General Counsel and Associate Register of 
Copyrights. 
[FR Doc. 2020–13725 Filed 6–23–20; 8:45 am] 
BILLING CODE 1410–30–P 
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND 
SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
[NOTICE: (20–053)] 
Name of Information Collection: COVID 
19 Census of NASA Grantees 
AGENCY: National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA). 
ACTION: Notice of information 
collection—Renewal with change of an 
Existing Information Collection. 
SUMMARY: The National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration, as part of its 
continuing effort to reduce paperwork 
and respondent burden, invites the 
general public and other Federal 
agencies to take this opportunity to 
comment on proposed and/or 
continuing information collections. 
DATES: Comments are due by August 24, 
2020. 
ADDRESSES: All comments should be 
addressed to Claire Little, National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
300 E Street SW, Washington, DC 
20546–0001 or call 202–358–2375. 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 
Requests for additional information or 
copies of the information collection 
instrument(s) and instructions should 
be directed to R. Travis Kantz, NASA 
Clearance Officer, NASA Headquarters, 
300 E Street SW, JF0000, Washington, 




NASA is requesting an extension with 
change to this existing collection in 
order to continue to gather information 
consistent with OMB and NASA COVID 
guidance. This data will help inform 
NASA about the status and ongoing 
implementation issues surrounding 
COVID mitigation for NASA grantees 
and will improve the quality and 
responsiveness of NASA in responding 
to grantee issues which impact scientific 
research funded by NASA. 
This information may be disclosed as 
necessary to NASA personnel, 
contractors, and partners to administer 
NASA Education programs. It also may 
be disclosed to NASA administrators 
and managers, Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) officials, and 
members of Congress for the purposes of 
accountability and tracking of program 
and project efficiency and effectiveness. 
II. Methods of Collection 
Interview. 
III. Data 
Title: COVID 19 Census of NASA 
Grantees. 
OMB Number: 2700–0177. 
Type of review: Renewal with Change. 
Affected Public: Educational 
institutions from k-12, universities, 
community and tribal colleges, 
museums. 
Estimated Annual Number of 
Activities: 12. 
Estimated Number of Respondents 
per Activity: 156. 
Annual Responses: 12. 
Estimated Time per Response: 15 
minutes. 
Estimated Total Annual Burden 
Hours: 22464. 
Estimated Total Annual Cost: 
$10,953,446. 
IV. Request for Comments 
Comments are invited on: (1) Whether 
the proposed collection of information 
is necessary for the proper performance 
of the functions of NASA, including 
whether the information collected has 
practical utility; (2) the accuracy of 
NASA’s estimate of the burden 
(including hours and cost) of the 
proposed collection of information; (3) 
ways to enhance the quality, utility, and 
clarity of the information to be 
collected; and (4) ways to minimize the 
burden of the collection of information 
on respondents, including automated 
collection techniques or the use of other 
forms of information technology. 
Comments submitted in response to 
this notice will be summarized and 
included in the request for OMB 
approval of this information collection. 
They will also become a matter of 
public record. 
Roger Kantz, 
NASA PRA Clearance Officer. 
[FR Doc. 2020–13538 Filed 6–23–20; 8:45 am] 
BILLING CODE 7510–13–P 
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND 
SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
[Notice: 20–058] 
NASA Advisory Council; Aeronautics 
Committee; Meeting 
AGENCY: National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration. 
ACTION: Notice of meeting. 
SUMMARY: In accordance with the 
Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended, the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) 
announces a meeting of the Aeronautics 
Committee of the NASA Advisory 
Council (NAC). This meeting will be 
held for soliciting, from the aeronautics 
community and other persons, research 
and technical information relevant to 
program planning. 
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3 Medical CDRs are periodic reviews of an 
individual’s medical impairment(s) to determine 
continuing eligibility for SSI and/or SSDI. 
local workforce entities would receive 
funding and technical assistance from 
ETA in order to better serve disability 
beneficiaries, with a portion of Ticket 
funding reserved for rewarding strong 
performance and program innovation. 
States and localities would be allowed 
greater flexibility in tailoring services to 
fit local circumstances. The redesigned 
program would retain key features of the 
current program, such as benefits 
counseling and suspension of SSA 
medical Continuing Disability Reviews 
(CDRs) while program participants 
pursue employment.3 
In close coordination with SSA and 
ETA, DOL’s Office of Disability 
Employment Policy (ODEP) will provide 
policy analysis and guidance to support 
the transfer and improvement of the 
program. 
Request for Information 
Through this RFI, we are soliciting 
feedback from interested and affected 
parties on the potential benefits and 
challenges in transferring the Ticket 
program to DOL and serving program 
participants through the public 
workforce systems, in order to enable 
them to increase employment and 
earnings and maximize self-sufficiency. 
We are also interested in evidence 
supporting or challenging the 
assumptions underlying this proposal. 
Responses to this RFI will inform 
decisions regarding the development, 
design, and implementation of the 
redesigned program. As such, responses 
supported by substantial evidence and 
careful reasoning will be afforded 
greatest weight. This RFI notice is for 
internal planning purposes only and 
should not be construed as a solicitation 
or as an obligation on the part of DOL 
or any participating federal agencies. 
We ask respondents to address the 
following questions in the context of the 
preceding discussion in this document. 
Respondents do not need to address 
every question and should focus on 
those that relate to their expertise or 
perspective. To the extent possible, 
please clearly indicate the question(s) 
addressed in your response. We ask that 
each respondent include the name and 
street address of his or her institution or 
affiliation, if any, and the name, title, 
street address, email address, and 
telephone number of a contact person 
for his or her institution or affiliation, if 
any. 
Questions 
Workforce System Capacity 
1. How might state workforce systems 
use new Ticket program funding to 
increase capacity to effectively serve 
SSA disability beneficiaries, given that 
the number of SSA disability 
beneficiaries who will seek services in 
a particular locality is unknown? 
2. How might state workforce systems 
integrate the provision of the Ticket 
program with other existing WIOA 
services? What opportunities and 
challenges will arise in doing so? 
3. How could DOL’s ETA help 
prepare state workforce systems for a 
potentially significant increase in SSA 
disability beneficiaries seeking services? 
4. What ongoing federal support 
would be most helpful to state 
workforce systems as they administer 
the Ticket program? 
5. How could state workforce systems 
provide quality remote services, when 
necessary, to serve SSA disability 
beneficiaries regionally or nationwide? 
6. What are key considerations in 
transferring SSA’s Work Incentives 
Planning and Assistance (WIPA) 
services to state workforce agencies? 
Participant Experience and Outcomes 
7. What specific program changes 
could improve experiences and 
outcomes for persons accessing the 
redesigned Ticket program services 
through the workforce system? 
8. What is the capacity of the 
workforce system to effectively serve 
young adults or transition-age youth 
(i.e., ages 14–18) under a redesigned 
Ticket program? What capacity and 
coordination issues would arise in 
serving transition-age youth? 
Employment Networks and Vocational 
Rehabilitation 
9. What lessons can be taken from 
current EN models (e.g., community- 
based, nonprofit, workforce ENs) or 
collaborative AJC program models that 
can inform the new Ticket program? 
10. How can VR entities partner with 
state workforce systems to support SSA 
disability beneficiaries in the redesigned 
Ticket program? 
Funding Structure, Performance Metrics 
and Performance-Based Payments 
11. What payment structures and 
which WIOA performance indicators (if 
any) would encourage state workforce 
systems to provide robust employment 
and training services to persons with 
disabilities, leading to job placement 
and ongoing support to ensure job 
retention? 
12. Which of the WIOA performance 
indicators (if any) could serve as 
potential interim measures to trigger 
partial performance-based payments? 
13. What are appropriate intervals 
(medium- and long-term) for 
performance-based payments? 
14. How would workforce entities and 
DOL track and measure program 
success? Would workforce entities 
require access to new administrative 
data sources? 
General 
15. What challenges within the 
current Ticket program would 
potentially remain in a redesigned 
program administered by state 
workforce entities, and what could DOL 
do to address or mitigate them? 
16. What strengths of the current 
Ticket program contribute to the success 
of individual Ticket holders, and how 
could these be preserved in the 
redesigned program? 
17. Are there current or recent state 
examples of integrated systems that 
offer lessons for successful 
implementation of the redesigned Ticket 
program? 
18. What are the implications of the 
current COVID–19 pandemic for 
redesigning the Ticket program at this 
time, such as employer demand, 
workforce system capacity, and remote 
services? 
19. Are there additional 
considerations in transferring the Ticket 
program from SSA to DOL? 
Signed at Washington, DC, this __th day of 
September, 2020. 
Jennifer Sheehy, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Disability 
Employment Policy. 
[FR Doc. 2020–21533 Filed 9–28–20; 8:45 am] 
BILLING CODE 4510–FK–P 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
Copyright Office 
[Docket No. 2020–9] 
Sovereign Immunity Study: Notice and 
Request for Public Comment 
AGENCY: U.S. Copyright Office, Library 
of Congress. 
ACTION: Notice of inquiry; extension of 
comment period. 
SUMMARY: The U.S. Copyright Office is 
extending the deadline for the 
submission of reply comments and 
empirical research studies in response 
to the June 3 and June 24, 2020, notices 
regarding its state sovereign immunity 
policy study. 
DATES: Written reply comments and 
empirical research studies in response 
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1 85 FR 34252 (June 3, 2020). 
2 Letter from Sens. Thom Tillis & Patrick Leahy 
to Maria Strong, Acting Register of Copyrights, U.S. 
Copyright Office at 1 (Apr. 28, 2020), https://
www.copyright.gov/rulemaking/statesovereign- 
immunity/letter.pdf. 
3 85 FR 37961 (June 24, 2020); see 85 FR at 34255. 
to the notices published June 3, 2020, at 
85 FR 34252, and June 24, 2020, at 85 
FR 37961, must be received no later 
than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on 
October 22, 2020. 
ADDRESSES: For reasons of government 
efficiency, the Copyright Office is using 
the regulations.gov system for the 
submission and posting of public 
comments in this proceeding. All 
comments are therefore to be submitted 
electronically through regulations.gov. 
Specific instructions for submitting 
comments are available on the 
Copyright Office website at http://
www.copyright.gov/docs/ 
sovereignimmunitystudy. If electronic 
submission of comments is not feasible 
due to lack of access to a computer and/ 
or the internet, please contact the Office, 
using the contact information below, for 
special instructions. 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 
Kevin Amer, Deputy General Counsel, 
kamer@copyright.gov; Mark T. Gray, 
Attorney-Advisor, mgray@
copyright.gov; or Jalyce E. Mangum, 
Attorney-Advisor, jmang@copyright.gov. 
They can be reached by telephone at 
202–707–3000. 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On June 3, 
2020, the U.S. Copyright Office issued a 
notice of inquiry (‘‘NOI’’) commencing a 
policy study on state sovereign 
immunity from copyright infringement 
suits.1 Congress has requested that the 
Office ‘‘research this issue to determine 
whether there is sufficient basis for 
federal legislation abrogating State 
sovereign immunity when States 
infringe copyrights.’’ 2 To assist 
Congress in making that assessment, the 
Office solicited public comment on 
several issues concerning the degree to 
which copyright owners face 
infringement from state actors today, 
whether such infringement is based on 
intentional or reckless conduct, and 
what remedies, if any, are available to 
copyright owners under state law. 
On June 24, 2020, the Office issued an 
additional notice providing for a second 
round of written comments to permit 
interested parties the opportunity to 
address any comments submitted in 
response to the NOI and to allow parties 
engaged in empirical research to 
complete and submit their findings.3 To 
ensure that members of the public have 
sufficient time to comment, and to 
ensure that the Office has the benefit of 
a complete record, the Office is 
extending the deadline for the 
submission of additional comments 
and/or empirical research to 11:59 p.m. 
Eastern Time on October 22, 2020. 
Dated: September 24, 2020. 
Regan A. Smith, 
General Counsel and Associate Register of 
Copyrights. 
[FR Doc. 2020–21566 Filed 9–28–20; 8:45 am] 
BILLING CODE 1410–30–P 
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND 
SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
[Notice: (20–078)] 
NASA Astrophysics Advisory 
Committee; Meeting. 
AGENCY: National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration. 
ACTION: Notice of meeting. 
SUMMARY: In accordance with the 
Federal Advisory Committee Act, the 
National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) announces a 
meeting of the Astrophysics Advisory 
Committee. This Committee reports to 
the Director, Astrophysics Division, 
Science Mission Directorate, NASA 
Headquarters. The meeting will be held 
for the purpose of soliciting, from the 
scientific community and other persons, 
scientific and technical information 
relevant to program planning. 
DATES: Monday, October 19, 2020, 11:00 
a.m.–5:00 p.m., Tuesday, October 20, 
2020, 11:00 a.m.–5:00 p.m., and 
Wednesday, October 21, 2020, 11:00 
a.m.–5:00 p.m., Eastern Time. 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. 
KarShelia Henderson, Science Mission 
Directorate, NASA Headquarters, 
Washington, DC 20546, (202) 358–2355 
or khenderson@nasa.gov. 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The 
meeting will be available to the public 
by WebEx. 
On Monday, October 19, the event 




the event number is 199 918 6105, and 
event password is ixXyezN@783. 
On Tuesday, October 20, the event 




624d6ab4cfee14f5, the event number is 
199 163 7113, and the event password 
is TSpcp97Hd*5. 
On Wednesday, October 21, the event 




24be91839cbc1d217, the event number 
is 199 599 3836, and the event password 
is bKsf3Unn$57. 
The agenda for the meeting includes 
the following topics: 
—Astrophysics Division Update 
—Updates on Specific Astrophysics 
Missions 
—Reports from the Program Analysis 
Groups 
—Reports from Specific Research and 
Analysis Programs 
The agenda will be posted on the 




The public may submit and upvote 
comments/questions ahead of the 
meeting through the website https://
arc.cnf.io/sessions/h259/#!/dashboard 
that will be opened for input on October 
5, 2020. 
It is imperative that the meeting be 
held on this date to accommodate the 
scheduling priorities of the key 
participants. 
Patricia Rausch, 
Advisory Committee Management Officer, 
National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration. 
[FR Doc. 2020–21428 Filed 9–28–20; 8:45 am] 
BILLING CODE 7510–13–P 
NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION 
Notice of Permits Issued Under the 
Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978 
AGENCY: National Science Foundation. 
ACTION: Notice of permit issued. 
SUMMARY: The National Science 
Foundation (NSF) is required to publish 
notice of permits issued under the 
Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978. 
This is the required notice. 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 
Nature McGinn, ACA Permit Officer, 
Office of Polar Programs, National 
Science Foundation, 2415 Eisenhower 
Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22314; 703– 
292–8030; email: ACApermits@nsf.gov. 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On August 
20, 2020, the National Science 
Foundation published a notice in the 
Federal Register of a permit application 
received. The permit was issued on 
September 23, 2020 to: 
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Rhode Island Legal Services, Inc ................................................................................................ RI RI–1 1,036,191 
South Carolina Legal Services, Inc ............................................................................................. SC MSC 166,572 
South Carolina Legal Services, Inc ............................................................................................. SC SC–8 6,466,912 
Dakota Plains Legal Services, Inc ............................................................................................... SD NSD–1 1,098,419 
East River Legal Services ........................................................................................................... SD SD–2 461,315 
Dakota Plains Legal Services, Inc ............................................................................................... SD SD–4 501,191 
Legal Aid Society of Middle Tennessee and the Cumberlands .................................................. TN TN–10 3,347,711 
Memphis Area Legal Services, Inc .............................................................................................. TN TN–4 1,661,056 
West Tennessee Legal Services, Inc .......................................................................................... TN TN–7 765,560 
Legal Aid of East Tennessee ...................................................................................................... TN TN–9 2,703,092 
Texas RioGrande Legal Aid, Inc ................................................................................................. TX MSX–2 2,081,141 
Texas RioGrande Legal Aid, Inc ................................................................................................. TX NTX–1 36,819 
Lone Star Legal Aid ..................................................................................................................... TX TX–13 12,888,876 
Legal Aid of NorthWest Texas ..................................................................................................... TX TX–14 9,794,740 
Texas RioGrande Legal Aid, Inc ................................................................................................. TX TX–15 12,318,247 
Utah Legal Services, Inc .............................................................................................................. UT MUT 99,574 
Utah Legal Services, Inc .............................................................................................................. UT NUT–1 96,783 
Utah Legal Services, Inc .............................................................................................................. UT UT–1 2,516,704 
Central Virginia Legal Aid Society, Inc ........................................................................................ VA MVA 200,938 
Southwest Virginia Legal Aid Society, Inc ................................................................................... VA VA–15 928,630 
Legal Aid Society of Eastern Virginia .......................................................................................... VA VA–16 1,682,317 
Virginia Legal Aid Society, Inc ..................................................................................................... VA VA–17 865,389 
Central Virginia Legal Aid Society, Inc ........................................................................................ VA VA–18 1,404,007 
Blue Ridge Legal Services, Inc ................................................................................................... VA VA–19 922,443 
Legal Services of Northern Virginia, Inc ...................................................................................... VA VA–20 1,711,145 
Legal Services of the Virgin Islands, Inc ..................................................................................... VI VI–1 208,408 
Legal Services Vermont ............................................................................................................... VT VT–1 558,386 
Northwest Justice Project ............................................................................................................ WA MWA 757,981 
Northwest Justice Project ............................................................................................................ WA NWA–1 335,121 
Northwest Justice Project ............................................................................................................ WA WA–1 6,318,864 
Legal Action of Wisconsin, Inc .................................................................................................... WI MWI 428,697 
Wisconsin Judicare, Inc ............................................................................................................... WI NWI–1 182,487 
Wisconsin Judicare, Inc ............................................................................................................... WI WI–2 1,081,437 
Legal Action of Wisconsin, Inc .................................................................................................... WI WI–5 4,132,260 
Legal Aid of West Virginia, Inc .................................................................................................... WV WV–5 2,966,918 
Legal Aid of Wyoming, Inc ........................................................................................................... WY NWY–1 203,288 
Legal Aid of Wyoming, Inc ........................................................................................................... WY WY–4 565,108 
These grants will be awarded under 
the authority conferred on LSC by 
section 1006(a)(1) of the Legal Services 
Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. 2996e(a)(l). 
Grant awards are made to ensure civil 
legal services are provided in every 
service area, although no listed 
organization is guaranteed a grant 
award. Grants will become effective, 
and grant funds will be distributed, on 
or about January 1, 2021. 
LSC issues this notice pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. 2996f(f). Comments and 
recommendations concerning potential 
grantees are invited and should be 
delivered to LSC within 30 days from 
the date of publication of this notice. 
Dated: October 30, 2020. 
Stefanie Davis, 
Senior Assistant General Counsel. 
[FR Doc. 2020–24513 Filed 11–4–20; 8:45 am] 
BILLING CODE 7050–01–P 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
Copyright Office 
[Docket No. 2020–9] 
Sovereign Immunity Study: 
Announcement of Public Roundtables 
AGENCY: U.S. Copyright Office, Library 
of Congress. 
ACTION: Notice of public roundtables. 
SUMMARY: The U.S. Copyright Office is 
conducting a study to evaluate the 
degree to which copyright owners are 
experiencing infringement by state 
entities without adequate remedies 
under state law, as well as the extent to 
which such infringements appear to be 
based on intentional or reckless 
conduct. To aid its analysis, the Office 
is announcing public roundtables to 
provide the opportunity for members of 
the public to address the following 
topics: Evidence of actual or threatened 
copyright infringement by states; state 
policies and practices for minimizing 
copyright infringement and addressing 
infringement claims; and alternative 
remedies under state law for copyright 
infringement. 
DATES: The roundtables will be held on 
Friday, December 11, 2020. Attendees 
will be able to join the event online 
starting at approximately 8:30 a.m., and 
the event will run until approximately 
5:00 p.m. 
ADDRESSES: The Office will conduct the 
roundtables remotely using the Zoom 
videoconferencing platform. Requests to 
participate as a panelist in a roundtable 
session should be submitted by 11:59 
p.m. Eastern Time on November 16, 
2020 using the form available at https:// 
www.copyright.gov/policy/state- 
sovereign-immunity/hearing- 
request.html. Any person who is unable 
to send a request via the website should 
contact the Office using the contact 
information below to make an 
alternative arrangement for submission 
of a request to participate. Additional 
information will be made available at 
https://www.copyright.gov/policy/state- 
sovereign-immunity/roundtable. 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 
Kevin R. Amer, Deputy General 
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to Maria Strong, Acting Register of Copyrights, U.S. 




4 See Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1004 (2020). 
5 Id. 
6 17 U.S.C. 301. 
Counsel, kamer@copyright.gov; Mark T. 
Gray, Attorney-Advisor, mgray@
copyright.gov; or Jalyce E. Mangum, 
Attorney-Advisor, jmang@copyright.gov. 
They can be reached by telephone at 
202–707–3000. 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On June 3, 
2020, the U.S. Copyright Office issued a 
notice of inquiry (‘‘NOI’’) commencing a 
policy study on state sovereign 
immunity from copyright infringement 
suits.1 Congress has requested that the 
Office ‘‘research this issue to determine 
whether there is sufficient basis for 
federal legislation abrogating State 
sovereign immunity when States 
infringe copyrights.’’ 2 To assist 
Congress in making that assessment, the 
Office solicited public comment on 
several issues concerning the degree to 
which copyright owners face 
infringement from state actors today, 
whether such infringement is based on 
intentional or reckless conduct, and 
what remedies, if any, are available to 
copyright owners under state law. Initial 
comments were due on September 2, 
2020, and reply comments and 
empirical studies were due on October 
22, 2020. Information about the study, 
including the NOI and public 
comments, may be accessed on the 
Copyright Office website at https://
www.copyright.gov/policy/state- 
sovereign-immunity/. 
The Office is now announcing that it 
will hold roundtable discussions on 
December 11, 2020, to allow interested 
members of the public to discuss and 
provide additional information on the 
topics of the study. The roundtables will 
be held virtually over Zoom to allow 
maximum participation and avoid the 
need for participants to travel. Each 
roundtable session will cover a topic 
relevant to the study, as discussed 
below. Depending on the level of 
interest, the Office may hold multiple 
sessions on the same topic to 
accommodate a greater number of 
participants and provide additional time 
for discussion. 
Members of the public who seek to 
participate in a roundtable should 
complete and submit the form available 
on the Office website at https://
www.copyright.gov/policy/state- 
sovereign-immunity/hearing- 
request.html no later than November 16, 
2020. Shortly thereafter, the Office will 
notify participants of their selection and 
panel assignments. In order to 
accommodate the expected level of 
interest, the Office plans to assign no 
more than one representative per 
organization to each session. 
The Office will post a tentative 
agenda for the roundtables on its 
website on or about December 4, 2020. 
The Office also will provide sign-up 
information for members of the public 
who wish to observe, but not participate 
in, one or more of the roundtable 
sessions. The sessions will be video 
recorded and transcribed, and copies of 
the recording and transcript will be 
made available on the Copyright Office 
website 
Roundtable Subjects of Inquiry 
The roundtables will consist of 
sessions on the following topics: (1) 
Evidence of actual or threatened 
copyright infringement by states; (2) 
state policies and practices for 
minimizing copyright infringement and 
addressing infringement claims; and (3) 
alternative remedies under state law for 
copyright infringement. 
Evidence of Actual or Threatened 
Copyright Infringement by States 
Congress has asked the Office to 
‘‘study the extent to which copyright 
owners are experiencing infringements 
by state entities without adequate 
remedies under state law.’’ 3 To this 
end, the Office seeks evidence 
concerning actual or threatened 
copyright infringement by states, 
including both specific instances of 
infringing conduct and empirical 
information relating to broader trends. 
Relevant issues include, but are not 
limited to, the prevalence and outcomes 
of infringement suits brought against 
state actors; whether the frequency of 
infringement by states has changed over 
time and whether it is likely to increase 
or decrease in the future; and the extent 
to which state immunity affects sales 
and licensing practices in transactions 
involving state entities. In addition, in 
light of the Supreme Court’s articulation 
of the standard of intent required to 
establish unconstitutional 
infringement,4 the Office is particularly 
interested in information that would 
allow it to assess the extent to which 
state infringements have involved 
intentional or reckless conduct. 
State Policies and Practices for 
Minimizing Copyright Infringement and 
Addressing Infringement Claims 
The Office is interested in whether or 
to what extent states have adopted 
policies to address complaints of 
copyright infringement and/or to 
decrease the likelihood of inadvertent 
infringement by state employees and 
institutions. The Office is particularly 
interested in testimony by state officials 
about their own practices, but the Office 
also invites participation by 
organizations or individuals who have 
navigated the relevant processes or 
otherwise have experience with this 
topic. 
Alternative Remedies Under State Law 
for Copyright Infringement 
The Supreme Court’s decision in 
Allen v. Cooper requires Congress to 
consider whether states ‘‘fail[] to offer 
an adequate remedy for an 
infringement.’’ 5 The Office accordingly 
is interested in hearing from members of 
the public about what remedies states 
provide for infringement of copyright, as 
well as whether those remedies are 
adequate for enforcement purposes. The 
Office would be particularly interested 
in hearing from those who have asserted 
alternative state-law remedies in court 
and how such cases were resolved. 
Discussion of these issues should 
include consideration of the 
relationship of any state-law cause of 
action to the preemption provisions 
under section 301 of the Copyright Act.6 
Dated: November 2, 2020. 
Regan A. Smith, 
General Counsel andAssociate Register of 
Copyrights. 
[FR Doc. 2020–24577 Filed 11–4–20; 8:45 am] 
BILLING CODE 1410–30–P 
MORRIS K. UDALL AND STEWART L. 
UDALL FOUNDATION 
Sunshine Act Meetings 
TIME AND DATE: 10 a.m. to 12 p.m. (MST), 
Friday, November 20, 2020. 
PLACE: The offices of the Morris K. 
Udall and Stewart L. Udall Foundation, 
130 South Scott Avenue, Tucson, AZ 
85701. 
STATUS: This meeting will be open to the 
public. Due to COVID–19, visitors are 
currently prohibited from entering the 
Udall Foundation offices. Members of 
the public who would like to attend this 
meeting should contact Elizabeth 
Monroe at monroe@udall.gov prior to 
November 20 to request the 
teleconference connection information. 
MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED: (1) Call to 
Order and Chair’s Remarks; (2) 
Executive Director’s Remarks; (3) 
Remarks from Senator Tom Udall; (4) 
























Copyright and State Sovereign immunity
u.S.  Copyright offiCe
appendix c cOmmEnTing PARTiEs And  
ROundTAblE PARTiciPAnTs 
U.S. Copyright Office    Copyright and State Sovereign Immunity 
C-1 
Parties Who Submitted Initial Comments in  
Response to the June 3, 2020 Notice of Inquiry 
American Intellectual Property Law 
Association (AIPLA) 
Allen, Frederick 
Association of Public and Land-grant 
Universities and the Association of 
American Universities (APLU-AAU) 





Cacciottolo, Neil J. 
Flynn, Joshua 
Fons, Eric 
French, Ryan  
Gigante, Alexander  
Hawkins, Kevin 
Hockley Photography 
Kelly, Patricia  
Library Copyright Alliance (LCA) 
McMahan, Kelley 
Miglavs, Jnis 
National Press Photographers 
Association (NPPA) 
National Writers Union (NWU) 





University of Illinois at Urbana 
Champaign 
University of Massachusetts 
University of Michigan Library  
University of Minnesota  
Whidbey Writers Group 
 
  
U.S. Copyright Office    Copyright and State Sovereign Immunity 
C-2 
Parties Who Submitted Reply Comments in  
Response to the June 3, 2020 Notice of Inquiry 
Association of Public and Land-grant 
Universities and the Association of 
American Universities (APLU & AAU) 
Association of Southeastern Research 
Libraries (ASERL) and the Greater 
Western Library Alliance (GWLA) 
Association of University Presses 
(AUPresses) 
Bynum, Michael  






Songwriters Guild of America (SGA) & 
Society of Composers & Lyricists (SCL) 
Software and Information Industry 
Association (SIIA) 
University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign 
University of Michigan Library  
 
  
U.S. Copyright Office    Copyright and State Sovereign Immunity 
C-3 
Virtual Roundtable Participants  
(December 11, 2020) 
Allen, Frederick (Nautilus Productions) 
Band, Jonathan (Library Copyright 
Alliance) (LCA) 
Bell, Keith 
Benson, Sara (University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign) 
Butler, Brandon (Association of 
Southeastern Research Libraries (ASERL); 
Software Preservation Network (SPN)) 
Bynum, Michael 
Calzada, Alicia (National Press 
Photographers Association) (NPPA) 
Dooley, Yvonne (University of North 
Texas) 
Evans, Harold (University of Arkansas) 
Johnson, Andrea (C MATH is EASY) 
Klaus, Kurt (Dunlap Bennett & Ludwig, 
PLLC) 
Laiho, Devin (Colorado Attorney 
General’s Office) 
Lanier, Raven (University of Michigan 
Library) 
Levine, Melissa (University of Michigan 
Library) 
Linder, Craig (Dow Jones & Company) 
MacDonald, Agnus (University of 
California, Office of General Counsel) 
Madigan, Kevin (Copyright Alliance)  
Molnar, Isaac (Ohio Attorney General’s 
Office) 
Munter, Johannes (News Media Alliance) 
(NMA) 
Murphy, Kristen (American Chemical 
Society) (ACS) 
Olson, Darcee (Louisiana State 
University) 
Samberg, Rachael (University of 
California, Berkeley) 
Sapiandante, Maria  
Sedlik, Jeff (Art Center College of Design) 
Shontz, Douglas (University of Illinois; 
Association of Public and Land-Grant 
Universities) 
Smith, Kevin (University of Kansas) 
Thro, William (University of Kentucky) 
Vockell, Marc (University of Texas) 
Wassom, Brian (American Intellectual 
Property Law Association) (AIPLA) 
Xu, Yuanxiao (University of Michigan 
Library) 
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U.S. Copyright Office    Copyright and State Sovereign Immunity 
E-1 
 


















AL1 No – – – 
AK2 Yes Yes Contract, quasi-contract, 
or tort claims  
State court 
AZ3 Yes Yes Not specified  State court 
AR4 No Yes Not specified State claims 
commission 
CA5 Yes Yes Not specified  State court 
CO6 Not specified Yes Specified tort claims State court 
CT7 Yes Yes Claims for which a private 
person could be liable; 
suits must be authorized 
by Claims Commissioner 
State court 
DE8 Yes Yes Tort, contract, and liability 
insurance claims 
State court 
DC9 – Yes Contract and tort claims DC court  
FL10 Yes Yes Tort claims State court  
GA11 Yes Yes Contract and tort claims State court  
HI12 Not specified Yes Tort claims State court 
ID13 Yes Yes Tort claims State court  
IL14 Yes Yes State-law claims  State court 
IN15 Yes Yes Contract and tort claims State court 
IA16 Not specified Yes Tort claims State court 
KS17 Not specified Yes Torts and other approved 
claims 
State court 
KY18 Yes Yes Contract claims State court 
LA19 Yes Yes Contract and tort claims State court  
ME20 Not specified Yes Specified tort claims  State court 
MD21 Yes Yes Contract and tort claims State court  
MA22 Not specified Yes 
  
Tort claims State court 
MI23 Yes Yes Tort claims where 
immunity is specifically 
waived and employment 
related claims 
State court 



















MN24 Not specified Yes Tort claims and 
employment-related 











MS25 Not specified Yes Tort claims State court  
MO26 Not specified Yes Tort claims State court  
MT27 Yes Yes Tort claims State court  
NE28 Yes Yes Tort claims State court 
NV29 Yes Yes Tort claims State court  
NH30 Not specified  Yes Contract and tort claims State court  
NJ31 Not specified Yes Act or omission of a public 




NM32 Not specified Yes Torts claims where 
immunity is specifically 
waived and claims related 
to religious freedom 
State court 
NY33 Yes Yes Claims for which 
individuals and 
corporations can be liable 
 
State court  
NC34 Not specified Yes Tort claims State 
commission 
ND35 Yes Yes Contract and tort claims; 
claims involving title to 
property 
State court  
OH36 Yes Yes Claims available to private 
parties 
State court  
OK37 Not specified Yes Tort claims State court 
OR38 Yes Yes Contract and tort claims  State court 
PA39 Yes Yes Specified tort claims State court  



















RI40 Not specified Yes Tort claims Not specified 
SC41 Yes Yes Tort claims unless listed 
under exceptions to 
waiver of immunity. 
State court  
SD42 Yes Yes Claims involving real or 
personal property; waiver 
of immunity to the extent 
of liability insurance 







TN43 Yes Yes Specified state-law claims State 
commission  
TX44 Not specified Yes Specified tort and contract 
claims 
State court  
UT45 Not specified Yes Specified state-law claims  State court  
VT46 Not specified Yes Tort claims State court 
VA47 Not specified Yes Tort claims State court  
WA48 Yes Yes Tort claims State court 
WV49 No No – – 
WI50 Yes Yes Contract and tort claims State court 
WY51 Yes Yes Contract and tort claims State court 
 
 
1 ALA. CONST. art. I, § 14 (“[T]he State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or 
equity.”). 
2 ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 21 (“The legislature shall establish procedures for suits against the State.”); 
ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250 (“A person or corporation having a contract, quasi-contract, or tort claim 
against the state may bring an action against the state in a state court that has jurisdiction over the claim.”). 
3 ARIZ. CONST. art. 4IV, pt. 2, § 18 (“The legislature shall direct by law in what manner and in what courts 
suits may be brought against the state.”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-821.01 (“Persons who have claims against 
a public entity, public school or a public employee shall file claims with the person or persons authorized to 
accept service for the public entity, public school or public employee as set forth in the Arizona rules of 
civil procedure within one hundred eighty days after the cause of action accrues.”); id. § 12-401 (“Actions 
against counties shall be brought in the county sued unless several counties are defendants, when it may be 
brought in any one of the counties . . . .  Actions against public officers shall be brought in the county in 
which the officer, or one of several officers, holds office.”). 
4 ARK. CONST. art. 5V, § 20 (“The State of Arkansas shall never be made defendant in any of her courts.”); 
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 19-10-201–223, 21-5-701–708, 6-82-501–507 (establishing a claims commission for 
the hearing and adjudication of claims against the state of Arkansas, its agencies, and its institutions). 
 




5 CAL. CONST. art. III, § 5 (“Suits may be brought against the State in such manner and in such courts as 
shall be directed by law.”); CAL. GOV. CODE §§ 815–996.6 (California Tort Claims Act); CAL. GOV. CODE 
§ 945 (“A public entity may sue and be sued”); see id. § 955 (“The proper court for trial of actions against 
the State for the taking or damaging of private property for public use is a court of competent jurisdiction in 
the county in which the property is situate.”); id. § 955.2 (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
where the State is named as a defendant in any action or proceeding for death or injury to person or 
personal property and the injury or the injury causing death occurred within this State, the proper court for 
the trial of the action is a court of competent jurisdiction in the county where the injury occurred or where 
the injury causing death occurred.”). 
6 COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-104 (“Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the governing 
body of a public entity, by resolution, may waive the immunity granted in section 24-10-106 for the types 
of injuries described in the resolution. Any such waiver may be withdrawn by the governing body by 
resolution.”); id. § 24-10-106 (“This section provides for partial waiver of immunity for tort actions against 
the state.”); COLO. R. CIV. P. 98 (noting that actions against a public officer “shall be tried in the county 
where the claim, or some part thereof, arose”).  
7 CONN. CONST. art. XI, § 4 (“Claims against the State shall be resolved in such manner as may be provided 
by law.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 4-159(c), (e) (“The General Assembly may grant the claimant permission 
to sue the state under the provisions of this section when the General Assembly deems it just and equitable 
and believes the claim to present an issue of law or fact under which the state, were it a private person, 
could be liable. . . . The review by the General Assembly of claims submitted to it by the Office of the 
Claims Commissioner under this section shall be conducted in accordance with such procedures as the 
General Assembly may prescribe.”); id. § 4-160(a) (“Whenever the Claims Commissioner deems it just and 
equitable, the Claims Commissioner may authorize suit against the state on any claim which, in the opinion 
of the Claims Commissioner, presents an issue of law or fact under which the state, were it a private 
person, could be liable.”); id. § 4-160(d) (“The claimant shall bring such action against the state as party 
defendant in the judicial district in which the claimant resides or, if the claimant is not a resident of this 
state, in the judicial district of Hartford or in the judicial district in which the claim arose.”); Miller v. Egan, 
265 Conn. 301, 338, 828 A.2d 549, 559 (Conn. 2003) (finding that when plaintiff brings action for money 
damages against state, he must proceed through Office of the Claims Commissioner pursuant to chapter; 
otherwise, the action will be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under doctrine of sovereign 
immunity); LaPaglia v. Conn. Valley Hosp., No. CV175039918S, 2018 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3191, at *20 
(Super. Ct. Oct. 2, 2018) (finding no exception to the application of sovereign immunity to the plaintiff’s 
copyright infringement claim).  
8 DEL. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“Suits may be brought against the State, according to such regulations as shall be 
made by law.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4001–05, 4010–13; id. tit. 18, § 6511 (“The defense of 
sovereignty is waived and cannot and will not be asserted as to any risk or loss covered by the state 
insurance coverage program, whether same be covered by commercially procured insurance or by self-
insurance, and every commercially procured insurance contract shall contain a provision to this effect, 
where appropriate.”).  
9 D.C. CODE § 2-359.04 (“Unless otherwise specifically provided by law of the District, the District 
government and every officer, department, agency, or other unit of the District government shall not raise 
the defense of sovereign immunity in the courts of the District in an action based upon a written 
procurement contract executed on behalf of the District government.”); id. § 2-402 (“The Mayor of the 
District of Columbia is empowered to settle, in his discretion, claims and suits, either at law or in equity, 
against the District of Columbia whenever the cause of action . . . [a]rises out of the negligence or wrongful 
act . . . [or] [a]rises out of the existence of facts and circumstances which place the claim or suit within the 
doctrines and principles of law decided by the courts in the District of Columbia or by the Supreme Court 
of the United States to be controlling in the District of Columbia. ”). 
10 FLA. CONST. art. X, § 13 (“Provision may be made by general law for bringing suit against the state as to 
all liabilities now existing or hereafter originating.”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28 (“In accordance with s. 13, 
Art. X of the State Constitution, the state, for itself and for its agencies or subdivisions, hereby waives 
sovereign immunity for liability for torts, but only to the extent specified in this act.”); id. (noting that the 
action shall be heard in the county where the property is located or where the cause of action accrued. If it’s 
 




an action against a state university, a county where the university’s main campus is location or where the 
cause of action accrued).  
11 GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. IX (“The General Assembly may waive the state’s sovereign immunity from 
suit by enacting a State Tort Claims Act . . . The state’s defense of sovereign immunity is hereby waived as 
to any action ex contractu for the breach of any written contract now existing or hereafter entered into by 
the state or its departments and agencies. . . . [the state] may be subject to suit and may be liable for injuries 
and damages caused by the negligent performance of, or negligent failure to perform, their ministerial 
functions and may be liable for injuries and damages if they act with actual malice or with actual intent to 
cause injury in the performance of their official functions. . . . No waiver of sovereign immunity under this 
Paragraph shall be construed as a waiver of any immunity provided to the state or its departments, agencies, 
officers, or employees by the United States Constitution.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-21-1 (“The defense of 
sovereign immunity is waived as to any action ex contractu for the breach of any written contract existing 
on April 12, 1982, or thereafter entered into by the state, departments and agencies of the state, and state 
authorities.”); id. § 50-21-23 (“The state waives its sovereign immunity for the torts of state officers and 
employees while acting within the scope of their official duties or employment and shall be liable for such 
torts in the same manner as a private individual or entity would be liable under like circumstances . . . [t]he 
state shall have no liability for losses resulting from conduct on the part of state officers or employees 
which was not within the scope of their official duties or employment.”) id. § 50-21-28 (providing that 
contract claims shall be heard in the Superior Court of Fulton County and tort actions shall be heard in the 
state or superior court in the county where the tort occurred.). 
12 HAW. REV. STAT. § 662-2 (“The State hereby waives its immunity for liability for the torts of its 
employees and shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like 
circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages.”); id. § 662-3 
(“The circuit courts of the State and, except as otherwise provided by statute or rule, the state district courts 
shall have original jurisdiction of all tort actions on claims against the State, for money damages, accruing 
on and after July 1, 1957, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent 
or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the State while acting within the scope of the employee’s 
office or employment.”). 
13 IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 18 (“The governor, secretary of state, and attorney general shall constitute a 
board of examiners, with power to examine all claims against the state . . . [a]nd no claim against the state, 
except salaries and compensation of officers fixed by law, shall be passed upon by the legislature without 
first having been considered and acted upon by said board.”); IDAHO CODE § 6-903 (“Except as otherwise 
provided in this act, every governmental entity is subject to liability for money damages arising out of its 
negligent or otherwise wrongful acts or omissions and those of its employees acting within the course and 
scope of their employment or duties[.]”); id. § 6-915 (“Actions against the state or its employee shall be 
brought in the county in which the cause of action arose or in Ada County.”).  
14 ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 4 (“Except as the General Assembly may provide by law, sovereign immunity in 
this State is abolished.”); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/8 (establishing exclusive jurisdiction in Court of 
Claims for state-law, contract, and tort claims against state). 
15 IND. CONST. art. IV, § 24 (“Provision may be made, by general law, for bringing suit against the State; 
but no special law authorizing such suit to be brought, or making compensation to any person claiming 
damages against the State, shall ever be passed.”); IND. CODE § 34-13-1-1 (“Any person having a claim 
against the State arising out of an express or implied contract may bring suit within ten (10) years after 
accrual of the claim[.]”); id. § 34-13-2-3 (“This chapter shall not be construed as[] a waiver of the Eleventh 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, consent by the state of Indiana or its employees to be 
sued in any federal court, or consent to be sued in any state court beyond the boundaries of Indiana.”); id. § 
34-13-3-1 (“This chapter applies only to a claim or suit in tort.”).  
16 See IOWA CODE § 699.5 (“A suit shall not be permitted for a claim under this chapter unless the attorney 
general has made final disposition of the claim. However, if the attorney general does not make final 
disposition of a claim within six months after the claim is made in writing to the director of the department 
of management, the claimant may, by notice in writing, withdraw the claim from consideration and begin 
suit”); id. § 699.13 (Claims against the state are barred unless notice is provided in writing within two years 
of the claim.); see id. § 699.2 (defining “claim” as “[a]ny claim against the state of Iowa for money only, 
 




on account of damage to or loss of property or on account of personal injury or death, caused by the 
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the state while acting within the scope of the 
employee’s office or employment, under circumstances where the state, if a private person, would be liable 
to the claimant for such damage, loss, injury, or death.”); id. § 699.6 (“Judgments in the district courts in 
suits under this chapter shall be subject to appeal to the supreme court of the state in the same manner and 
to the same extent as other judgments of the district courts.”); id. §§ 25.1, 25.2 (providing for consideration 
of specified claims against the state by department of management and state appeal board). 
17 See KAN. STAT. ANN. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-6103(a) (“Subject to the limitations of this act, each 
governmental entity shall be liable for damages caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any 
of its employees while acting within the scope of their employment under circumstances where the 
governmental entity, if a private person, would be liable under the laws of this state”); id. § 61-2802 
(governing procedure for claims filed in the district court against “any officers of the state, or any 
subdivisions thereof”); id. § 46-907 et seq. (providing for consideration of claims against state by 
legislature’s joint committee on special claims against the state); id. § 46-919 (“A recommendation by the 
joint committee on special claims against the state that an award be made to any claimant shall not be 
construed as a waiver of immunity from liability on the part of the state or any agency thereof nor shall 
such recommendation impose liability upon the state or any agency thereof in the amount recommended.”).  
18 KY. CONST. § 231 (“The General Assembly may, by law, direct in what manner and in what courts suits 
may be brought against the Commonwealth.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45A.245 (“Any person, firm or 
corporation, having a lawfully authorized written contract with the Commonwealth at the time of or after 
June 21, 1974, may bring an action against the Commonwealth on the contract, including but not limited to 
actions either for breach of contracts or for enforcement of contracts or for both.  Any such action shall be 
brought in the Franklin Circuit Court and shall be tried by the court sitting without a jury”).  
19 LA. CONST. art. X, § 10(A)–(B) (“Neither the state, a state agency, nor a political subdivision shall be 
immune from suit and liability in contract or for injury to person or property. . . . The legislature may 
authorize other suits against the state, a state agency, or a political subdivision. A measure authorizing suit 
shall waive immunity from suit and liability.”); LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:5106 (“No suit against the state or a 
state agency or political subdivision shall be instituted in any court other than a Louisiana state court.”).  
20ME. STAT. tit. 14, § 8103 (“Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, all governmental entities 
shall be immune from suit on any and all tort claims seeking recovery of damages. When immunity is 
removed by this chapter, any claim for damages shall be brought in accordance with the terms of this 
chapter.”); id. § 8104-A (“Except as specified in section 8104-B, a governmental entity is liable for 
property damage, bodily injury or death in the following instances. . . . ownership; maintenance or use of 
vehicles, machinery and equipment . . . construction, operation or maintenance of any public building . . . 
[d]ischarge of pollutants . . . [and] [r]oad construction, street cleaning or repair.”); id. § 8106 (“The 
Superior Court shall have original jurisdiction over all claims permitted under this chapter”).  
21 MD. CONST. art. V, § 6 (“It shall be the duty of the Clerk of the Court of Appeals and the Clerks of any 
intermediate courts of appeal, respectively, whenever a case shall be brought into said Courts, in which the 
State is a party or has interest, immediately to notify the Attorney General thereof.”); MD. CODE ANN., 
STATE GOV’T §12-104 (“Subject to the exclusions and limitations in this subtitle and notwithstanding any 
other provision of law, the immunity of the State and of its units is waived as to a tort action, in a court of 
the State[.]”); id. § 12-201 (“Except as otherwise expressly provided by a law of the State, the State, its 
officers, and its units may not raise the defense of sovereign immunity in a contract action, in a court of the 
State, based on a written contract that an official or employee executed for the State or 1 of its units while 
the official or employee was acting within the scope of the authority of the official or employee.”). 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 2 (“Public employers shall be liable for injury or loss of property or personal 
injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any public employee while acting 
within the scope of his office or employment[.]”); id. § 12 (“Claims against the commonwealth, except as 
otherwise expressly provided in this chapter or by any general or special provision of law, may be enforced 
in the superior court.”).  
23 MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 22 (“Procedures for the examination and adjustment of claims against the state 
shall be prescribed by law.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1407(1) (“Except as otherwise provided in this act, 
a governmental agency is immune from tort liability if the governmental agency is engaged in the exercise 
 




or discharge of a governmental function.”); id. §§ 15.361–15.369 (“AN ACT to provide protection to 
employees who report a violation or suspected violation of state, local, or federal law”); id. § 15.361(a) 
(“Employee includes a person employed by the state or a political subdivision of the state except state 
classified civil service.”); id. § 600.6419(1)(a) (establishing jurisdiction in court of claims over “any claim 
or demand, statutory or constitutional, liquidated or unliquidated, ex contractu or ex delicto, or any demand 
for monetary, equitable, or declaratory relief or any demand for an extraordinary writ against the state or 
any of its departments or officers,” subject to specified exceptions). 
24 MINN. STAT. § 1.05 (waiving sovereign immunity for violations of certain federal statutes and allowing 
aggrieved party to bring action against the state in federal court or in any other court of competent 
jurisdiction); id. § 3.736 subdiv. 1 (“The state will pay compensation for injury to or loss of property or 
personal injury or death caused by an act or omission of an employee of the state while acting within the 
scope of office or employment . . . .”); id. subdiv. 2 (“[Such] claim shall be brought under this section as a 
civil action in the courts of the state.”); id. subdiv. 4 & 4a (establishing limits on monetary liability of the 
state); id. subdiv. 8 (“A state agency . . . may procure insurance against liability of the agency and its 
employees for damages resulting from the torts of the agency and its employees. Procurement of the 
insurance is a waiver of the limits of governmental liability under subdivisions 4 and 4a only to the extent 
that valid and collectible insurance . . . exceeds those limits and covers the claim.”). 
25 MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-5 (“Notwithstanding the immunity granted in Section 11-46-3, or the 
provisions of any other law to the contrary, the immunity of the state and its political subdivisions from 
claims for money damages arising out of the torts of such governmental entities and the torts of their 
employees while acting within the course and scope of their employment is hereby waived . . . only to the 
extent of the maximum amount of liability provided for in Section 11-46-15.”); id. § 11-46-13(2) (“The 
venue for any suit filed under the provisions of this chapter against the state or its employees shall be in the 
county in which the act, omission or event on which the liability phase of the action is based, occurred or 
took place.”). 
26 MO. REV. STAT. § 537.600 (“Such sovereign or governmental tort immunity as existed at common law in 
this state . . . shall remain in full force and effect; except that, the immunity of the public entity from 
liability and suit for compensatory damages for negligent acts or omissions is hereby expressly waived[.]”); 
id. § 508.060 (“All actions whatsoever against any county shall be commenced in the circuit court of such 
county”); see id. § 508.010 (limited the venue for tort suits within the state). 
27 MONT. CONST. art II, § 18 (“The state, counties, cities, towns, and all other local governmental entities 
shall have no immunity from suit for injury to a person or property, except as may be specifically provided 
by law by a 2/3 vote of each house of the legislature.”); id. art. III, § 39 (listing express limitations on the 
legislature’s powers, not limiting the power to makes laws waiving sovereign immunity); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 2-9-102 (“Every governmental entity is subject to liability for its torts and those of its employees 
acting within the scope of their employment or duties whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary 
function.”); id. § 2-9-105 (“The state and other governmental entities are immune from exemplary and 
punitive damages.”); id. § 2-9-311 (“The district court shall have jurisdiction over any action brought under 
parts 1 through 3 of this chapter”).  
28 NEB. CONST. art V, § 22 (“The state may sue and be sued, and the Legislature shall provide by law in 
what manner and in what courts suits shall be brought.”); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 81-8,209–81-8,239.11 
(noting that the state shall be liable for “damage to or loss of property or on account of personal injury or 
death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the state, while acting within 
the scope of his or her office or employment, under circumstances in which the state, if a private person, 
would be liable to the claimant for such damage, loss, injury, or death”); id. § 81-8,214 (“The district court, 
sitting without a jury, shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear, determine, and render judgment on any suit 
or tort claim.”). 
29 NEV. CONST. art IV, § 22 (“Provision may be made by general law for bringing suit against the State as 
to all liabilities originating after the adoption of this Constitution”); N.R.S. §§ 41.031 through 41.0337 
(Nevada Tort Claims Act); id. § 41.031 (“Nevada hereby waives its immunity from liability and action and 
consents to have its liability determined in accordance with the same rules of law as are applied to civil 
actions against natural persons, except as otherwise provided.”); id. (“An action against the State of Nevada 
must be filed in the county where the cause or some part thereof arose or in Carson City.”). 
 




30 N.H. REV. STAT. § 541-B:1IIa (defining a “claim” as “any request for monetary relief for either [b]odily 
injury, personal injury, death or property damages caused by the failure of the state or state officers, 
trustees, officials, employees, or members of the general court to follow the appropriate standard of care 
when that duty was owed to the person making the claim, including any right of action for money damages 
which either expressly or by implication arises from any law, unless another remedy for such claim is 
expressly provided by law; or [p]roperty damages suffered by a state employee or official during the 
performance of that employee's or official's duties while on state business where compensation is 
appropriate under principles of equity and good conscience.”); id. § 541-B:9-a (“When a claim filed 
pursuant to this chapter is against both the state and an agent, official or employee of the state, the court 
shall determine whether the state is responsible for the actions of the agent, employee or official. If the 
court determines that the state is responsible for the actions of the agent, employee or official; the agent, 
employee or official shall be dismissed as a defendant and the plaintiff shall proceed solely against the 
state.”); id. § 541-B-9 (the board of claims and the superior court share jurisdiction depending on amount of 
claim); id. § 491:8 (“The superior court shall have jurisdiction to enter judgment against the state of New 
Hampshire founded upon any express or implied contract with the state, including specific performance and 
other equitable remedies that are not limited to money damages.”). 
31 N.J.S.A. § 59:2-2 (“A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of a 
public employee within the scope of his employment in the same manner and to the same extent as a 
private individual under like circumstances.”); id. § 59:13-3 (“The State of New Jersey hereby waives its 
sovereign immunity from liability  arising out of an express contract or a contract implied in fact and 
consents to have the same determined in accordance with the rules of law applicable to individuals and 
corporations; provided, however, that there shall be no recovery against the State for punitive or 
consequential damages arising out of contract nor shall there be any recovery against the State for claims 
based  upon implied warranties or upon contracts implied in law.”); id. § 59:9-1 (“Tort claims under this act 
shall be heard by a judge sitting without a jury or a judge and jury where appropriate demand therefor is 
made in accordance with the rules governing the courts of the State of New Jersey.”); id. § 59:13-4 (“The 
courts of competent jurisdiction of the State of New Jersey shall have jurisdiction over all claims against 
the State for breach of a contract, either express or implied in fact.”). 
32 N.M.R.A. §§ 41-4-1 through 41-4-12 (granting immunity from tort liability except for claims resulting 
from injury caused by law enforcement officers and the negligent operation or maintenance of motor 
vehicles, aircraft and watercraft; buildings, public parks, machinery, equipment and furnishings; airports; 
public utilities; medical facilities; health care providers; or highways and streets); id. § 28-22-3 (“A person 
whose free exercise of religion has been restricted by a violation of the New Mexico Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain 
appropriate relief against a government agency”); id. § 41-4-1 (“A. Exclusive original jurisdiction for any 
claim under the Tort Claims Act [41-4-1 NMSA 1978] shall be in the district courts of New Mexico. 
Appeals may be taken as provided by law. B. Venue for any claim against the state or its public employees, 
pursuant to the Tort Claims Act [41-4-1 NMSA 1978], shall be in the district court for the county in which 
a plaintiff resides, or in which the cause of action arose, or in Santa Fe county. Venue for all other claims 
pursuant to the Tort Claims Act, shall be in the county in which the principal offices of the governing body 
of the local public body are located.”). 
33 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 18b (“The legislature may provide for the manner of trial of actions and 
proceedings involving claims against the state”); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8 (“The state hereby waives its 
immunity from liability and action and hereby assumes liability and consents to have the same determined 
in accordance with the same rules of law as applied to actions in the supreme court against individuals or 
corporations, provided the claimant complies with the limitations of this article.”); id. § 9(2) (Court of 
Claims has jurisdiction “[t]o hear and determine a claim of any person, corporation or municipality against 
the state for the appropriation of any real or personal property or any interest therein, for the breach of 
contract, express or implied, or for the torts of its officers or employees while acting as such officers or 
employees, providing the claimant complies with the limitations of this article.”); Morell v. 
Balasubramanian, 514 N.E.2d 1101 (N.Y. 1987) (State immune when performing governmental act 
(legislating, judging, or making discretionary decisions) as opposed to proprietary act (act substitutes for or 
supplement traditionally private enterprises).); see Student Lifeline, Inc. v. State of N.Y., 847 N.Y.S.2d 905, 
 




905 (Ct. Cl. 2007) (finding that the court is “divested of jurisdiction over” copyright infringement aspect of 
plaintiff’s claims). 
34 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (“The North Carolina Industrial Commission is hereby constituted a court for 
the purpose of hearing and passing upon tort claims against the State Board of Education, the Board of 
Transportation, and all other departments, institutions and agencies of the State.”). 
35 N.D. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“All courts shall be open, and every man for any injury done him in his lands, 
goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due process of law, and right and justice administered 
without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the state in such manner, in such courts, and in 
such cases, as the legislative assembly may, by law, direct.”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12.02 (“An action 
respecting the title to property, or arising upon contract, may be brought in the district court against the 
state the same as against a private person.”); id. § 32.12.2-02 (“The state may only be held liable for money 
damages for an injury proximately caused by the negligence or wrongful act or omission of a state 
employee acting within the employee’s scope of employment under circumstances in which the employee 
would be personally liable to a claimant in accordance with the laws of this state, or an injury caused from 
some condition or use of tangible property under circumstances in which the state, if a private person, 
would be liable to the claimant.”); id. § 32-12.2.10 (“This chapter does not waive the state’s immunity 
under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution in any manner, and this chapter may not 
be construed to abrogate that immunity.”). 
36 OH. CONST. art. I, § 16 (“Suits may be brought against the state, in such courts and in such manner, as 
may be provided by law.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.02 (subject to exceptions, “[t]he state hereby 
waives its immunity from liability . . .  and consents to be sued, and have its liability determined, in the 
court of claims created in this chapter in accordance with the same rules of law applicable to suits between 
private parties . . . .”); id. § 2743.03(A)(1) (court of claims has “original jurisdiction of all civil actions 
against the state permitted by the waiver of immunity contained in section 2743.02 of the Revised Code.”). 
37 OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 152.1 (“A. The State of Oklahoma does hereby adopt the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity. The state, its political subdivisions, and all of their employees acting within the scope of their 
employment, whether performing governmental or proprietary functions, shall be immune from liability for 
torts. B. The state, only to the extent and in the manner provided in this act, waives its immunity and that of 
its political subdivisions. In so waiving immunity, it is not the intent of the state to waive any rights under 
the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution.”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 153 (“The state or a 
political subdivision shall be liable for loss resulting from its torts or the torts of its employees acting 
within the scope of their employment subject to the limitations and exceptions specified in The 
Governmental Tort Claims Act and only where the state or political subdivision, if a private person or 
entity, would be liable for money damages under the laws of this state.”); id. § 163(A) (“Venue for actions 
against the state within the scope of this act shall be either the county in which the cause of action arose or 
Oklahoma County, except that a constitutional state agency, board or commission may, upon resolution 
filed with the Secretary of State, designate another situs for venue in lieu of Oklahoma County.”). 
38 ORE. CONST. art. IV, § 24 (“Provision may be made by general law, for bringing suit against the State, as 
to all liabilities originating after, or existing at the time of the adoption of this Constitution; but no special 
act authorizeing [sic] such suit to be brought, or making compensation to any person claiming damages 
against the State, shall ever be passed.”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30.265 (waiver for torts); id. § 30.320 
(waiver for contracts); id. § 30.310 (“A suit or action may be maintained by the State of Oregon or any 
county, incorporated city, school district or other public corporation of like character in this state, in its 
corporate name, upon a cause of suit or action accruing to it in its corporate character, and not otherwise, in 
the following cases: (1) Upon a contract made with the public corporation. (2) Upon a liability prescribed 
by law in favor of the public corporation. (3) To recover a penalty or forfeiture given to the public 
corporation. (4) To recover damages for injury to the corporate rights or property of the public 
corporation.”). 
39 PA. CONST. art. I, § 11 (“Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts 
and in such cases as the Legislature may by law direct.”); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8521(b) (“Nothing 
contained in this subchapter shall be construed to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in 
Federal courts guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”); id. § 
8522 (list of exemptions from sovereign immunity); id. § 8523 (“Actions for claims against a 
 




Commonwealth party may be brought in and only in a county in which the principal or local office of the 
Commonwealth party is located or in which the cause of action arose or where a transaction or occurrence 
took place out of which the cause of action arose. If venue is obtained in the Twelfth Judicial District 
(Dauphin County) solely because the principal office of the Commonwealth party is located within it, any 
judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County shall have the power to transfer the action to any 
appropriate county where venue would otherwise lie.”). 
40 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-31-1(a) (The state of Rhode Island and any political subdivision thereof, including 
all cities and towns, shall . . . hereby be liable in all actions of tort in the same manner as a private 
individual or corporation . . . .”); see Rosen v. Chang, 758 F. Supp. 799, 804 (D.R.I. 1991) (“Both federal 
and state courts have interpreted R.I.G.L. § 9–31–1 as a waiver of the State’s Eleventh Amendment 
immunity to tort suits in federal court.”). 
41 S.C. CONST. ANN. art. XVII, § 2 (“The General Assembly may direct, by law, in what manner claims 
against the State may be established and adjusted.”); S.C. CODE ANN. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-40 (“The 
State, an agency, a political subdivision, and a governmental entity are liable for their torts in the same 
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, subject to the limitations 
upon liability and damages, and exemptions from liability and damages, contained herein.”); id. § 15-78-60 
(exceptions to waiver of immunity); id. § 15-78-100(b) (“Jurisdiction for any action brought under this 
chapter is in the circuit court and brought in the county in which the act or omission occurred.”). 
42 S.D. CONST. article III, § 27 (“The Legislature shall direct by law in what manner and in what courts 
suits may be brought against the state.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-32-8 (“In any and all actions to 
determine adverse claims to real or personal property, or involving the possession of real or personal 
property, or to foreclose mortgages or other liens upon real or personal property, or to partition the same, 
the state of South Dakota may be sued and made defendant in the courts of this state.); id. § 21-32-16 (“To 
the extent such liability insurance is purchased pursuant to § 21-32-15 and to the extent coverage is 
afforded thereunder, the state shall be deemed to have waived the common law doctrine of sovereign 
immunity and consented to suit in the same manner that any other party may be sued.”); see also id. § 21-
32–7 (providing for advisory proceeding before commissioner). 
43 TENN. CONST. art. I, § 17 (“Suits may be brought against the State in such manner and in such courts as 
the Legislature may by law direct.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 9-8-307(a)(1) (“[The Tennessee Claims 
Commission] has exclusive jurisdiction to determine all monetary claims against the state based on the acts 
or omissions of ‘state employees,’” for certain enumerated claims), (f) (“No language contained in this 
chapter is intended to be construed as a waiver of the immunity of the state of Tennessee from suit in 
federal courts guaranteed by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”); see id. § 
20-13-102 (“No court in the state shall have any power, jurisdiction or authority to entertain any suit 
against the state, or against any officer of the state acting by authority of the state, with a view to reach the 
state, its treasury, funds or property, and all such suits shall be dismissed as to the state or such officers, on 
motion, plea or demurrer of the law officer of the state, or counsel employed for the state.”). 
44 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.021 (“A governmental unit in the state is liable for: (1) 
property damage, personal injury, and death proximately caused by the wrongful act or omission or the 
negligence of an employee acting within his scope of employment if: (A) the property damage, personal 
injury, or death arises from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or motor-driven equipment; and 
(B) the employee would be personally liable to the claimant according to Texas law; and (2) personal injury 
and death so caused by a condition or use of tangible personal or real property if the governmental unit 
would, were it a private person, be liable to the claimant according to Texas law.”); id. § 101.102 (“A suit 
under this chapter shall be brought in state court in the county in which the cause of action or a part of the 
cause of action arises.”); TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.034 (“In order to preserve the legislature’s interest in 
managing state fiscal matters through the appropriations process, a statute shall not be construed as a 
waiver of sovereign immunity unless the waiver is effected by clear and unambiguous language. In a 
statute, the use of ‘person,’ as defined by Section 311.005 to include governmental entities, does not 
indicate legislative intent to waive sovereign immunity unless the context of the statute indicates no other 
reasonable construction. Statutory prerequisites to a suit, including the provision of notice, are 
jurisdictional requirements in all suits against a governmental entity.”); TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 271.152 
(“A local governmental entity that is authorized by statute or the constitution to enter into a contract and 
 




that enters into a contract subject to this subchapter waives sovereign immunity to suit for the purpose of 
adjudicating a claim for breach of the contract, subject to the terms and conditions of this subchapter.”); 
Univ. of Hous. Sys. v. Jim Olive Photography, 580 S.W.3d 360, 366 (Tex. App. 2019) (“Texas has not 
waived sovereign (governmental) immunity in the Texas Tort Claims Act for copyright infringement by a 
governmental unit.”). 
45 UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-301 (“Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is waived as to any 
contractual obligation” and enumerated state-law claims); id. § 63G-7-403 (action may be brought in the 
district court). 
46 12 V.S.A. § 5601(a) (” The State of Vermont shall be liable for injury to persons or property or loss of 
life caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the State while acting within the 
scope of employment, under the same circumstances, in the same manner, and to the same extent as a 
private person would be liable to the claimant except that the claimant shall not have the right to levy 
execution on any property of the State to satisfy any judgment. The Superior Courts of the State shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction of any actions brought hereunder.”). 
47 VA. ST. §§ 8.01-195.3 (“Subject to the provisions of this article, the Commonwealth shall be liable for 
claims for money only accruing on or after July 1, 1982, and any transportation district shall be liable for 
claims for money only accruing on or after July 1, 1986, on account of damage to or loss of property or 
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee while acting 
within the scope of his employment under circumstances where the Commonwealth or transportation 
district, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant for such damage, loss, injury or death.”); Va. 
Code Ann. § 8.01-195.4 (“The general district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear, 
determine, and render judgment on any claim against the Commonwealth or any transportation district 
cognizable under this article when the amount of the claim does not exceed $4,500, exclusive of interest 
and any attorneys’ fees. Jurisdiction shall be concurrent with the circuit courts when the amount of the 
claim exceeds $4,500 but does not exceed $25,000, exclusive of interest and such attorneys’ fees. 
Jurisdiction of claims when the amount exceeds $25,000 shall be limited to the circuit courts of the 
Commonwealth.”). 
48 WASH. CONST. art. II, § 26 (“The legislature shall direct by law, in what manner, and in what courts, suits 
may be brought against the state.”); REV. CODE WASH. (ARCW) § 4.92.010 (“Any person or corporation 
having any claim against the state of Washington shall have a right of action against the state in the 
superior court.”). 
49 W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 35 (“The State of West Virginia shall never be made defendant in any court of 
law or equity, except the State of West Virginia, including any subdivision thereof, or any municipality 
therein, or any officer, agent, or employee thereof, may be made defendant in any garnishment or 
attachment proceeding, as garnishee or suggestee.”). 
50 WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 27 (The legislature shall direct by law in what manner and in what courts suits 
may be brought against the state.); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.80(4) (“No suit may be brought against any 
volunteer fire company organized under ch. 213, political corporation, governmental subdivision or any 
agency thereof for the intentional torts of its officers, officials, agents or employees nor may any suit be 
brought against such corporation, subdivision or agency or volunteer fire company or against its officers, 
officials, agents or employees for acts done in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial or quasi-
judicial functions.”); id. § 893.82(3) (“[N]o civil action or civil proceeding may be brought against any 
state officer, employee or agent for or on account of any act growing out of or committed in the course of 
the discharge of the officer’s, employee’s or agent’s duties . . . unless within 120 days of the event causing 
the injury, damage or death giving rise to the civil action or civil proceeding, the claimant in the action or 
proceeding serves upon the attorney general written notice of a claim stating the time, date, location and the 
circumstances of the event giving rise to the claim for the injury, damage or death and the names of persons 
involved, including the name of the state officer, employee or agent involved.”); see Holytz v. City of 
Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 39, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962) ( “[S]o far as governmental responsibility for torts is 
concerned, the rule is liability - the exception is immunity.”); Energy Complexes v. Eau Claire County, 152 
Wis. 2d 453, 449 N.W.2d 35 (1989) (finding that the section 893.80(4) immunity provision does not apply 
to breach of contract suits). 
 




51 WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (“Suits may be brought against the state in such manner and in such courts as the 
legislature may by law direct.”); WYO. STAT. § 1-39-104(a) (“Any immunity in actions based on a contract 
entered into by a governmental entity is waived except to the extent provided by the contract if the contract 
was within the powers granted to the entity and was properly executed and except as provided in section 1-
39-120(b)”); id. § 1-39-105–112 (waiving immunity for actions arising from the negligent operation or 
maintenance of any motor vehicle, aircraft or watercraft; any building, recreation area or public park; 
airports; public utilities; medical facilities; and the negligence of health care providers or peace officers); 
id. § 1-39-117 (“Original and exclusive jurisdiction for any claim filed in state court under this act shall be 
in the district courts of Wyoming.”).  
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